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I like Monty—sort of.By Robert M. Citino | Front & Center | 6 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post It’s easy to dislike Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery. He was a pompous blowhard, an egotist, and a braggart, and lot of Americans grind their teeth at the mention of his name. To hear him tell it, he was the man: the wise father of the victorious Allied campaign plan in Normandy, the calming presence who had to prop up a panicked U.S. command structure in the Bulge, and the grim warlord who oversaw the final drive over the Rhine and into Germany in 1945. It didn’t stop after the war, either. In 1957, he famously abused the hospitality of President Eisenhower during a Gettysburg battlefield tour by lecturing Ike on the course of the battle and the quality of both Lee and Meade’s generalship. Like many Americans confronted by Monty before and since, Ike seethed, and who can blame him? Subscribe Today
And yet, I can’t help but admit a strange admiration for the man. His generalship was not impeccable. He was cautious, so much so that it sometimes looked like timidity. Military historians are probably never going to warm to a commander who once summed up his art of war as “an infinite capacity for taking pains.” We prefer our hard-chargers, our Norm Cotas, our George Pattons, our Erwin Rommels. Given the perilous–indeed, disastrous–situation facing the British army in 1944, however, with infantry replacements all but dried up, it is hard to imagine aggressive Pattonesque leadership achieving much of anything. Monty led Britain’s last army, he knew it, and he led it pretty well, all things considered, from Alamein to the end. He knew the limitations of his force, he knew how to fight a managed, set-piece battle, and he understand the danger of getting into a maneuver contest with the Wehrmacht. As to his braggadocio and his tendency to see the war as nothing more than a line in his resumé, sure they were obnoxious, but let’s just say that “alpha male” behavior on this pattern is hardly uncommon among history’s great captains. It might even be a necessary attribute. This brings us to the battles for Caen in the summer of 1944, usually “exhibit A” in the anti-Monty indictment. It’s easy to build a case: the failure to take the city on D-Day (as he had promised), then a pair of disastrous right hooks at Villers-Bocage and Operation Epsom, and finally the ignominy of two breakthrough attempts that failed even though they were spearheaded by massive carpet bombings (Operations Charnwood and Goodwood). But even here, let’s be fair. Challenge to the reader: get out a Normandy situation map from July 1944. Then count the Panzer Divisions in each sector, the U.S. and the British. Then come up with a plan that would have worked better than Goodwood. Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Military History, World War II
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6 Comments to “I like Monty—sort of.”
I agree grudgingly with your comments of Montgomery. If one conducts an analysis of British manpower leading up to the D-Day landings, a bloodletting of the British Army would have disastrous results. It is reasonable to conclude that the manpower shortage facing Monty was critical. The movement of divisions/corps to Monty’s Army Group was a tactical and logistical decision. One point of Monty’s personality that rubs many the wrong way was his arrogance and Anglocentric outlook. This was a necessary view for Monty to take for morale reasons. Certainly the U.S. had the far greater amount of troops in the theater but Monty had the shortest and arguably more defended route to Germany. A tough road to hoe with manpower and morale issues.
By Mike Hegarty on Aug 6, 2009 at 8:12 pm
Mike-
I agree. I think that at this stage we have to be able to give credit where credit is due. Monty may have been obnoxious, but so what? He did what he could with the hand he’d been dealt.
–RC
By Rob Citino on Aug 7, 2009 at 9:05 am
I’m one to agree as well. I like Mike Hasting’s conclusions that everything that made up Monty’s personality is what made him such a great leader… and I think across the span of history there is not one great leader who did not have one flaw or another. It’s part of what makes them great, in my opinion.
Plus, given the British lack of manpower a relatively cautious leader is what they needed at the time. Even if it meant that the advance was painfully slow, it at least occupied the Germans, allowing the Americans and Canadians to cross the Atlantic, get into Europe and start spreading the Germans out and grinding them down to ensure an Allied victory.
By Andrew Morris on Sep 11, 2009 at 3:06 pm
Andrew–
Given manpower levels, the U.S. Army SHOULD have been ready to pay the greatest cost. It’s a simple matter of arithmetic.
By Rob Citino on Sep 11, 2009 at 7:44 pm
Rob I agree with you. Monty has been somewhat maligned by the wider public, Americans especially. The viscount absolutely had some personality flaws, but he was an able tactician and an excellent command officer. The sheer firepower the Germans had arrayed around Caen meant that any of the British operations in that area were going to be slow, bloody and painful. Had the roles been reversed I don’t think Patton would have done any better. But the fact is the Germans had to react to Monty’s moves, if the Normandy line had broken around Caen the road to Paris would have lay at Monty’s feet. The whole German army in Normandy would have been enveloped and its lines of communication cut, a situation more catastrophic than the disastrous withdrawal through Falese to the Rhine; likely the total destruction of the German forces in the west and the end of the war. Monty drew Wehrmacht strength in around Caen and the Germans had no choice but to concentrate there. Without this Patton would not have been able to break out in the west.
Additionally I don’t think you can criticize a Commander for an individual trait without examining the situation. Being cautious (or reckless for that matter) is not in itself a bad thing if the tactical situation calls for caution. I am yet to see an operation where Monty’s cautious style negatively affected the final outcome. Indeed his one major operational failure was the only time he rushed; a more cautious approach would have probably saved Market Garden. When facing an enemy with the aggression and flair for bold manoeuvre of Rommel someone who is a fundamentally sound tactician with an aptitude for set piece engagements and a cautious nature would seem to fit the bill perfectly. Seat of your pants double envelopments and deep penetrations are always more appealing to the average Joe, but against the afrika corps the 8th army would have been flanked and outmanoeuvred quick smart if it tried too much of that caper. Monty played to his strengths in Egypt and Libya; he pinned Rommel down and mauled him.
Monty was an egocentric narcissist and apparently hell to work with, but that shouldn’t detract from his achievements.
By Tim on Sep 27, 2009 at 11:33 pm
Tim–
All good points. Perhaps in terms of “style points”, Monty wasn’t the world’s greatest field commander. Then again, wars are not won on style points.
By Rob Citino on Sep 28, 2009 at 7:27 pm