Gaius Julius Caesar’s African Campaign: The Campaign to Destroy the Allies of Gnaeus Pompeius Magnus

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Following this encounter, there was a three-week hiatus. Caesar further strengthened his lines on the plateau of Ruspina and trained his recruits, while ships from his first convoy continuously arrived with reinforcements. Juba had been compelled to return to Numidia by the timely intervention of Bocchus of Mauretania and Publius Sittius, but he left some cavalry and 30 elephants with Scipio. Even without Juba’s help, the Pompeians were too strong for Caesar to launch an offensive, but finally the second segment of his expedition arrived, bringing two forces, Legions XIII and XIV, 800 cavalry and 1,000 archers and slingers. Now with eight legions, Caesar could hope for victory in a pitched battle before Juba returned.

The terrain around Ruspina did not lend itself to such a battle and was not easy to supply. Caesar’s horses had already begun to suffer from lack of fresh fodder. Therefore, on the night of November 7, he moved his forces to a group of low hills six or seven miles to the south. This helped in gaining provisions, but it did not provoke the confrontation he desired. Scipio encamped so as to be able to use the town of Uzita to strengthen his position, and he could not be induced to fight except in the unlikely event that he possessed the advantage. Caesar, now further re-

inforced by the arrival of Legions IX and X, extended his lines so as to threaten Uzita, but again he was foiled by his opponents’ skillful use of the terrain. In addition, even here he was having difficulty supplying his troops with corn and other provisions, so he decided to move on to another, more fertile area.

Ten weeks after leaving Ruspina, Caesar set fire to his camp near Uzita and marched about 20 miles southeast to Aggar. Some minor clashes followed. But later, when an additional 4,000 legionaries and 1,000 archers and slingers arrived from Sicily, Caesar decided the time had come to strike a decisive blow. In order to overcome the superior numbers of the enemy and to neutralize the effect of their cavalry in a pitched battle, he required equal ground with a limited front. Only Caesar’s genius and daring could have provided the solutions to this problem. Fifteen miles to his north lay the city of Thapsus on the sea, approached by necks (isthmuses) of land on either side of a wide lagoon. It was held by a strong Pompeian garrison. After a night march, Caesar organized lines of defense and advanced on the city.

Scipio then tried to cross the same isthmus. Caesar had anticipated this. On the previous day he had built a fort there and installed a garrison of three cohorts, while he and the rest of his forces invested Thapsus with a line of siege works. Finding the isthmus barred to him, Scipio proceeded to the western side of the lake and built a camp. When Caesar learned that, he abandoned his siege works and moved against Scipio on February 6, 46 BC. This was the moment for which he had yearned: His enemy lay with the sea on one flank and the lagoon on the other; retreat to safety would be very difficult.

As described in The African War:’When Caesar arrived and saw that Scipio had his line drawn up in front of the rampart, with elephants stationed on both wings…he himself drew up a three-fold line and posted his Legions X and II on the right wing, the VIII and IX on the left, and five cohorts from Legion V on each wing as a fourth line, opposite the elephants. On both wings he had archers, slingers and cavalry interspersed with light infantry.’ Seeing frenzied activity among the enemy, Caesar’s officers and veterans urged him to attack immediately, but he preferred to organize his forces professionally before advancing.

Suddenly a trumpeter on his right wing, yielding to pressure from the troops and without Caesar’s orders, began to sound the charge. This was taken up by all the cohorts, and they began to advance even as the centurions tried to restrain them. Caesar realized that it was impossible to resist his troops’ impetuosity and set his horse at a gallop against the Pompeian front line. The slingers and archers on his right wing hurled missile volleys at the dense mass of enemy elephants, which became terrified and caused havoc. Then the front ranks on the same wing, consisting of Moorish cavalry, fled. Caesar’s legions charged around the elephants and seized the enemy’s rampart, causing a frenzied retreat.

Scipio’s forces were routed over the entire field, with Caesar’s legions in hot pursuit. Finally the Pompeians halted on a hill and laid down their arms; the victors, however, could not be restrained. Ten thousand Pompeians were slaughtered and a good many put to flight. The soldiers then turned savagely against Roman senators and knights and even against their own officers, whom they accused of softness toward the enemy. Caesar returned to camp with the loss of 50 of his own men and a few wounded. The city of Thapsus itself was taken without resistance. Some rebel Republican leaders, including Pompey’s two sons, fled to Spain, where a revolt against Caesar’s deputies had already broken out, but many of them perished on the way. Scipio, when cornered by Publius Sittius at sea, stabbed himself. Juba also died by his own hand, and Caesar annexed Numidia as a province after exacting large fines from the individuals and communities that had supported his enemies.

According to The Cambridge Ancient History,’The strategy by which Caesar had brought off the battle of Thapsus was his crowning masterpiece.’ But in his work Death of a Republic, John Dickinson writes that’The dramatic climax of the war for Africa was not Caesar’s victory at Thapsus but the death of Marcus Porcius Cato. He was not present at the battle, for he had been left in command of Utica, the republican headquarters….In the end, the Roman residents of Utica told Cato that they wished to submit to Caesar, and he did not oppose them.’

As the Republicans were leaving Utica, Cato invited some prominent Roman residents to supper, where he discussed Stoic philosophy. After the gathering broke up, Cato withdrew to his room and later called for his sword and calmly committed suicide. Cato’s demise was symbolic of Caesar’s victory over the Republicans. Although the civil war continued in Spain, his dominance was assured.

Upon his return to Rome, Caesar celebrated his victory at Thapsus. As Plutarch points out:’He did not omit to pronounce before the people a magnificent account of his victory, telling them that he had subdued a country which would supply the public every year with two hundred thousand attic bushels of corn and three million pounds’ weight of oil. He then led three triumphs for Egypt, Pontus, and Africa….After the triumphs, he distributed rewards to his soldiers, and treated the people with feasting and shows.’

The critical victories at Pharsalus and Thapsus ended the joint rule of Pompey and Caesar, and while conspiracies, revolutions and temporary restorations might follow, the Roman Republic, which had spanned 500 years, was terminated. For all intents and purposes, Julius Caesar was the first emperor in all but name — at least until the fateful Ides of March in 44 BC.

This article was written by Jonas Goldstein and originally published in the June 2006 issue of Military History magazine. For more great articles be sure to subscribe to Military History magazine today!

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Tags: Ancient-Medieval, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures