|
|
 |
Operation Market Garden: History's Greatest Airborne AssaultWorld War II | Single Page | 10 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post The 73-day battle of 'Hell's Highway was perhaps the most savagely fought single action in the history of the U.S. Army's 101st and 82nd Airborne divisions — and the least publicized. It is the story of a road, its bridges, and the men who fought and died to keep it open.
For the airborne troops fortunate enough to return from the assault on Normandy, the rear bases in England were utopia. Most of their buddies had come out on stretchers or were interred in the fertile soil of the French coast. The 82nd and 101st were well known to the British, who realized the sacrifices they had made in Normandy and responded to the survivors with kindness and respect. The troopers were glad to find people they could understand and, after a few days, they swarmed over the island on passes to London, Scotland and the familiar towns they had known before the invasion. Subscribe Today
Once the divisions returned to their bases, the re-equipping, reorganizing and training began. All weapons were fired on the range: carbines, M-Is, submachine guns and Colt 45s. New equipment and men joined the units. It was a summer of alerts and dry runs. Troops received rehearsal briefings and assault equipment three times before being moved to a marshaling area. On September 11, 1944 (six days before the invasion of Holland), the unit commanders of the 101st and 82nd Airborne divisions received a briefing on their next parachute assault operation.
The code name of the mission was Operation Market Garden. Early in the hectic week of planning, from September 10 to September 17, Lt. Gen. Lewis H. Brereton, commander of the First Allied Airborne Army, made one bold decision that changed the whole character of the operation. It would be a daylight jump. That was a gamble on Allied superiority in the air. The objective area was northeast of the major Belgian seaport of Antwerp. The airborne effort was designed to assist the advance of the British Second Army into Holland so it could attack eastward over the Neder Rhine River into Germany. It was essential that the British armor advance rapidly. The British would drop their 1st Airborne Division, assisted by a brigade of Polish paratroopers, at Arnhem on the other side of the Rhine. The decision on H-hour was to be made 72 hours after receipt of photographic intelligence.
The major advantage to be gained from the Market Garden operation was apparent. A thrust north across the Rhine River would flank the Siegfried Line and allow the Allies to launch armored assaults across the Westphalia Plain. The British Second Army was not capable of such an offensive at that time. Its supply lines stretched 250 miles from the Normandy ports. Antwerp had been captured but was not operating as an Allied port because German troops still dominated its approaches. All Second Army transport was being used at full capacity in order to sustain the fighting of one corps. General Bernard Montgomery insisted that airborne assistance was essential to the plan. The airborne would initiate the invasion and unroll a security carpet on the road before the advancing ground forces.
It was not a long road in comparison with some of the tremendous distances of the war, running 70 miles through Holland from the Belgian border north to Arnhem. The 101st sector was much shorter: 20 miles or less from Eindhoven through Zon and St. Oedenrode to Veghel. Twenty miles of road is more than a division is supposed to defend, especially when the road is a passageway inviting attack from both sides, a corridor that threatens to cut off a desperate enemy whose available resources of men and material were much greater than those of the Allied forces in Holland. The First Allied Airborne Army was to drop from the skies behind enemy lines and hold that corridor open at all costs. If Operation Market (the airborne part of the overall plan) was successful, the airborne would control the key bridges and strategic points and the British XXX Corps could roll in with maximum speed and complete the Garden (ground) phase of the operation. The British corps had to reach Arnhem in 48 hours, because airborne troops could not be expected to hold out longer than that without standard artillery, tanks and effective resupply. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Airborne Operations, Historical Conflicts, World War II
 |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
What is HistoryNet?The HistoryNet.com is brought to you by the Weider History Group, the world's largest publisher of history magazines. HistoryNet.com contains daily features, photo galleries and over 5,000 articles originally published in our various magazines. If you are interested in a specific history subject, try searching our archives, you are bound to find something to pique your interest.
|
From Our Magazines
|
Weider History Group |
Weider History Network: HistoryNet | Armchair General | Great History | Achtung Panzer! Copyright © 2010 Weider History Group. All rights reserved. Reproduction in whole or in part without permission is prohibited. |
||
Loading ...
10 Comments to “Operation Market Garden: History's Greatest Airborne Assault”
Wow….my grandfather was involved in this. He was a British paratrooper who was taken POW by the Germans. He told us many stories of this, it's
just so unbelievable that he survived this to tell us about it.
By Deb on Nov 11, 2008 at 11:39 pm
I`m amazed that there is no mention at all about severe lack of good intelligence over German SS elite divisions on the area. Even though some reconossaince planes from RAF gave some photos that showed the presence of strong enemy tanks divisions on the area. To me, it was another big mistake from British commanders who decided to go along anyway, regardless any cost. It's remarkable the hard task that U.S. paratroopers accomplished, and the gallantry, bravery shown by brits soldiers. But, as I said before, a big failure to blame on a commander who was worried only on obtaining another star.
By Raul Avellaneda on Feb 26, 2009 at 6:29 pm
ok, so i dont get a word this is saying. it doesnt make any sense wht so ever. i think you should have some more information, maybe in some easier language so that i can understand it to my needs =]
this is really diffiicult to understand..but then again this is just my opinoin. if u could e-mail me any info on this topic.. PLEASE do! cuz it is really hard to find anything on this topic
thanks
-caden
By caden on Mar 18, 2009 at 2:59 pm
GET YOUR INFO STRAIGHT… PEOPLE NEED THE WHOLE STORY AND IF YOU ASK ME, THIS SITE WAS AS INACCURATE AS WIKKIPEDIA
By JAYMES SEIVERS on Mar 31, 2009 at 6:13 pm
As a military feature writer and broadcaster for over 30 years in the U.S. Army, I found this article to be first rate, informative, and quite easy to understand. Operation Market Garden is often overlooked unlike D-Day and Battle of the Bulge. Colonel Wilson provides an excellent account of what happened, when, why, where, etc. I enjoyed this material very much.
By Col. Renita Foster Menyhert on Apr 10, 2009 at 3:00 pm
To Jaymes: how can you claim that the info is inaccurate? The author participated in the operation!
By Zack on Jun 16, 2009 at 12:08 am
But the airborne troops participated in the garden phase am i correct? Or did the turn around and try to get back to France why the Brits did the Garden? Even though we lost this operation it still weakened the Nazis quite a bit for the Soviets to push in at the capture of Berlin? I am asking this not stating. Someone please inform me.
By billythekid727 on Sep 13, 2009 at 10:53 pm
I believe that Arnhem was a bridge too far. What Montgomery should have done was land the British and the polish airborne brigades last just as soon as xxx corps was leaving Nijmegen, that way the britsh would not had suffered so severly. Also we should have realized that by looking at the aireal reconnaissance photographs that the Nazi's had a large garrison of armor in the area of arnhem. It was a foolish mistake ignoring this threat. We should of used more than one highway as well. It was a great risk on relying that all bridges are intact and usable and lightly defended. The allies should have flanked to either side and used every single road way available instead of just one. However, I am proud of these young men fighting for what they belive in. These men, these heroes from around the world, band together to defend and fight for their land, they're people, they're famlies. They know it's gonna be tough. Some will get hurt, some will die, but that didn't stop them from doing what needed to be done. These people living in they're own homes are threatend, bullied by a tyrant thinking he has the right of way. That his race shall be the only one to exist. And everyone shall either be slaves, murders. Yes this operation was a faliure. But that did not stop these united nations. It only made them more wiseon he to conduct a successful assualt on the enemy. They regrouped, held on tight, and started to push back. I thank these saints for fighting for what's right. Who ever reads this comment, I hope you agree with me. Some may disagree about my strategy, but that's just how I think that battle could have been won.
By Martin alvarez on Jan 18, 2010 at 8:02 am
@ martin alvarez,
the bridge wasnt at Arnhem it was at Nijmegen, arnhem was a km or so further on. and obviously it was a bridge to far, there were three bridges: a destroyed railroad bridge then a another smaller bridge too small for armor then Nijmegan bridge on the other side, so nijmegan was the only way to go, and the highway leading up to it was the only highway into nijmegan.
By David Stevens on Mar 21, 2010 at 4:29 pm