It's easy to dislike Field Marshal Bernard Law Montgomery. He was a pompous blowhard, an egotist, and a braggart, and lot of Americans grind their teeth at the mention of his name. To hear him tell it, he was the man: the wise father of the victorious Allied campaign plan in Normandy, the calming presence who had to prop up a panicked U.S. command structure in the Bulge, and the grim warlord who oversaw the final drive over the Rhine and into Germany in 1945. It didn't stop after the war, either. In 1957, he famously abused the hospitality of President Eisenhower during a Gettysburg battlefield tour by lecturing Ike on the course of the battle and the quality of both Lee and Meade's generalship. Like many Americans confronted by Monty before and since, Ike seethed, and who can blame him?
And yet, I can't help but admit a strange admiration for the man. His generalship was not impeccable. He was cautious, so much so that it sometimes looked like timidity. Military historians are probably never going to warm to a commander who once summed up his art of war as "an infinite capacity for taking pains." We prefer our hard-chargers, our Norm Cotas, our George Pattons, our Erwin Rommels. Given the perilous–indeed, disastrous–situation facing the British army in 1944, however, with infantry replacements all but dried up, it is hard to imagine aggressive Pattonesque leadership achieving much of anything. Monty led Britain's last army, he knew it, and he led it pretty well, all things considered, from Alamein to the end. He knew the limitations of his force, he knew how to fight a managed, set-piece battle, and he understand the danger of getting into a maneuver contest with the Wehrmacht. As to his braggadocio and his tendency to see the war as nothing more than a line in his resumé, sure they were obnoxious, but let's just say that "alpha male" behavior on this pattern is hardly uncommon among history's great captains. It might even be a necessary attribute.
This brings us to the battles for Caen in the summer of 1944, usually "exhibit A" in the anti-Monty indictment. It's easy to build a case: the failure to take the city on D-Day (as he had promised), then a pair of disastrous right hooks at Villers-Bocage and Operation Epsom, and finally the ignominy of two breakthrough attempts that failed even though they were spearheaded by massive carpet bombings (Operations Charnwood and Goodwood). But even here, let's be fair. Challenge to the reader: get out a Normandy situation map from July 1944. Then count the Panzer Divisions in each sector, the U.S. and the British. Then come up with a plan that would have worked better than Goodwood.
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I agree grudgingly with your comments of Montgomery. If one conducts an analysis of British manpower leading up to the D-Day landings, a bloodletting of the British Army would have disastrous results. It is reasonable to conclude that the manpower shortage facing Monty was critical. The movement of divisions/corps to Monty's Army Group was a tactical and logistical decision. One point of Monty's personality that rubs many the wrong way was his arrogance and Anglocentric outlook. This was a necessary view for Monty to take for morale reasons. Certainly the U.S. had the far greater amount of troops in the theater but Monty had the shortest and arguably more defended route to Germany. A tough road to hoe with manpower and morale issues.
Mike-
I agree. I think that at this stage we have to be able to give credit where credit is due. Monty may have been obnoxious, but so what? He did what he could with the hand he'd been dealt.
–RC
I'm one to agree as well. I like Mike Hasting's conclusions that everything that made up Monty's personality is what made him such a great leader… and I think across the span of history there is not one great leader who did not have one flaw or another. It's part of what makes them great, in my opinion.
Plus, given the British lack of manpower a relatively cautious leader is what they needed at the time. Even if it meant that the advance was painfully slow, it at least occupied the Germans, allowing the Americans and Canadians to cross the Atlantic, get into Europe and start spreading the Germans out and grinding them down to ensure an Allied victory.
Andrew–
Given manpower levels, the U.S. Army SHOULD have been ready to pay the greatest cost. It's a simple matter of arithmetic.
Rob I agree with you. Monty has been somewhat maligned by the wider public, Americans especially. The viscount absolutely had some personality flaws, but he was an able tactician and an excellent command officer. The sheer firepower the Germans had arrayed around Caen meant that any of the British operations in that area were going to be slow, bloody and painful. Had the roles been reversed I don’t think Patton would have done any better. But the fact is the Germans had to react to Monty’s moves, if the Normandy line had broken around Caen the road to Paris would have lay at Monty's feet. The whole German army in Normandy would have been enveloped and its lines of communication cut, a situation more catastrophic than the disastrous withdrawal through Falese to the Rhine; likely the total destruction of the German forces in the west and the end of the war. Monty drew Wehrmacht strength in around Caen and the Germans had no choice but to concentrate there. Without this Patton would not have been able to break out in the west.
Additionally I don’t think you can criticize a Commander for an individual trait without examining the situation. Being cautious (or reckless for that matter) is not in itself a bad thing if the tactical situation calls for caution. I am yet to see an operation where Monty’s cautious style negatively affected the final outcome. Indeed his one major operational failure was the only time he rushed; a more cautious approach would have probably saved Market Garden. When facing an enemy with the aggression and flair for bold manoeuvre of Rommel someone who is a fundamentally sound tactician with an aptitude for set piece engagements and a cautious nature would seem to fit the bill perfectly. Seat of your pants double envelopments and deep penetrations are always more appealing to the average Joe, but against the afrika corps the 8th army would have been flanked and outmanoeuvred quick smart if it tried too much of that caper. Monty played to his strengths in Egypt and Libya; he pinned Rommel down and mauled him.
Monty was an egocentric narcissist and apparently hell to work with, but that shouldn’t detract from his achievements.
Tim–
All good points. Perhaps in terms of "style points", Monty wasn't the world's greatest field commander. Then again, wars are not won on style points.
Oh Please. He was timid to the point of being reckless and causing more casualties due to letting the enemy escape. He was intimidated by Rommel and wouldn't take ANY risks. Maybe that was good, because he didn't have the talent to pull it off.
Case 1 – Alamein and pursuit. Rommel had a shell of an army with no fuel. He let all but some of the unomotorized Italians escape. These escaped troops caused more Brit casualties down the road
Case 2 – Italy with the Americans under fire at Salerno, he plodded up the toe with no hurry, with virtually no opposition. this caused more American casualties
Case 3 – Goodwood – the coordination between the infantry and the armor was pathetic. The logistics of getting the troops across the bridges was poorly planned and executed. Granted he faced tough German troops, but they were at far less than full strength.
Case 4 – Falaise – There was a need for quick action to trap the German armies. Something Monty was incapable of. These escaped troops caused more Brit casualties down the road
Case 5 – Amsterdam – Took the city, but failed to realize that the city was worthless without the approaches. Actually, failed to realize it although he was told this was the case. Instead of taking the Scheldt when it was there for the taking, he delayed causing more casualties to the Canadians in slogging through the river areas AND the resulting longer supply lines also lengthened the war.
Personal opinion, the guy was good at one thing. Waiting until he had an overwhelming amount of force and then bludgeoning his way through. No creativity at all. The ONE thing I will give him was stopping Rommel at Alam Halfa. He judged correctly that Rommel would attack from the south and judged the terrain correctly in placing his troops along the ridge. Of course, having enormous supply advantages and a narrow attack corridor made his job much easier than his predecessors.
Case 1 – Alamein and pursuit – worn out after days of heavy fighting and lacking in supplies pursuit wasn't really possible.
Case 2 – Italy with the Americans under fire at Salerno – every bridge in hilly country destroyed and the ruins defended – how would you have advanced any faster?
Case 3 – Goodwood – yes UK armour / infantry co-ordination wasn't that good (like the American's in the Bocage) but having to charge headlong into 88's across open country? What would your plan be?
Case 4 – Falaise – some Germans were trapped, some weren't – you can't always get what you want.
Case 5 – Amsterdam – after the longest fastest advance in the history of the western front the British army was worn out. It's debatable if they could have gone any further. You might just as well say that he should have gone all the way to Berlin.
"not creative" LOL – remember Market Garden?
His greatest failing was not realising the importance of PR in war – for some reason he thought wining was more important.
Canadians in the know consider Monty a butcher. Not of Germans but of those under his command. Idiotic Canadian politicians allowed Canadian troops to be commanded by the British (Monty) as also happened in WWI. He used them as "cannon fodder", to wit: Dieppe, Alamein, Arnhiem and other situations. Caen is just one example. He does not even allow that it was Canadians that were massacred. He was cautious to the point of being dangerous to his own. He fed troops piece meal. Years ago I had talked to numerous Canadian soldiers about Monty. They hated his guts because they lose commrades needlessly. All those would have far rather been commanded by Patton.
Yes he was an egoistic , vain , narcisstic human being. His contant bossy attitude and (I told you so) remarks were not just harmful to his reputation but also coordination of Allied operations and gained him multiple enemies. (Bedell Smith once told Monty he is great to serve under , OK to serve with but hell to serve over ) That said he was a very good trainer of troops , great morale raiser and capable strategic planner. Over cautious is not always a bad thing. You have to set your objectives according to resources you have. Monty took over a very damaged and faulty instrument in shape of British Army in 1942-44 period. Later Allied soldiers are dubbed as civilians in uniform. Monty probably saw that before anyone else. Allied troops probably would never be expert soldiers ready to exploit enemy weakness to full extent. That's why he did not overwhelm overflank retreating Rommel after Alamein. There were numerous times in desert when British commanders assumed Rommel was weak or finished ( El Ageylia 1941 and 1942 , in Gazala 1942 ) and he came back to give them a bloody nose again and again. To have material superiorty is not everything. To raise morale and keep his credibility it is understandable he kept pursuing retreating DAK not flanking trying to destroy it.
In Italy 8th Army advance badly handicapped by demolitions of bridges and mining by retreating Germans. Besides terrain was suitable for defence. Agreed he might throw caution a little bit overboard though.
In Normandy both Monty , Bradley and Ike admitted British/Canadian troops would have to sacrifice themselves so Americans could break through before invasion started. Admitted he stalled before Caen and his statements that everything is according to plan were ill considered. Still 2nd British Army and Canadians were fighting against bulk of Panzer Group West , constantly pushing them back slowly in WWI style attrition because these were the cards he was dealt with.
His only operational failures were inabilty of closing Scheldt Estuary in Sept 1944 and Market Garden which shouldn't have been initiated in first place. There are no excuses for these mistakes of his. Otherwise he did an OK job maybe not just a spectacular one like Patton used to do with mobile cavalry tactics.