The supplies number were clearly tipped in favor of the Allies, between the British Empire, the U.S., and the Soviet Union. If Hitler focuses on the Caucasus, he gains resources, while removing the Soviets from the argument, thus being able to provide more support to the Japanese against the U.S.

Of course hindsight is 20/20, and the only thing Stalin would want to keep more than the city that was his namesake, is the lifeblood that would keep it that way.

By Tamahome Jenkins on Aug 18, 2009 at 10:44 am

If Germany had focused on North Africa by way of Libya and Turkey, the oil fields of the mid-east would have been available; Egpyt and India out of the war and a link with Japan through Pakistan built. All of this without a Soviet invasion. Liebensarum was such a short sighted policy.

By Sam Rankin on Aug 25, 2009 at 5:45 pm

Yes, the last observator poses some reason!

I inclusive aded why German strategist planified three moves related with this,but not implemented during 1941-42:

*first German planing to reinforzed Italian Lybia
*no named operation departed from Bulgaria for entering in Turkey and Palestina
*no named plan from supposed conquest Egypt to Palestina
*some anex operation from South Caucassus to Turkey and Persia

among the German moves from Syria,Irak and secret operations in Persia and Afganistan.joining at this the German planning not only extended to Afganistan or East British India,inclusive are planned the total ocupation of West French Africa for reinforzed the future atlantic operations joining with Fall Felix,the occupation of Canary islands,Madeira,Azores and Cape Green archipielago.

Proper Italy between your plannings projected the occupation of French Tunisia,Algeria and Morocco,Egypt,Anglo-Egyptian Sudan,british somalia and parts of british Kenia also

Particulary the Adm.Raeder as favoured the North African and Middle East future moves and some Wehrmatch Luftwaffe and Schutz Staffel leaders also (in last case theirs organized the "Aegypt unit" for opered in recent ocupied Egypt)

In same way some German diplomats and SS officers as meeting with some muslim leaders in area also.

If certain why the Dessert Fox,Gen.Erwin Rommel can to seized Egyptian soil,from this land,no poses any heavy allied oposition in route to Middle East.your site are very similar toGreek Alexandros Ho Megas (Alexander the Great) in your conquest of Persian Achemenid Empire or the conquest dreams of Roman General Marcus Licinius Crasus and X legion,but equiped with tanks,moblie infantry,aviation and artillery.

By Wladimir on Aug 27, 2009 at 12:40 pm

I'll probably ask this question later this semester as well, but I'd like your thoughts on the caution of the German General von Paulus.

Do you think that if a more aggressive commander, such as Erwin Rommel, could have taken Stalingrad at the same time with the same resources?

It's good to hear a fresh perspective about this, as in my experience the only time we ever here about the importance of oil during WW2 is the effect it had on Japan, and the stunning last-gasp German attack in the Battle of the Bulge.

Call it Western-centric history, but the Eastern Front is all too easily forgotten and stereotyped. Time to bring it back to the conversation and round out the views of WW2 with it in the frame.

By Andrew Morris on Sep 11, 2009 at 3:56 pm

Andrew–

Tough call! The problems of 6th Army were not all due to Paulus. In fact, by July 26, 6th Army was dead in the water on the path to Stalingrad because of lack of fuel, not a lack of command aggressiveness. Now, I'll admit: once battle had been joined in the city itself, sure, it's possible to see a more aggressive German commander making more raid progress than Paulus did! But who really knows?

By Rob Citino on Sep 11, 2009 at 6:12 pm

It would also be interesting to know whether the Stalingrad/Caucasus operations would have succeeded, if the Germans had sent their reserves to that region, instead of wasting them in an attempt to defend Tunisia. At the end, approximately a quarter million troops were in Tunisia, and they were largely supplied by the Luftwaffe. Could that same force have been used to win the battle of Stalingrad?

By Adam Rinkleff on Sep 13, 2009 at 1:15 pm

The Werhmacht’s need for oil is heavily discussed in the literature, and often sited for the failure of Operation Blue under the guise of further spreading scarce resources and stretching the Axis supply lines to the point of snapping, as well as a large player in the demise of the Axis overall. But have you considered the possibility that the German need for oil happened to be an ancillary goal/benefit of the drive on the Caucasus?
Prima facie: a simple question. But turn the kaleidoscope slightly, and view it with an eye on the potential impact on the Soviet war machine. It becomes feasible that the Germans were not after the oil reserves of Maikop, Baku, etc as much as they were of trying to choke off the Soviet oil supply.
The Soviets were cognizant that the German High Command had their cross hairs trained on the Caucasus for months. The refinery workers diaries detail the feverish pace demanded of them by the Red Army, drilling new wells and developing equivalent oil sources more interior, at times working the clock full round. They also detail that the Soviets practiced the strategic policy of “Scorched Earth” on the Baku, Grozny and Maikop wells. The Germans discovered this and expected more of the same as they penetrated farther. With this in mind, is it not possible that the Germans held to a strategic plan of depriving the Soviets of the lubricant of modern warfare, rather than seeking more oil for their own consumption? The deprivation would serve to grind the Soviet war machines to a halt, thus helping 6th Army in the taking of Stalingrad, and eventually ensuring a German victory.
The German High Command did not all of the sudden become mindless with Operation Blue. The concurrent attack on the Soviet Oil fields and Stalingrad seem strategically sound when viewed without hindsight as our interpreter of the eventual outcome– without oil the Soviets could not fight.
Hitler and the Generals were all steeped in the lessons of Napoleon's misstep in underestimating the tenacity and resolve of the Soviet people. Successful, the drive on the Caucasus would have functioned as a tidy tourniquet on the Soviet oil flow, and go a great distance to counterbalance Scorched Earth, national pride/honor, and Stalin's willingness to toss his own mother under an on coming tank.
It is important to note that the Soviet’s were fully aware that the Romanian’s functioned as the major supplier in oiling Bewegungskrieg; there are dozens of mentions in period documents traversing the Stalin/Hitler diplomatic pipeline during the late 1930’s. Additionally, there is substantial documentary evidence that strongly argues that the Soviet’s could have captured Germany’s Romanian oil supply line on 22-26 June 1941, during the massive air and coastal bombings of Constanta, the Danube Delta, Bucharest, and yes, Ploiesti. The Soviets held reign, just as they did during Operation 60,000 (Apr-May 1944), never pressing their advantage, why is a question that perplexed both the German and Romanian High Commands.
It should also be noted that once the Axis combined forces secured the Crimea and forced the Soviet’s back the German oil supply was secure: Ploiesti. Infrequent and small raids did occur on Ploiesti, but nothing that caused significant hindrance in quenching the thirst for oil by the beast of Blitzkrieg, until 1944. The point being, blaming the German thirst for oil as the reasoning for the failure of Blue and Stalingrad can be over simplification and selling the German High Command strategically short for the wrong reasons.

By Lee on Sep 25, 2009 at 10:49 pm

Lest we forget, the conflagration occurring on the other side of the world at the same time was provoked by another belligerent's fixation and desire for that ol' light sweet crude.

By paul penrod on Feb 1, 2010 at 4:43 pm