In March 1879, the Anglo-Zulu War was well into its third month, and two of the three British columns advancing into Zululand were stalled–one defeated at Isandlwana, the other surrounded and under siege at Eshowe. On March 20, Colonel Henry Evelyn Wood, commanding the only British force still capable of offensive action in Zululand, received a letter from the overall British commander, Lieutenant General Frederic Augustus Thesiger, the second Baron Chelmsford. Chelmsford wished to relieve the column at Eshowe, and he wanted Wood to demonstrate in his area to draw off some of the strength of a Zulu impi (army) that Chelmsford thought was gathering to attack Eshowe. That request gave Colonel Wood and his cavalry commander, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Redvers Buller, an excuse to carry out an operation that they had been considering ever since they established their camp at Khambula. Wood’s goal was the destruction of the stronghold of the abaQulusi, a Nguni clan allied with the Zulus, located on a mountain 20 miles to the southeast, known as Hlobane (pronounced’shlo-BAH-nyeh’).

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At the outset of the Anglo-Zulu War, the British governor of Cape Colony and high commissioner for native affairs in South Africa, Sir Henry Edward Bartle Frere, and his military commander, General Chelmsford, had formulated their plan for the invasion of Zululand. Chelmsford knew that the country was vast, and occupation was out of the question. It would seem that the only effective way for the British forces to gain a victory would be to advance on the Zulu capital of Ulundi, attempt to capture their king, Cetshwayo, and smash any intercepting Zulu izimpi (armies) as they went. With that plan in mind, Chelmsford divided his army into five columns. The left, center and right columns would advance on Ulundi from three different directions. A fourth column could be held in reserve to protect Natal from any Zulu surprise attack. A fifth force, the 41st Regiment under Colonel Hugh Rowlands, V.C., would camp at Luneville in the Transvaal, to guard against possible intervention either by the Pedi tribe under Sekhukhune–a known ally of Cetshwayo–or by the Boers. Chelmsford would go with the center column. On January 11, 1879, Chelmsford put his plan into operation as British troops crossed the Buffalo River at Rorke’s Drift and entered the land of the Zulu.

The British invasion forces were soon in deep trouble. Informed by his scouts of the three-pronged British offensive, King Cetshwayo committed some of his available amabutho (regiments) to deal with each of the British forces, but kept most of them concentrated in a single, highly mobile 20,000-man impi under the joint command of inKhosi (princes) Ntshingwayo kaMahole and Mavumengwana, with which he intended to engage each of the slow-moving enemy prongs in turn. On January 22, 1879, a sizable part of Chelmsford’s central column and part of Colonel A.R.E. Durnford’s No. 3 Column ran into Cetshwayo’s main impi at Isandlwana and was annihilated–858 British and 471 native troops were wiped out. With his entire offensive thrown off balance, Chelmsford had to beat a hasty retreat back to Natal.

On the same day of the Isandlwana debacle, Colonel Charles Knight Pearson’s No. 1 Column, working its way along the coast, repulsed a poorly coordinated attack by a Zulu impi at Nyezane. On January 28, however, Pearson learned of Isandlwana and, left to his own devices, dug in at Eshowe for what became a protracted siege.

That left only one active British force in Zululand–No. 4 Column in the northwest, commanded by Colonel Wood–and Wood, like Pearson, chose to take up a very good defensive position on the crest of a hill at Khambula. For the time being, it seemed as if the invasion had come to a halt while Lord Chelmsford gathered his thoughts. In the meantime, he transferred most of Rowlands’ column to Wood’s command, along with the Edendale Troop, Natal Native Horse and 1st Squadron, Mounted Infantry, from what remained of Chelmsford’s center force. Then on March 20, Chelmsford made his request to Wood for a diversion, and Wood prepared to move against the abaQulusi encamped at Hlobane.

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