In 1999, the New York University Department of Journalism solicited nominations for the Top 100 Works of Journalism in the United States in the 20th century. The Vietnam War garnered four entries, including a 1965 "CBS Evening News" report by correspondent Morley Safer involving U.S. Marines in South Vietnam. This entry was nominated by New York University journalism professor and writer Mitchell Stephens, who described his submission as a "report for CBS on atrocities committed by American soldiers on the hamlet of Cam Ne in Vietnam." In his book A History of News, Stephens claims, "The Marines, who faced no resistance, held cigarette lighters to the thatched roofs and proceeded to 'waste' Cam Ne." The film and photos of Cam Ne were widely distributed and are among the most famous images of the Vietnam War. Did Professor Stephens get it right? This article investigates the incident at Cam Ne from the perspectives of both the media and the Marine Corps.

Why Were the Marines at Cam Ne?
After the August 1964 incident in the Gulf of Tonkin between North Vietnamese torpedo boats and U.S. Navy destroyers, President Lyndon B. Johnson ordered airstrikes against North Vietnamese military bases and storage areas. Those attacks were conducted by carrier-based aircraft of the U.S. Navy Seventh Fleet. At the same time, the U.S. Pacific Command activated the 9th Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB), making it a force in readiness, capable of landing as needed on short notice.

The beginning of 1965 was a period of political instability for the government of South Vietnam. Buddhists led anti-government riots in Saigon and Hue. In February, the Viet Cong launched a major attack on the U.S. military base at Pleiku in the Central Highlands. Again the United States launched retaliatory airstrikes against North Vietnam. In this round the United States would launch attacks from the air base at Da Nang to ensure the participation of the South Vietnamese air force. The possibility existed that North Vietnam might respond by launching air attacks against Da Nang. On February 7, the Marine Corps 1st Light Anti-aircraft Missile Battalion was ordered to protect the airfield there. More VC attacks led to more airstrikes against North Vietnam. On March 7, the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered the 9th MEB, which had been off the coast of Da Nang, to come ashore to further protect the airfield. A new phase of the war had begun.

Initially, the Marine intervention was to be limited. The JCS landing order directed that the Marine force "will not, repeat will not, engage in day-to-day actions against the VC." The role of the Marines was to protect the base. The area around Da Nang would be protected by the South Vietnamese armed forces. But the Marines' mission was enlarged as the American troop buildup continued. By April they were patrolling into the densely populated area south of Da Nang. In July, an 85-man VC group reinforced by a 13-man North Vietnamese sapper unit launched a ground and mortar attack on the air base from the area to the south. This enemy force was armed with one 57mm recoilless rifle, four 82mm mortars, grenades and assorted demolition equipment. The base perimeter was penetrated at 0115 hours. Three aircraft were destroyed and three more were damaged. The VC quickly withdrew in the same direction from which they had launched their attack. Although no enemy was confirmed killed by the Marines, blood trails leading away from the airfield were found the following morning.

Marine commanders felt they could not adequately defend the air base if they were unable to patrol farther, and in July their tactical area of responsibility (TAOR) was expanded to include the region south of the Cau Do River, a few miles southwest of Da Nang. On July 12, elements of the 9th Marine Regiment moved into the area and quickly received fire from a VC force coming from the hamlet of Cam Ne 4 (numbered in order to identify it in the complex of six villages of the same name). The Marines pulled back and called for close air support. Marine patrols continued in the area around Cam Ne during July and into August. Almost daily contact was maintained with the village chief to obtain information on the civilian population. American intelligence considered Cam Ne a well-known VC stronghold and its residents long-time Communist sympathizers, dating back to the French occupation. On August 3, 1965, Lt. Col. Verle Ludwig, commanding officer of the 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, was ordered to "search out the VC and to destroy them, their positions, and fortifications." One company commander involved in the operation instructed his men "to overcome and destroy" any position, including huts, from which they received fire. As the Marines moved into Cam Ne, the VC withdrew, refusing to fight.

Morley Safer and Cam Ne
The American news media accompanied U.S. forces to Vietnam in 1965. Thirty-three-year-old CBS correspondent Morley Safer, one of the first television newsmen to be permanently assigned to Vietnam, was sent to Da Nang. At the beginning of August, Safer was having coffee with some Marine officers in an attempt to get an idea of what sort of activity the Marines were engaged in. One lieutenant told him that an operation was planned for the very next morning, and invited the reporter to come along. On August 3, Safer joined the Marines headed for Cam Ne.

While en route to their objective, the lieutenant told Safer his force was going to level Cam Ne, "really tear it up." When asked why, the officer said his men had taken a lot of fire from the village. Further, the Vietnamese province chief said he wanted it leveled. Another reporter, Richard Critchfield of the Washington Star, later told Safer the reason Cam Ne was leveled had nothing to do with the Viet Cong; rather, it was because the chief was furious with the residents of Cam Ne for refusing to pay their taxes. According to Critchfield, who was an expert on villages in Vietnam, the chief wanted the village punished. Safer was accompanied by a South Vietnamese cameraman, Ha Thuc Can, whose film of the controversial operation was narrated by Safer.

The report was filed on the spot, sent via telex from Da Nang to Saigon to New York. CBS realized that it had a powerful story as soon as it was read in the New York office. CBS News President Fred Friendly asked a staffer to confirm that Safer was sure of his facts. Safer confirmed the validity of the report. Friendly was nervous, aware of the enormous implications of broadcasting the film, as yet unseen by CBS officials. He called CBS President Frank Stanton to warn him about the upcoming broadcast. Next he called Pentagon public affairs official Arthur Sylvester, telling him to listen to the local CBS radio station. At that point the film itself had been transported by airplane from Vietnam to Los Angeles. A data line was leased to Los Angeles. Fred Friendly and Walter Cronkite in New York watched the film of U.S. Marines setting fire to Vietnamese dwellings, watched the burning of Cam Ne. They were shocked by the film images, but felt it was so important they could not fail to broadcast it. CBS called Safer again to ensure they had the proper context of the story. This was confirmed. The film was broadcast on CBS Evening News on August 5, 1965.

Reaction to the Cam Ne report was immediate and powerful. CBS was inundated with calls and letters critical of this negative portrayal of American military personnel. Early in the morning after the film was broadcast, Stanton was awakened by the telephone. "Frank, are you trying to f– me?" yelled a voice.

"Who is this?" asked the president of CBS.

"Frank, this is your president," answered Lyndon Johnson, "and yesterday your boys shat on the American flag."

That same morning newspapers across the nation featured an Associated Press photograph of a Marine setting fire to a hut with a cigarette lighter. The president ordered a background investigation on Safer, sure he was working for the Communists. No Communist affiliation was found. LBJ then ordered an investigation of the Marine officer in charge of the Cam Ne operation, certain that Safer must have bribed the Marine to burn Cam Ne. Nothing came of that, either. The Pentagon asked CBS to replace Safer as Vietnam correspondent. The Department of Defense began monitoring the evening television newscasts. Safer followed up his initial report with additional broadcasts critical of Marine operations in the area. The commander of the Marines in Vietnam, Maj. Gen. Lewis Walt, banned Safer from all of I Corps, the Marine Corps' area of responsibility in South Vietnam, but the order was soon rescinded.

The film that accompanied Safer's CBS report on Cam Ne showed a Marine, armed with a rifle, lighting a hut with his cigarette lighter. No opposition was evident. According to Safer's report, the Marines were under orders to burn to the ground any hamlet from which they received even a single burst of sniper fire. The pleas of old men and women for the Marines to spare their houses were ignored. So were pleas from the villagers to delay while their possessions were removed. The houses and all their belongings were burned, as were all rice stores. The day's operation netted four prisoners, all of whom were old men.

"It first appeared that the Marines had been sniped at before and that a few houses were made to pay," Safer reported. "Shortly after, one officer told me he had orders to go in and level the string of hamlets that surrounded Cam Ne village. And all around the common paddy fields [camera focuses on a roof being lit by a flamethrower] a ring of fire. One hundred and fifty homes were leveled in retaliation for a burst of gunfire. In Vietnam, like everywhere else in Asia, property, a home, is everything. A man lives with his family on ancestral land. His parents are buried nearby….Today's operation shows the frustration of Vietnam in miniature. There is little doubt that American firepower can win a military victory here. But to a Vietnamese peasant whose home means a lifetime of backbreaking labor, it will take more than presidential promises to convince him that we are on his side."

Pages: 1 2