To the Christian army besieging the walled Muslim city of Acre in the spring of 1191, the situation appeared nearly hopeless.

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While they tightened the noose around Acre, the entrenched Christians were, in turn, being systematically squeezed by a Muslim relief force commanded by the dreaded Saladin (born Salah-ad-Din Yusuf ibn-Ayyub). Two years of warfare on the sandy beaches and plains near the city had decimated their numbers, as had the ravages of disease and starvation. Stubbornly clinging to their siege works, sandwiched between the walls and Saladin, the Christian Franks were in dire need of both reinforcements and quality leadership.

Located on the Mediterranean coast in what is today northern Israel, Acre had been a goal of the First Crusade nearly a century earlier. In that initial attempt to wrest the Holy Land from the Muslims, European Crusaders in 1099 had captured Jerusalem, the focal point of the Christian faith. Other cities, including Acre, were subsequently seized. As the Europeans, or Franks, settled in the Levant, they created Latin kingdoms buttressed by a series of fortified cities that carried on trade both with Europe and with the Muslims in Egypt and the Near East.

Internal Squabbling, however, began to weaken the unity of the Frankish states. The problem of feuding was compounded by the rise of Saladin in the II70s as Islam’s greatest military leader. A warrior of relatively low birth, Saladin had seized power through war and diplomacy in Egypt and Syria after the death of the Fatamid ruler Nur al-Din. After defeating jealous nobles, Saladin was quick to distribute his wealth to bind vassals to him. Frankish historian William of Tyre noted that the provinces of Saladin’s empire furnished him with ‘numberless companies of horsemen and fighters, men thirsty for gold.’

Saladin was quick to take advantage of the weakening Latin kingdoms. After a series of abortive truces, he brought the Frankish army to bay on the parched plain of Hattin near the Sea of Galilee on July 4, 1187. The shimmering heat was almost as great an enemy to the armored Christians as the Muslim blades and arrows, and they died by the thousands. ‘When one saw how many were dead, one could not believe there were any prisoners,’ wrote Arab chronicler Ibn alAthir, ‘and when one saw the prisoners, one could not believe there were any dead. Never since their invasion of Palestine had the Franks suffered such a defeat.’ Among those captured was Guy of Lusignan, who had been crowned King of Jerusalem the year before.

By July 10, Saladin had hammered through the Levantine littoral, capturing Jaffa, Haifa, Caesarea, Acre and Sidon. In early September, he captured the stronghold of Ascalon, and by the end of the month he had laid siege to Jerusalem, which capitulated on October 2. Only the well-defended bastion of Tyre, under the capable leadership of Conrad of Montserrat, and a handful of isolated Crusader fortresses maintained resistance.

After the debacle at Hattin, the remaining Franks blamed each other for the defeat. Sensing the Christian despair, Saladin released Guy of Lusignan, hoping to further cloud the already murky political waters of the Frankish states. Guy immediately traveled to Tyre to reclaim his right to command as king of Jerusalem. Conrad, however, would have nothing to do with that proposal, and he abruptly slammed the city gates shut on the shocked Guy.

Feeling in need of a decisive event to bolster his sagging fortunes, Guy collected a small army of 400 horse and 7,000 foot and recklessly marched on the Muslim stronghold of Acre. Rising next to the sea, Acre had well-manned battlements and a pair of towers that dominated the landscape: the Accursed Tower, facing landward, and the Tower of Flies, brooding over the harbor. With its rich maritime trade, the city was a jewel that Guy could not resist. However, considering the relatively puny size of his force and the vast scope of the project, he would have done better to eschew the immobility of siege warfare for a war of movement and maneuver against the Muslims.

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