The Assassination of Ngo Dinh Diem

Vietnam  | 2 comments  |  Print This Post  |  Email This Post

The brutal murder of the president of South Vietnam, Ngo Dinh Diem, and his powerful brother and adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, on November 2, 1963, was a major turning point in the war in Vietnam. Up until the deaths of the Ngo brothers, the United States had been ‘advising the government of South Vietnam in its war against the Viet Cong and their benefactors, the government of North Vietnam. At the time, the United States had 16,000 troops in South Vietnam training the ARVN forces and even going so far as to accompany them on helicopter-borne raids deep into enemy territory. American casualties were beginning to mount, and images of the dead were being broadcast on stateside network television.

In the wake of the assassinations, American policy toward the war in Vietnam changed dramatically. The murder of President John F. Kennedy almost three weeks later placed a new head of state in the White House. Lyndon B. Johnson carried on his predecessor’s Vietnam policies until 1964, when American participation in the war dramatically increased. A series of corrupt generals ruled Saigon while American forces would eventually reach the 500,000 mark.

What the American public did not realize in the fall of 1963 was just how much the Kennedy administration knew of the coup and of the Central Intelligence Agency’s covert role in the background plotting that went on in the weeks prior to the event. In order to fully understand how the deaths of Diem and Nhu affected the outcome of the war in Vietnam, it is imperative that the reader know more about Kennedy’s political thinking as he entered the White House in January 1961, and how his training and background in Asian affairs shaped his policies toward Southeast Asia.

The political education of John F. Kennedy started at the home of his powerful father, Ambassador Joseph Kennedy. Over dinner at the Kennedy compound, the patriarch would quiz his large family on the daily events of the world. The children were expected to know what was going on and answer accordingly.

As a member of Congress, Representative Kennedy took an avid interest in foreign policy, especially as it affected Third World countries and their struggle against colonialism among the Western nations. After his election to the Senate over the incumbent senator, Henry Cabot Lodge (who would later serve as American ambassador to South Vietnam during the Diem years), Kennedy was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. There, he began sounding off on international matters, especially those affecting the newly emerging nations of Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. Two of his primary concerns were Vietnam and Algeria.

In the late 1950s, Kennedy became a member of a group of influential Americans called the Friends of Vietnam, which included the noted New York–based newspaper writer Max Lerner as well as Harvard historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr., who was later a member of the Kennedy administration. The Friends of Vietnam were mostly liberal in their politics; they sought to ensure that the government of South Vietnam would remain separate, rather than reuniting with the Communist north as stipulated by the Geneva accords of 1954. Commenting on the situation in South Vietnam at the time, Kennedy remarked that what was needed was a revolution — a political and social revolution far superior to anything the Communists can offer.

Early in his congressional career, Kennedy had traveled to Asia and met with many of the power brokers and other dissident members of the various governments in the region. He was particularly adamant that the French would not be successful in keeping control of Vietnam by force of arms. He spoke out forcefully, saying that the Communist Viet Minh, then battling the French for control of Vietnam, would ultimately win the independence of that country. Kennedy also angered the French, as well as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s administration, by proposing to add to a sweeping military aid bill an amendment stipulating that any further American aid to France had to be contingent on that country’s granting independence to Vietnam.

Tags: Foreign Affairs

You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a comment, or trackback from your own site.