One of the classic "what ifs" of the Second World War centers on how—or if—the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941, code-named Operation Barbarossa, could have achieved a quick victory. Hitler certainly believed that it could. All one had to do, he insisted, was to "kick in the door" and the "whole rotten structure" of Stalin's Communist regime would come tumbling down. In many respects Barbarossa was a stunning success. The Germans took the Soviets completely by surprise, advanced hundreds of miles in just a few weeks, killed or captured several million Soviet troops, and seized an area containing 40 percent of the USSR's population, as well as most of its coal, iron ore, aluminum, and armaments industry. But Barbarossa failed to take its capstone objective, Moscow. What went wrong?
Some historians have pointed to the German decision to advance along three axes: in the north toward Leningrad, in the south toward Ukraine, and in the center against Moscow. But the Wehrmacht had force enough to support three offensives, and its quick destruction of so many Soviet armies suggests that this was a reasonable decision. Others have pointed to Hitler's decision in August to divert most of the armored units attached to Field Marshal Fedor von Bock's Army Group Center, whose objective was Moscow, and send them south to support an effort to surround and capture the Soviet armies around Kiev, the capital of Ukraine. The elimination of the Kiev pocket on September 26 bagged 665,000 men, more than 3,000 artillery pieces, and almost 900 tanks. But it delayed the resumption of major operations against Moscow until early autumn. This, many historians argue, was a fatal blunder.
Yet, as historian David M. Glantz points out, such a scenario ignores what the Soviet armies around Kiev might have done had they not been trapped, and introduces too many variables to make for a good counterfactual. The best "minimal rewrite" of history must therefore focus on the final German bid to seize Moscow, an offensive known as Operation Typhoon.
Here is how Typhoon might have played out:
When the operation begins, Army Group Center enjoys a substantial advantage over the Soviet forces assigned to defend Moscow. It has at its disposal 1.9 million men, 48,000 artillery pieces, 1,400 aircraft, and 1,000 tanks. In contrast, the Soviets have only 1.25 million men (many with little or no combat experience), 7,600 artillery pieces, 600 aircraft, and almost 1,000 tanks. The seeming parity in the number of tanks is misleading, however, since the overwhelming majority of Soviet tanks are obsolescent models.
Initially, Army Group Center runs roughshod over its opponents. Within a few days, it achieves the spectacular encirclement of 685,000 Soviet troops near the towns of Bryansk and Vyazma, about 100 miles west of Moscow. The hapless Russians look to the skies for the onset of rain, for this is the season of the rasputitsa—literally the "time without roads"—when heavy rainfall turns the fields and unpaved roads into muddy quagmires. But this year the weather fails to rescue them, and by early November frost has so hardened the ground that German mobility is assured. With Herculean efforts from German supply units, Army Group Center continues to lunge directly for Moscow.
Thoroughly alarmed, the Stalin regime evacuates the government 420 miles east to Kuybyshev, north of the Caspian Sea. It also evacuates a million Moscow inhabitants, prepares to dynamite the Kremlin rather than have it fall into German hands, and makes plans to remove Lenin's tomb to a safe place. Stalin alone remains in Moscow until mid-November, when the first German troops reach the city in force. And in obedience to Hitler's order, Fedor von Bock uses Army Group Center to surround Moscow, instead of fighting for the city street by street. Nonetheless, the Soviet troops withdraw rather than fall prey to yet another disastrous encirclement, and on November 30—precisely two months after Operation Typhoon begins—it culminates in the capture of Moscow.
The above scenario is historically correct in many respects. The three major departures are the absence of the rasputitsa, which did indeed bog down the German offensive for two crucial weeks; the headlong drive toward Moscow rather than the diversion of units to lesser objectives in the wake of the victory at Bryansk and Vyazma—a major error; and, of course, the capture of Moscow itself.
But would the fall of Moscow have meant the defeat of the Soviet Union? Almost certainly not. In 1941 the Soviet Union endured the capture of numerous major cities, a huge percentage of crucial raw materials, and the loss of four million troops. Yet it still continued to fight. It had a vast and growing industrial
base east of the Ural Mountains, well out of reach of German forces. And in Joseph Stalin it had one of the most ruthless leaders in world history—a man utterly unlikely to throw in the towel because of the loss of any city, no matter how prestigious.
A scenario involving Moscow's fall also ignores the arrival of 18 divisions of troops from Siberia—fresh, well-trained, and equipped for winter fighting. They had been guarding against a possible Japanese invasion, but a Soviet spy reliably informed Stalin that Japan would turn southward, toward the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines, thereby freeing them to come to the Moscow front. Historically, the arrival of these troops took the Germans by surprise, and an unexpected Soviet counteroffensive in early December 1941 produced a major military crisis. Surprised and disturbed, Hitler's field commanders urged a temporary retreat in order to consolidate the German defenses. But Hitler refused, instead ordering that German troops continue to hold their ground. Historically they managed to do so. However, with German forces extended as far as Moscow and pinned to the city's defense, this probably would not have been possible. Ironically, for the Germans, the seeming triumph of Moscow's capture might well have brought early disaster.
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Your scenario lacks the strength of one thing. It fails to take into account the abominable state of Bock's armies in the autumn of 41. Add to this that Hitler expressly ordered that the city be taken, like you said, by enveloping the city from the east. This added an extra 50-60 miles to the route of advance of Reinhardt and Guderian's panzer armies, an added length they were quite unlikely to reach in their desperate state. If indeed they went directly at the capital, they may have garnered the strength to perhaps reach it but in my opinion, the eventual urban fight for the city center would have made Stalingrad look like a training exercise.Stalin would've lost some semblance of command and control, but like you said, this megalomaniacal madmen probably would have found the resources to stay in the fight. No. Moscow was for all intents and purposes, forfeited by the Wehrmacht when they diverted large forces to Yugoslavia & Greece, 6 weeks before the launching of Barbarossa. Or, had Guderian and Reinhardt's group been reinforced with Hoepner's group 1 month earlier than it was, maybe this might have allowed the Germans to reach Moscow. I still believe the actual taking of the city by the German Army was quite impossible.
Moscow should not have been the priority of Barbarossa anyway. It should have been Leningrad. Taking Leningrad would:
1. greatly relieve the Axis supply problems,
2. allow the line to be shortened,
3. allow the bulk of the Finnish army to move north to help Armee
Lapland seize Murmansk, the only all- weather port in the western
"Lend-Lease" would be much disrupted – the Kriegsmarine could
use Murmansk as a base, making Archangelsk to dangerous to
ship to..
4. provide a superb base for communications, hospitals, troop
R&R, etc.
5. render the Baltic an Axis lake, easing transport, etc.
Moscow COULD have been taken in 1941, but would likely be the site of a protracted fight in 1942. The "Stalingrad" view above would not come to pass: The Axis would not be at the end of a lengthy supply line while the S.U. would have to ship men and materiels much farther. The S.U. loss of its main communications and production centre would seriously weaken its military effectiveness. The main question is "What effect would the loss of Moscow have on the MANY unwilling citizens of the S.U. – Uzbeks, Kalmuks, Kazakhs, etc.?" They didn't like Russians any better than Hitler did.
Nazis should have captured moscow in the fall of 1941 and if hitler had not went against his generals experienced advice and diverted his center army after the battle of smolensk,they would have
The taking of an area or city for political propaganda as opposed to taking an area that results in the (1) the destruction of the enemy force, or (2) adds resources to one’s effort, or (3) facilitates ones logistics is faulty strategy. Hitler wanted Moscow for the political propaganda. As Mr. Lamek suggests, a different strategy may have resulted on a much better outcome for the Nazis. The other problem was that the Germans had really very little concept of what a cold winter really could be. As stated, that winter was not particularly harsh; nevertheless, their tanks could not move in the cold nor turn their turrets. Ideally, the Germans should have “hunkered down” into a defensive line for the winter, regardless of which strategy they took. Unless one is well prepared for winter, one should ride it out. I am from Northern Canada. Even in this day of great communication, I see unpreparedness for winter. Canadian construction contractor work well all winter. American contractors from the south of the USA are crippled in the Canadian winter.
After smolensk the focus should defintely have been Moscow. Moscow in 1941 was the centre of the soviet state. All rail traffic went through Moscow, significant arms were still being manufactured in Moscow, the industrial capability of Moscow was still largely intact with little having actually been moved further East. Approximately 15% of the entire soviet population was living in and around Moscow and much of these people were the more qualified within the Soviet Union aside from the Leadership in all spheres, its doubtful any significant % would have been able to get out of a pincer attack that surrounds Moscow south through Tula north through Klin and sealing the ring just before Vladimir. A Highly likely outcome given the number of daylight hours for operations, the historical weather and the kill and penetrative capabilities of the German units. This would have allowed the investment of Moscow to take place and certainly its surrender, panic along the lines of a Kiev or Minsk. The ongoing alteration of rail gauge adjustment from narrow to wide would have continued to progress at 20 km's per day ensuring that supply into Moscow would have been seamless. Any arriving Siberians would have no ability to deploy laterally given the single rail approach as Moscow had been taken. defence with resupply and much of the additional Soviet armed forces capability eliminated through the loss of Moscow a large winter offensive would have been impossible. If the Soviets were to continue which would be seriously doubtful they would have had to pull back. Supplies from Murmansk and Archangel would have been disrupted permanently without the rail corridor and Leningrad would have surrendered. Essentially the Critical nature of the Moscow Rail Hub would have secured German objectives on the Northern flank comprehensively, together with its population, industrial and political capabilities would have been significantly compromised. The germans would have passed the tipping point and the road to victory been all but guaranteed. The fact that Hitler elected to drive South to conduct the encirclement at Kiev and capture / destroy 660 000 is a tactical win though pales into insignificance against what could have been accomplished with a Moscow victory. ( The latter would have been a strategic game changer). The Kiev thrust gave the Soviets the ability to whether the storm of Operation Typhoon and contain the Germans before leveraging a counterattack with winter as their sweet ally. Certainly Adolf was the Soviets most admirable ally though given his gross interference and incompetence in all matters requiring strategic military thought. (Seems to have been consistently more focussed on controlling coal mines than the destruction of the soviet armed forces capability and the capturing & or destruction of its population industrial, political and logistical capability.
The reason the Wehrmacht didnt succeed in the Soviet Union is the lack of a main strategy. Hitler wanted both the destruction of soviet armies by ways of mass encirculments and the capture of resources and cities to feed propangda and industry. Hitler changed his goal a few times giving soviets just enough time to hold fast giving the Germans tactical but not strategic victories. Indeed the Germans needed to both destry the soviet armies and gain cities and resources, however the strategy was changed at times when the Germans may have been better 'sticking to the job at hand'. Had the Germans focused on the destruction of soviet armies before making geographic goals then perhaps Moscow would have been taken a lot easier. Or perhaps the german focused on the taking of Moscow and Leningrad for strategic victories which should have bottle necked soviet supplies and troop movements whilst freeing up supply lines for the Germans. Then the Germans could go about destroy the soviet armies. Had Moscow fallen so would have Leningrad almost ensuring a german victory in the east. Perhaps there would be so more huge battles but germany would be without the disadvantages of supply amongst other things that hampered their war effort til the end of the war. Again a typical case of hitlers poor decisions.
Taking of Moscow would not have made any difference, as Russia still had resources, factories etc east of Urals, plus Baku and oil.
To have had any chance of success, Operation Barbarossa required the taking of Baku and the oil fields in 1941 as well as Moscow and hence an attack of 4 army groups (with co-operation or coercion of Turkey) in total (perhaps 5 million men, possible if Total war enacted in 1939/40 not 1943). With the oil secured, the Soviets ability to fuel its tanks and armies greatly reduced. By end of 1941 a line from Rostov to Astrakhan could be secured. Then 1942 a further push towards cities like Perm, effectively taking all of Western Russia, with the war in the east won by end 1942.
I disagree Gavin. Whatever the Soviets lost the Germans gained making the battle exponentially harder for the Soviets. I do believe the Soviets would have fought on in a heroic battle had the Germans taken Moscow. Germans would have won the central railway lines, and in a few weeks the german rail lines could run from the factories in Germany straight to the front and reinforce, whilst also taking away that advantage from the Soviets. This would also severely damage soviet morale, whilst lifting the Germans. The taking of a capital has always been detrimental in warfare throughout the ages. The German panzer divisions were at u strength by the start of Barbarossa. Had they been at or 0 then I think World War 2 would have been lost by the Allies. Imagine if there were 200 German divisions on the atlantic wall (assuming the SU lost) – this would be impossible to invade. The Luftwaffe could seriously challenge the RAF and USAAF causing far less damage to german industry, which means more tanks, more aircraft, more AA/AT and more oil synthesization. The knock-on affects of the victory of the battle of moscow are scary.
I'm only a teen, so bear with me…
What I know was the biggest problem for the Germans by this point was need for petrol for their tanks, planes and etc. I remember one source I heard saying that a big error on Hitler's part was sending his southern group towards the oil fields AND Stalingrad.
Back on subject, what Trent says is correct. Had the SU fallen and the majority of the Wermacht been on the Atlantic Wall, D-Day would've failed horribly. The transport boats wouldn't have even made it to their beaches, while the lucky ones that did would get picked off by artillery fire. Trent again is accurate on the lack of main strategy. As I said about the southern group, Hitler split in half a large army simply because a city DARED be named after his foe Stalin. If Hitler'd let the task force go all at Stalingrad or the oil fields, he would've succeeded.
It is unlikely the Germans could have taken Moscow. The weather might have been less inhospitable, but it was still going to rain in October to some extent. What was holding back the Germans more than anything was logistics, or rather lack thereof. Not enough petrol, spare parts, winter gear, ammo, etc. German trains were not running in sufficient quantities even when the rails had been re-guaged.
Had the germans not turned south to make the pocket at Kiev the Soviets there would've held out and threatened Army Group Center's long right flank. They had been doing this since the Germans too Smolensk.
Read David Stahel's books on Barbarossa, Kiev and Typhoon, along with Glantz. The pro-German histories written by German Generals or primarily using their notes written in the '60's and '70's have been partially/fully debunked. The numbers of prisoners taken at Kiev have been revised downward, though it was still a significant victory for the Germans.
48,000 pieces of artillery for the Germans in Typhoon – that's a totally bogus number. Check other sources for all those German/Soviet numbers and you will see they are not accurate. For example wikipedia (Battle of Moscow) credits the Soviets with 3,232 tanks and the Germans with only 549 aircraft initially.
Someone mentioned Germanreinforcements pouring in over rail lines to Moscow if it were taken. The German rail system collapsed for awhile because they had very few trains that could operate in Russia in the winter. Also, there were few remaining replacements (men) and tank production had earlier been reduced in favor of U-boats and aircraft. (Because the Soviets were supposed to have been defeated and Germany was going to turn back on England in 1942.)