From January to April 1968, the battle at Khe Sanh, perhaps the most controversial of the Vietnam War, raged for 77 days. The two opposing commanders, Generals William C. Westmoreland and Vo Nguyen Giap, used the Khe Sanh combat base and surrounding area for their own purposes. For Westmoreland, Khe Sanh evolved from a reconnaissance platform to a potential invasion launch point, to a strongpoint and, finally, to a killing ground. For Giap, the base was a testing ground and then a staging ground for an option play. Each general knew the other had plans for the area, and at times each thought he was manipulating the other. In the end, Khe Sanh became the point at which two strategies of two generals converged.

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As early as 1964 Westmoreland described Khe Sanh’s possibilities: ‘Khe Sanh could serve as a patrol base blocking enemy infiltration from Laos; a base for SOP operations to harass the enemy in Laos; an airstrip for reconnaissance to survey the Ho Chi Minh Trail; a western anchor for the defenses south of the DMZ; and an eventual jumping-off point for ground operations to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail.’

The prospects Westmoreland saw for Khe Sanh changed through the course of the war. Intelligence had been the primary reason for being at Khe Sanh in 1964, in the early stages of the war. In fact, recon forces from the base were the first to confirm that Main Force NVA units were operating inside South Vietnam. By 1966, Westmoreland had begun to consider Khe Sanh as part of a larger strategy. ‘I still hoped some day to get approval for a major drive into Laos to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail,’ he said, ‘in which case I would need Khe Sanh as the base for the operation.’ In a meeting with Lt. Gen. Lewis Walt, commander of III Marine Amphibious Force (MAF), Westmoreland said that he placed great strategic importance on Khe Sanh. He believed it was absolutely essential to hold the base, which explains why he then ordered Marines there. In September 1966 MACV began detailed planning for an invasion into Laos, and an airfield was built at Khe Sanh in October.

In April 1967 two strategic options were pitched to President Lyndon B. Johnson: one by Westmoreland, to enter Laos; and one by adviser Walt Rostow, to invade North Vietnam just above the DMZ. Although both were rejected, Westmoreland never gave up hope, and from August to October he upgraded the airfield at Khe Sanh so that it could serve as the advance base for a Laotian invasion. As soon as the airfield reopened, he began to stockpile supplies for the invasion.

By mid-1967, however, Khe Sanh’s role had changed. Its primary role was still strategic, but it was now being used as a defensive strongpoint as well. When Defense Secretary Robert McNamara proposed erecting a DMZ barrier in 1966, Khe Sanh became part of it, as the westernmost point in what Westmoreland called ‘the strong point obstacle system.’ Khe Sanh was designated as one of the Marine strongpoints south of the DMZ. According to Westmoreland: ‘The Marines devised these strong points to serve as observation posts, patrol bases and fire support bases. They were meant to canalize Communist movements. It was an effort to counter both enemy infiltration and direct invasion by increasing the enemy’s cost and minimizing our own.’

Lieutenant General Robert Cushman, new commander of III MAF, saw Khe Sanh as part of a shield below the DMZ for pacification in Quang Tri province. So while Westmoreland still hoped to use Khe Sanh in an offensive capacity, it was fit into a defensive scheme for I Corps. Hanoi’s attacks into I Corps in 1966 and 1967, as perceived by Westmoreland, gave an added defensive dimension to Khe Sanh. The base and its adjacent outposts commanded the main avenue of approach into eastern Quang Tri and, as Westmoreland saw it, formed a solid block to an enemy invasion or motorized supply from the west. Westmoreland feared that the two northern provinces of I Corps would be the target of an invasion.

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