Just goes to show that in combat, just like in boxing, if you focus exclusively on how bad you’re hurting and not think about the enemy’s situation, your chances for a bad call go up. Or, if both sides think they’re beaten, they’re both right.

By Bill Nance on Oct 11, 2009 at 8:54 pm

Right on, Bill. A good battle to illustrate the problem of information. Each side knew how badly IT was doing, but not how badly the other.side was doing. A very typical problem.

By Rob Citino on Oct 11, 2009 at 10:50 pm

Clausewitz advises, “In a lost battle the power of an army is broken, the moral to a greater degree than the physical. A second battle, unless fresh favorable circumstances come into play, would lead to a complete defeat, perhaps, to destruction.” He continues that risking your forces, “may be traced to the moral deficiency of the adversary, or to the preponderance gained in the battle not having been sufficient to make a lasting impression.” From this I believe Andrew, not knowing all the facts and the miscommunications, followed the path most advisable. He knew what he would be risking, what in the fog of war must have appeared the probable destruction of his beleaguered forces. I do not believe Clausewitz nor I would perceive his actions as cowardice: rather the opposite. Andrew made the best decisions he could with the Intel and training he had at the time.

By Lee on Oct 12, 2009 at 2:14 am

This proves that the moral of a combat unit plays such a huge role in later operations. A commander can retreat away from a victory just as well as the Germans fought their way through a loss. Allied losses suffered early in the war against Germany may have played a major role in Colonel Andrew’s withdrawal. I wonder if Andrew would have withdrawn had the British had more success prior to the invasion of Crete?

By Luke Truxal on Oct 12, 2009 at 7:08 pm

Good point, Luke. Losing can become a habit as much as winning can. If your first response to a setback is, “Oh no, here we go again,”, then perhaps you’re already beaten.

By Rob Citino on Oct 13, 2009 at 12:25 am

We would be remiss if we didn’t mention that Rob’s terrific cover story on the 1941 German invasion of Crete by air will appear in the the Winter 2010 issue of MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History, on newsstands on November 15. http://www.historynet.com/mhq

By B. Horne on Oct 19, 2009 at 3:10 pm

The RAF was next to non-existent in that battle with many of its planes being evacuated to North Africa and Egypt. Overwhelming Axis airpower certainly factored into Andrew’s decision. While Wellington’ and Blenheims were performing harassing raids and supply drops, few if any Spitfire or Hurricanes remained on Crete. Andrew made the best decision that he could under the circumstances.

By Mike Hegarty on Oct 19, 2009 at 8:33 pm

Mike–

Good points all!

–RC

By Rob Citino on Oct 19, 2009 at 8:59 pm

The question is: what were his orders? There is no point examining Andrew’s decision in isolation because he is unlikely to have had much idea of the overall battle on Crete. Obviously he should have been told to fight to the last man to hold the airfield but was he told this?

By Michael on Oct 19, 2009 at 9:58 pm

For the want of some good intelligence a battle was lost. Nothing new there!

By Robert on Oct 20, 2009 at 3:01 am

Many of the comments above are accurate and too the point. Although his orders are not known or discussed here, keep in mind the desire of England and their allies, with their limited manpower resources, as well as the blooding of the Empire from WWI, may well have caused him to withdraw in order to fight another day.

Wayne

By Wayne Trovinger on Oct 20, 2009 at 7:42 am

Insightful points from Mr. Citino, and good feedback. Without more information, though, we can neither exonerate nor condemn Colonel Andrew for his decision to retreat and consolidate with sister battalions to the east. The question of orders becomes central: what were the various battalion commanders supposed to defend in case of attack, and had General Hargest made clear the brigade’s defensive priorities? If he had, the other battalions should likely have attempted to fight their way west in order to consolidate around the critical Maleme airfield. Where was Hargest during the battle, and did he or others recognize the importance of the airfield and try to reinforce Andrew? If General Hargest did not see (or did not share with his battalion commanders) “the big picture” of what was really important in the brigade’s area of operations, the fault would seem to be his.

By Charles on Oct 20, 2009 at 9:48 am

I concur with Charles, we need more information in order to reach an accurate conclusion.

By ROGER KASSEBAUM on Oct 20, 2009 at 12:48 pm

Charles and Roger–

Thanks for the insightful comments. Might I just add that his communications with Brigade HQ (Hargest) had been interrupted virtually all day? For historians, the question of “orders”, it seems to me, has to give way to the question of “command and control”.

–RC

By Rob Citino on Oct 20, 2009 at 7:04 pm

Something that Dr. Citino exposes in his blog about the battle for Hill 107 that may need to be discussed is the different fighting styles of the Germans and the Allies. Colonel Andrew attempts to save his battalion when he believes his situation is hopeless. The German objective is the airfield and they attack constantly holding nothing back. The Germans always fight to the bitter end to reach their objective. Early in the war this gives them an advantage. However, later in the war it proves to be their downfall at Moscow and Stalingrad when the objective proves to be outside their logistical capabilities. The Germans continue their attack until they can no longer attack and it comes back to hurt them. The Allies are more concerned about their troops and the logistical demands of combat than the Germans therefore Colonel Andrew orders the retreat in order to preserve his battalion for another day. While you don’t win wars retreating this does show that the British are more realistic when it comes to deciding whether or not a strategic target is within their capability of taking or holding. In this case the British were wrong, but it doesn’t make their way of waging war wrong. The Germans however will sacrifice anything for their current objective even if it hurts them in the long run.

By Luke Truxal on Oct 21, 2009 at 12:21 am

It is important, when trying to analyze the decisions of a military commander (or anyone else, for that matter) to base that evaluation on the information and resources available to him at the time the decision was made. Inadequate intelligence often leads to bad decisions, as it’s a mistake to simply assume that one’s foes suffered the same damage as one’s own forces did. That path leads to disaster. When intelligence is lacking, a leader has to assume that the enemy is still capable and dangerous. Had Col. Andrews known the enemy’s actual strength and the importance of holding his ground at high costs, he would certainly have continued the fight, but it would have made little sense to fight to the last man just for its own sake.

By Eli on Oct 21, 2009 at 10:23 am

Communications between Brigade HQ and the various battalions were very difficult after the German airborne attack, and simple pre-standing “orders” would have been of limited value. Similarly, the Brigade commander lost much of his ability to provide on-going “command and control.” But had the battalion commanders been appropriately pre-briefed by General Hargest about the relative importance of the Brigrade’s defensive tasks, they should have themselves quickly realized the critical importance of holding the airfield and denying the Germans the ability to reinforce quickly and massively. I remain curious as to what kind of personal initiative was typical within the New Zealand land forces of that time, and how well General Hargest had given his subordinates an accurate overview of Brigade priorities prior to the attack. If the Kiwis had a hidebound approach to following orders rather than showing personal initiative, and coupled that with a tendency to keep info higher up the ladder rather than lower, it would explain a lot of what happened.

By Charles on Oct 21, 2009 at 2:37 pm

I suppose only orders in itself are not the only issue. The commanders intent with the orders are much more important. So if Hargest intent for Andrew’s orders had been to hold the position at the hill “at all costs” then I am sure he would have stayed in place. Personally I doubt that Hargest’s orders had this intent given the reasons mentioned earlier by others. Also dont forget that the NZ troops were not used to `modern` warfare and must have been at the end of their wits given the situation.

Unless there are some personal notes of Andrew and – or commanders subbordinate to him I doubt the whole truth will ever be known.

I would say that judging these situations and decisions by people who wer not `at the scene`is always going to be very easy.

Cheers

By Rene vd Assem on Oct 24, 2009 at 7:48 am

Although the LTC Andrew may not have had orders, he also had to have basic understanding of the situation. He was defending the main airfield on the Western side of the island against an airborne force whose only hope for reinforcement was through an airfield – more precisely his airfield. This situation is what commanders are paid for.

By Bill Nance on Oct 25, 2009 at 5:24 pm

I recall reading a book by a NZ survivor of the Crete campaign and admiring greatly their courage in extremely difficult circumstances, but also the apparent complete breakdown of communication between their fighting units, with the result that whilst they seemed to understand the importance of holding out, it was assumed that resistance had crumbled around them and thus the withdrawal. Unlike today, communication was a different story entirely. The next question that needs answering is whether Andrews had stayed fast, would it have defeated the invaders?

By Christopher Tarboton on Oct 26, 2009 at 5:17 am

Sorry I come late to this discussion. There is another angle to look at why Andrews decided to “bug out”. Perhaps this was another manifestation of the British “way of war” after the devastation they suffered during the Great War. France 1940, Singapore, Tobruk and Greece are more examples that demonstrate the British state of mind in the 1940’s.
This state of mind explains Montgomery’s greatness and success (except for Market Garden of course). He recognized this tendency and planned and executed battles in which the British soldier could win.

By Miguel Ondina on Oct 27, 2009 at 12:09 pm

The official Australian history is fairly clear about the cammender’s appreciation of the importance of the airfields. With Eban Emael and the Corinth Canal behind them, the British Commonwealth forces understood the importance –nay, the absolute necessity– of resupplying airborne troops via an airhead as soon as possible after the initial drop. The airfield was key: That’s why the Brits defended each one of them. British defense of Suda Bay was an afterthought left to the MNBDO because of the preoccupation with defending against airborne assault. No, I think it is clear that some people are made of sterner stuff and some aren’t (sorta like 2 of the 3 regiments of the US 106th Division in the Bulge). Andrews “put up the good fight” and saw his chance to live a comfortable existence in a German POW camp and he took it. Walking away was the easier course of action for a gentleman soldier. Funny how quickly and consistently it was recognized as the critical action of the battle. I don’t think he counted on that.

By Randall C. Reed on Nov 4, 2009 at 4:28 pm

Randall–

The New Zealand official history is a bit more protective of Andrew, and argues claims that Brigadier Hargest “misread the situation.” But your point is well taken.

May I ask: as you the Randall C. Reed who designed my favorite wargame of all time: Avalon Hill’s Air Assault on Crete? If so, welcome!

By Rob Citino on Nov 7, 2009 at 10:05 am