By late summer 1944 the Allies were suffering from success. Following a lightning quick advance across France, General Dwight Eisenhower’s legions had ground to a halt. In the north, Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery’s Twenty-first Army Group was stalled along the Dutch–Belgian border. In the south, Lieutenant General Omar Bradley’s Twelfth and Lieutenant General Jacob Devers’ Sixth Army groups had sputtered to a halt before the Siegfried Line.

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With supplies still having to be trucked all the way from Normandy, Eisenhower faced the difficult decision of where to allocate the resources he had available in order to keep the rapidly retreating Germans off balance. On September 10, Montgomery offered a solution. He would take the newly formed First Allied Airborne Army and drop it behind enemy lines in the Netherlands, seizing vital river crossings that would be held long enough for an advancing armored column from his XXX Corps to reach each airborne division in turn. If it worked, the Allies would flank the Siegfried Line (300 miles worth of fixed fortifications along Germany’s western border), cross the Rhine and have a clear path for an advance into the Reich’s industrial heart.

Dazzling in its audacity, Operation Market-Garden was planned as a bottom to top undertaking. It was vital that each of the lightly equipped airborne divisions taking part succeed in securing its objective and holding it long enough for the armored column to reach each unit in turn. In the south, the U.S. Army’s 101st Airborne Division would be responsible for capturing Eindhoven. In the middle, it would be the job of the 82nd Airborne to take and hold bridges at Nijmegen. And farthest north, the ultimate prize — a bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem — would be the objective of the “Red Devils” from the British 1st Airborne Division. It was an all-or-nothing gamble. If it worked, the war in Europe would come to an end much sooner. If it failed, the Germans would be given time they badly needed to recover from their drubbing in Normandy and the continued bloodletting at the hands of the Soviets on the Eastern Front.

The toughest assignment would fall to Maj. Gen. Roy Urquhart and his 1st Airborne Division. They would have to seize the bridge at Arnhem and hold it for three days. To accomplish this, Urquhart selected Brigadier Gerald Lathbury’s 1st Parachute Brigade, which was made up of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd battalions of the Parachute Regiment. The rest of the division would secure the drop and landing zones and other important areas around the bridge.

Lathbury planned to commit the 2nd and 3rd battalions to seizing the bridge, while the 1st was ordered to hold a patch of high ground north of Arnhem. The problem was that his drop zone was about eight miles away from the objective. Lathbury hoped to overcome that obstacle by sending out a coup de main force in jeeps that would dash ahead of the rest of the brigade, seize the bridge and hold it until the 2nd and 3rd battalions arrived on foot.

Everything began well enough. The September 17, 1944, jump and glider landings near the village of Wolfheze were almost perfect, with few casualties. Lathbury’s brigade was quickly organized and headed toward Arnhem. In the lead was Major Freddie Gough’s reconnaissance squadron. Gough, however, soon ran into stiff German opposition, and Lathbury was forced to send his 2nd and 3rd battalions toward Arnhem on foot in a race to beat the Germans.

Slowed by unexpected enemy opposition and the overly enthusiastic welcome of Dutch residents along the way, Lathbury’s columns quickly bogged down. By 6 p.m. his 1st and 3rd battalions were heavily engaged with the enemy, and Lt. Col. John Frost’s 2nd Battalion was moving toward the bridge alone.

Hoping to pick up the pace, Lathbury called on Lt. Col. John Fitch, the commander of the 3rd Battalion, to get some of his men moving. Soon C Company was ordered down a side road to outflank the Germans and find a faster route to the bridge. Commanding the company was Major R. Peter C. “Pongo” Lewis, who after receiving Fitch’s instructions returned to his company to brief his platoon leaders. One of these was Lieutenant Leonard William Wright, the commander of 9 Platoon. Patience was growing short. “I had my O-Group [staff] standing by; that was routine,” Wright said. “But, before I could start to brief them, I heard the high-pitched voice of the brigade commander, saying ‘Where’s the leading platoon commander?’ I jumped to my feet, saluted — believe it or not — and said, ‘Here, sir.’ He asked me what I was doing, and I replied, ‘Briefing my O-Group, sir.’ He snorted, very sharply, ‘They don’t need briefing; just tell them that’s the bloody way. Get moving!’ So I did.”

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