Walker initially positioned his three American divisions along the Naktong, from Waegwan south to the coast. The 24th ID held the center, with the 1st Cav. Div. on the right and the 25th ID on the left. North of the 1st Cav. Div., the ROKA 1st Division (1st Div.) held the Naktong up to the northwest corner of the perimeter. Manning the northern flank were the ROKA 6th Division (6th Div.) in the west and the 8th and Capital divisions in the center. The ROKA 3rd Division (3rd Div.) defended the northeast corner through Yongdok to the coast.

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The North Koreans initially threw six infantry divisions against the western flank of the perimeter and four against the northern flank. The NKPA 105th Armored Division (105th Armd. Div.) was held in reserve. Although the 105th was armed with the highly capable Soviet T-34 tank, the unit had suffered heavy losses during its advance and was down to only about 40 operational tanks. But the North Koreans continued to send fresh forces down the peninsula, and by late August they were able to commit three additional relatively fresh divisions, two against the center of the Naktong line and one against the southern end near the coast.

Walker’s force actually held a slight numerical advantage (some 92,000 troops to 70,000) in the first weeks of August. The majority of the NPKA soldiers were combat troops, however, while the majority of Walker’s soldiers were the support troops necessary to operate the Allies’ extensive logistics infrastructure.

Walker’s strategy was to conduct a “mobile defense,” in which a small portion of one’s defending force holds a thin screen of forward strongpoints, while the bulk of the force is held in reserve as a counterattack element. Although a standard element of U.S. tactical doctrine today, the mobile defense did not exist in the Army’s primary operations manual in 1950. Back then it was considered a theoretical and highly experimental concept, known as “defense on a wide front.” The usual defensive pattern in 1950 would have been a “positional defense,” in which the bulk of one’s forces were deployed along a continuous line of fixed positions, with small, mobile reserve forces at key points in the rear.

A positional defense assumed a frontage of six to eight miles for each division. By contrast, each of Walker’s four divisions along the Naktong had to hold fronts of 25 to 35 miles. This line of strongpoints was so long and thinly spread that Walker lacked sufficient troops to form the key large mobile reserve. Thus, he was forced to cobble together a series of ad hoc counterattack forces from troops in quiet sectors and newly arriving units, throwing them in whenever and wherever the NKPA penetrated his line. Thanks to a good network of roads and railroads within the perimeter, Walker usually managed to move his “fire brigades” where he needed them.

Still lacking subordinate corps headquarters, Walker was a one-man show. He continually moved by jeep and L-19 Bird Dog light aircraft to each point on the line as a threat emerged, personally overseeing the counter-attacks. Walker did, however, have a secret weapon: Colonel Eugene M. Landrum, his EUSAK chief of staff.

Landrum had commanded the American forces that recaptured the Aleutian island of Attu from the Japanese in World War II and, as a major general, later led the 90th Infantry Division during the brutal hedgerow fighting in Normandy in July 1944. While he’d been relieved of that command, and though he’d reverted to a colonel after the war, Walker always referred to him as “General” Landrum. Calm, unflappable, professional and a consummate team player, Landrum was an entirely different breed of officer from Almond, and Walker trusted him completely. Since a U.S. field army in 1950 was not authorized an assistant commanding general, Landrum was Walker’s de facto deputy. His primary job was to keep track of all forces in Korea and conjure up the reserves to plug any holes. Whenever the “general” returned to headquarters, Walker’s first question was, “Landrum, how many reserves have you dug up for me today?”

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