Battle of Big Bethel: Crucial Clash in Early Civil War Virginia
J. Michael Cobb, Edward Hicks and Wythe Holt; Savas Beatie
The “battle” near Big Bethel Church on June 10, 1861, is known, if it is known at all, primarily as a series of ephemeral firsts that provide fodder for quiz nights at Civil War Round Tables. No less an authority than Bruce Catton referred to the engagement as “an unremarkable little fight.” So why have three reputable scholars written a book offering “a new and more intricate picture of the battle itself plus a more contextualized social and political interpretation of its meaning?”
In the course of this carefully crafted book, their reasoning becomes clear. Although barely 5,500 troops faced each other and casualties on both sides numbered barely 100—with only 19 fatalities—the authors show that Big Bethel’s importance transcended its size and lethality. The authors not only display a thorough knowledge of the unique geography of the peninsula between the York and James rivers they take advantage of good local primary sources to make a strong case that this first planned land engagement of organized combat forces adumbrated, in many ways, the larger, bloodier clashes that soon would follow.
A neophyte and indifferently led Union force of about 4,400 men was enticed out of camps around Fort Monroe to attack a well-entrenched and capablyled neophyte Confederate force of about 1,400 men on a hillock beside the shortest road to Richmond. Three unsuccessful and uncoordinated Federal attacks led to a disorganized retreat and sparked a Southern celebration out of all proportion to the victory’s importance. Bravery was evident on both sides, but logistical and tactical acumen were in short supply. The tactical lesson, the authors conclude, is that “carefully designed entrenchments, skillful deployment of their forces, and overwhelming artillery strength enabled a smaller but better commanded Southern contingent to triumph at Bethel.”
The commanders would go on to some fame and much ignominy. Confederate Colonel “Prince” John Bankhead Magruder, who had a fair for the dramatic and a weakness for the bottle, would be shuffled off to Texas by Robert E. Lee. Brig. Gen. Benjamin Butler, who used his political connections to counter his battlefield bungling, held on for most of the war, until Ulysses S. Grant fired him.
Reading reports, letters and newspaper accounts, one might conclude that the fight at Big Bethel equaled Shiloh or Antietam. A combination of friendly fire, poor reconnaissance and intelligence, bad maps and a complicated battle plan helped doom the Federals, and the Rebels failed to follow up on their victory.
The authors claim “Big Bethel demonstrated beyond cavil that the struggle would be intensely pursued and bloody, that Southern arms were steady, capable, and fierce, and that Northern resolve would harden rather than fall away.” Unfortunately, the power of foresight was unavailable to those young men under fire.
Originally published in the April 2014 issue of Civil War Times. To subscribe, click here.
