Sergeant Milton Humphreys’ Concept of Indirect Fire

 | America's Civil War  | one comment  |  Print This Post  |  Email This Post

Today, indirect firing–shooting at an unseen target–is an integral part of warfare. During the Gulf War, Tomahawk missiles were launched from ships at targets hundreds of miles away. Out in the desert, banks of artillery pointing skyward fired at an unseen enemy, using the combined aid of satellites and computers. But during the Civil War, manning artillery was a good deal more art than science. With a solid cannonball it was fairly simple–just aim and fire. But when using an exploding shell, the gunner had to estimate the distance and time of trajectory and cut the fuse accordingly. There was a chart on the inside of the limber chest that he could use as a guide, but still, with no way to precisely measure the distance, all he could do was make an educated guess.

A Civil War gunner avoided firing explosive shells over his own troops if at all possible, because he never knew exactly when a shell would explode. Quality control in those days was not the best. Generally speaking, fuses produced in the North were more reliable than those made in the South.

For the most part, Civil War cannons were muzzleloaders, and being part of a gun crew was extremely dangerous. Out in the open, men and horses were sitting ducks for sharpshooters. A full crew consisted of a gunner, who directed fire, and seven artillerymen. The cannon and limber were drawn by four to six horses. Deployed for battle, the limber and horses were placed 6 yards behind the cannon; 11 yards farther back was the caisson, drawn by another four to six horses. All in all, that was a lot of targets bunched up in a small area.

Whenever possible, experienced gunners sought to use the terrain to lessen the danger. Since ground is never absolutely flat, they looked for a rise or swell. The gun was placed so that the cannonball would just clear the ridge of the swell. All that was visible to the enemy was the cannon barrel and the tops of the wheels. A cannon that was not tied down would recoil several feet upon firing. If the slope was great enough, the piece would then be out of the enemy’s sight, enabling the crew to reload with a greater degree of safety than would otherwise be possible. Although the cannon had existed for hundreds of years, this was as close to indirect firing as anyone had ever come. On May 19, 1863, however, an 18-year-old Confederate sergeant would change all that.

Milton Wylie Humphreys was born at Anthony’s Creek in Greenbrier County, Va. (now West Virginia), on September 14, 1844. Humphreys was something of a prodigy. As the boy approached school age, his father started teaching him the alphabet. Andrew Humphreys quickly discovered that his son not only knew the alphabet but also could read. His explanation was that he wanted to know what was written in the newspapers. Teachers soon discovered that Humphreys’ long suit was mathematics, or ‘figgers,’ as he called them. While still in grade school, using the face of a rock formation near his home as a chalk board, he solved complex math equations. At the age of 13, Humphreys entered Mercer Academy in Charleston, where he pursued college-level studies.

In 1860, he entered Washington College (now Washington and Lee University) in Lexington, Va., and was at the head of his class when the Civil War broke out in April 1861. Humphreys wanted to join immediately, but his age held him back until March 27, 1862, when he enlisted in Bryan’s Battery of the 13th Virginia Light Artillery. It was immediately apparent that Humphreys possessed three innate qualities that made him an outstanding gunner: exceptional eyesight, with an extraordinary degree of depth perception; an engineering inventiveness; and unshakable courage under fire.

Federal troops had gained a foothold in western Virginia early in the war. This area, which would become the new state of West Virginia on June 20, 1863, was important to both sides. The North needed the railroads that ran across the northern counties as a link between Washington, D.C., and the West. Homes and factories in the North needed coal from the rich reserves of the area. For the South, the region was a crucial source of salt and food.

In 1862, a plan was drawn up by the South to invade the western counties, destroy the railroads and recapture the salt-rich Kanawha Valley. By early 1863, that plan had been partially abandoned. Instead, during May, Brig. Gens. William E. Jones and John D. Imboden conducted a series of raids attempting to destroy the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad and round up as many horses and supplies as possible. Coincident with the raids, a small infantry force mounted a diversionary attack to draw Union troops away from Jones and Imboden.

Bryan’s Battery had spent the winter of 1862­63 at Thorn Spring near Dublin, Va. After necessary repairs were completed to the buildings in which they were living, the soldiers settled into the boring routine of camp life while they waited for spring. The only military maneuver they engaged in (other than twice daily drills) was a march to Dublin on January 11 to attack an expected enemy force that did not show up. Humphreys noted in his diary, ‘We stood around in the snow all day and returned to camp late.’ Fearing an attack on nearby Saltville, they left Thorn Spring on April 16, 1863, and camped on the north fork of Holston River.

Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to

Tags: 19th Century, America's Civil War, Historical Conflicts, Military Technology, Weaponry

You can follow any responses to this entry through the RSS 2.0 feed. You can leave a comment, or trackback from your own site.