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The Dahlgren Papers RevisitedAmerica's Civil War | Single Page | 5 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post In the winter 1999 issue of Columbiad, James M. McPherson reviewed Duane Schultz's The Dahlgren Affair: Terror and Conspiracy in the Civil War and took note of an article of mine on the same subject that appeared more or less simultaneously in MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History. In his review, McPherson pointed out that Duane Schultz and I 'come down on opposite sides' regarding the authenticity of the so-called Dahlgren papers, the documents at the core of the 'Dahlgren affair,' as Schultz terms it. After balancing the two sides in the case, McPherson offered the Solomonic judgment that 'the genuineness of the Dahlgren papers is contestable….'1 Subscribe Today
I will make a case for the genuineness of the Dahlgren papers–and make it strongly enough to remove that 'contestable' label. First, however, it is necessary to sketch in the background and the details of what came to be called the Kilpatrick-Dahlgren Raid. The raid itself was an utter failure and would merit nothing more than a footnote in Civil War history books except for the intrigue that occurred in its aftermath.
During the bitter winter of 1863-64, while the armies of Maj. Gen. George G. Meade and General Robert E. Lee occupied winter quarters on the opposite sides of the Rapidan River in northern Virginia, concern deepened in Washington for the welfare of Union prisoners being held in Richmond. Prisoner exchanges were floundering because of the Confederacy's refusal to exchange captured black soldiers. The Federal enlisted men penned in the prison camp on Belle Isle in the James River and the Union officers incarcerated in Libby Prison consequently soon began to suffer from overcrowding and its related effects. By one estimate, as many as fifteen hundred prisoners were dying each month from disease, hunger, or exposure. The Lincoln administration welcomed anyone with ideas for relieving this situation. The first to offer a plan and gain a hearing was the imaginative but inept Ben Butler.
Major General Benjamin F. Butler's command, based at Fort Monroe at the tip of the Virginia Peninsula, was the Union force closest to the Confederate capital. Butler advocated launching a surprise cavalry raid to break into Richmond and free the prisoners. He designed his raid to accomplish even more, however. Once in the city, his troopers would destroy prime military targets such as the Tredegar Iron Works and capture President Jefferson Davis and any other Confederate worthies they could find. Butler visited Washington and had his plan approved by President Abraham Lincoln and Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton. The Rebels, however, were forewarned of the scheme, and on February 7, 1864, they turned back Butler's troopers shortly after they started forward. As it turned out, the sole aspect of the Butler raid worth remembering was its plan for carrying off President Davis.2
It took Brig. Gen. Judson Kilpatrick less than a week to pick up the torch from Butler's palsied hand. Nine months earlier, during the Chancellorsville campaign, then-Colonel Kilpatrick led his brigade to the gates of Richmond during a Federal cavalry operation aimed at cutting General Lee's railroad supply line. That operation accomplished very little overall, but Kilpatrick's adventure elicited much comment. Now commanding the Third Division of the Army of the Potomac's Cavalry Corps, Kilpatrick determined to put this raiding experience to good use by leading a coup de main against the Confederate capital and freeing the Union prisoners there.
Judson Kilpatrick was ruthless, reckless, and inordinately ambitious. His nickname, 'Kill-Cavalry,' was applied in reference to the body count among his own troopers as well as the enemy's. Probably with the assistance of at least one Republican senator friendly to his cause, Kilpatrick found himself invited to the White House on February 12 to present his case for a raid on Richmond. He consulted with no one in the chain of command in obtaining the invitation; Lincoln likewise ignored the chain of command in issuing it.3 Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: 19th Century, America's Civil War, American Civil War, Historical Conflicts, Politics
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5 Comments to “The Dahlgren Papers Revisited”
I like your analysis and mannner of speaking, thank you for this interesting ticcket, it s always nice to visit this beautiful blog :)
By douce51 on Mar 14, 2009 at 8:06 pm
Very interesting article. However, part of your premise is based on COL Dahlgren being an outsider and able to carry out Kilpatrick's plan.
Dahlgren was every bit the opportunist that Custer and the other Cavalry officers were. Three young men promoted very quickly as the Union formed its Cavalry Corps organization for the Army of the Potomac.
Dahlgren was a Captain at Gettysburg and attemtping the daring missions that secured Custer, Merritt and Farnsworth not to mention Kilpatrick's rise.
Dahlgren had his father's coat tails to ride as well. Having a senior admiral as a father also helped in his rise to Colonel from Captain in less than one year.
Dahlgren, had he not been killed, was going to be a Brigade, if not Division Commander in Sheridan's forces by the end of the war.
Dahlgren was an insider.
Added to that, this raid and the killing of Davis was out of charactor for most everything else the Union did with its covert operations.
Now the Confederate covert operations was a different story. The burning of major cities with Greek Fire. The capture of US merchant ships on the high seas. The capture of civilian and military ships on the great lakes and rivers in Union cities. The cladestine operations across the boarder in Canada to attack or subvert the FederalGovernment. The Confederacy had a long pattern of such acts that we would call today terrorist.
The Union, maybe because they never developed covert organizations like the Confederacy did, had no great coordinated effort. Judah Benjamin was the cabinet level Confederate organizer of covert operations – to include the capture of President Lincoln and everything listed above.
If the Dahlgren letter is true, it was developed by Kilpatrick and Dahlgren alone and outside the bounds and generally against the wishes of President Lincoln.
By Don Herko in kansas on Apr 24, 2009 at 9:44 am
This article is well=written and makes a strong case for the involvement of Stanton. However, the author says, "It certainly cannot be imagined that the president countenanced political assassination and black flag warfare against civilians. Lincoln approved the capture of Davis, perhaps as a hostage for the release of Union prisoners, but nothing we know about the man suggests he would have gone beyond that."
The author seems to forget Athens, Alabama, where US Col. Turchin told his men, "I shut my eyes for three hours," thereby granting his soldiers permission to rape, rob, and pillage. Turchin's conviction by courtmartial was overturned by Lincoln's promoting Turchin to Brigadier General.
I see no reason to leave Lincoln out of speculation about the source of Dahlgren's orders.
By Charles Hayes on May 24, 2009 at 10:05 pm