Photograph by Jennifer E. Berry'The Soviet troops are sacrificial lambs. Divisions that come in with 10,000 men have 500 the next day'
A retired U.S. Army colonel fluent in Russian, David M. Glantz writes data-rich tomes that synthesize his research in the recently opened Soviet archives. His goal: to debunk long-standing myths with what he calls "ground truth." His latest epics, To the Gates of Stalingrad and Armageddon in Stalingrad (both published in 2009, with a third volume due next year), recast history's biggest battle in a new light. For example, he and coauthor Jonathan M. House are the first historians to use archival material from the brutal Soviet secret police force, the NKVD, which was charged with maintaining discipline in the Red Army. "Its documents are surprisingly candid about declining morale, the amount of censorship, numbers of deserters, and so on," Glantz says, "a human dimension of the battle often speculated upon but never before documented."
Subscribe Today
What do you mean by ground truth?
I mean examining the records of both sides to finally strip away the myths and begin to restore reality. You can't reach judgments regarding political, diplomatic, economic, or social factors in the war as a whole unless you have reached sound decisions regarding how the war was conducted, to what end it was conducted, and so forth. Historians today are focused not on operational but social issues. But it all sits on the structure of military reality.
Why choose Stalingrad?
There have been hundreds of books on the battle, dating back to the early 1950s. Many early ones were German memoirs, or about specific Germans. In the 1980s and 1990s, many were essentially derived from those sources plus a narrow base of Soviet sources, the predominant one being memoirs by Vasily Chuikov, who headed the Soviet Sixty-second Army; those are quite accurate and very good. But over time, all these books incorporated the same basic conclusions about the campaign as a whole and the battle for the city. And many of those conclusions are simply wrong.
For example?
One common perception is this: unlike in Barbarossa in 1941, where the Soviet army resisted the Wehrmacht and took immense casualties, during Blau in 1942 Stalin very quickly withdraws his forces and decides to trade space for time; once he gets back to a more defensible line, he launches a counteroffensive. That's flat wrong. From Blau's very beginning, Stalin's orders are to stand and fight. His strategy throughout the war is to attack everywhere at every time, in the belief that somewhere someone will break.
Does the Red Army attack on the road to Stalingrad?
Despite widespread belief otherwise, there's some horrendous fighting, generally caused by Soviet forces in counterattacks, counterstrokes, and even counteroffensives. The most important comes in July along the Germans' northern flank. Stalin commits a tank army as well as other new formations that didn't exist in 1941. There are major tank battles, 500 to 1,000 Soviet tanks.
What do these achieve?
In the first operations they're very poorly led, and so don't achieve that much—except that they bleed the Germans. The same thing happens at the end of July: two new Soviet tank armies appear at the bend of the Don River and launch counterattacks in support of the new Sixty-second Army. This huge tank battle goes on for nearly three weeks, and throws the German plan right out the window.
Why?
The number of Germans in the attacking infantry force is far smaller than in 1941, and many of the infantry units trailing in the panzers' wake are Romanians and Italians, who aren't really interested in dying for the führer. So in 1942, although Russian armies are encircled and their fighting ability destroyed, the troops get out and either go to ground or rejoin the Red Army later.
What happens to the German plan?
As Sixth Army advances, it has to protect its flanks, especially along the Don. So an ever-smaller part of the army is committed forward. After they clear the bend in the Don, they mount an offensive to seize the city. This is probably the most important point in the Battle of Stalingrad. They plan to seize the city by crossing the Don and advancing to the Volga in two pincers headed by panzer corps: get them into Stalingrad from the north and south, and seize it without a fight.
What stops them?
As soon as they launch their attacks, the Soviets begin counterattacks. They're often suicidal and futile, but totally preoccupy the northern panzer corps and prevent it from turning any forces south toward the city. That leaves three German divisions in hedgehogs stretched along a 40-kilometer road. They never get into the factory district in the north end of the city, which becomes the site of the last battles. The southern pincer does what it is supposed to. But the Soviet reaction north of the city thwarts [Sixth Army commander Friedrich] Paulus's plan.
Where does that leave him?
With one infantry corps—the only force he has to reduce the city. It has three infantry divisions in it, and a few other supporting groups—only one-third of Sixth Army. Since he can't get into Stalingrad with his armor, he goes in from the west on foot—block by block, street by street. He does try to lead attacks with armor, until each of those panzer divisions is worn out. By the time he's in the center city and trying to get into the north, German armor is gone and he's in a slug match. By October 1942, his regiments are battalions, divisions are regiments, and Sixth Army is probably a corps.
What is the Soviet strategy?
To feed just enough troops into the city to keep it from falling. They are sacrificial lambs. Divisions that come in with 10,000 men have 500 the next day. Many divisions are fragments. The 13th Guards, always described as an elite force, was destroyed two months before; they're sent in half-trained and one-third equipped. The 284th Rifle Division, popularized in the film Enemy at the Gates—only one of its three regiments has rifles. It's like Muhammad Ali's rope-a-dope. It was so brutal that Stavka, the Soviet high command, forbade A. I. Eremenko, Stalingrad front commander, and his commissar, Nikita Khrushchev, from crossing the river into the city: Stavka was afraid they'd develop an affinity with the poor troops dying there and decide to abandon it.
How do the Germans react?
For them it becomes a meat grinder. Every division they send in is weakened, so they have to pull new ones off the flanks. According to Sixth Army's loss figures, most divisions go in rated combat-ready. Within a week, they're rated either as weak or exhausted. The attrition rate is phenomenal. The Luftwaffe's rubbling of the city only exacerbates things. In early November, they run out of divisions. It's a true war of attrition.
How do they maintain the offensive?
They take all the engineer battalions out of Army Group B, which makes the final attack on November 11. So they have nobody to defend the Don, except Italians and Romanians. Hungarians are already in the line. Army Group B's left flank is an allied army group. The Soviets understand that weakness from their intelligence, and that's where they launch their counteroffensive.
What kind of leader was Stalin?
The myth is that Stalin micromanaged the first year, then at about the time of Stalingrad began deferring to his commanders, and thereafter the commanders fought the war under his general guidance. That's wrong. He was hands-on throughout. In 1941, his stubbornness and insistence on fighting back cost him a lot, but also ensured that Hitler's key assumption—that the Red Army would dissolve once it was smashed—didn't happen. By 1942, after Leningrad and Moscow, Stalin and Marshal Georgi Zhukov think alike. They understand that even if you have to ruthlessly expend manpower, resistance will wear down a numerically weaker opponent. That tactic cost probably 14 million military dead—the price of defeating a more experienced, battle-worthy, savvy Wehrmacht.
This article originally appeared in the May/June 2010 issue of World War II. Click here to hear Glantz discuss his Stalingrad trilogy in a HistoryNet podcast.
Loading ...
Mr. Glantz is by far my favorite WWII author. His books are just incredible. Kursk, Leningrad, Operation Mars, now his trilogy on the Stalingrad campaigns are just required reading for all WWII readers.
I don't know what to make of Joseph Stalin's stratagems. On the one hand, Stalin ignores the lustrous ascendance and near triumph of the glorious potential of free Man. But on the other hand, it is saddening to have to tell Stalin that he is the most lubricious polemic witnessed by the history of mankind. Without going into all the gory details, let's just say that I have observed that those who disagree with me on the next point tend to be unsophisticated and those who recognize the validity of the point to be more educated. The point is that I have reason to believe that Stalin is about to waste our time and money. I pray that I'm wrong, of course, because the outcome could be devastating. Nevertheless, the indications are there that when Stalin hears anyone say that history teaches us that to ignore or dismiss people like Stalin simply as insane, impulsive dips can have devastating consequences, Stalin's answer is to gag the innocent accused from protesting racism-motivated prosecutions. That's similar to taking a few drunken swings at a beehive: it just makes me want even more to make him pay for his crimes against humanity. To end this letter, I would like to make a bet with Joseph Stalin. I will gladly give him a day's salary if he can prove that honor counts for nothing, as he insists. If Stalin is unable to prove that, then his end of the bargain is to step aside while I place a high value on honor and self-respect. So, do we have a bet, Stalin?
Churchill and Hitler and history and stuff..
Winston Churchill was knighted after World War 2 and buried from Westminster Abbey, perhaps the highest tribute that could be paid to him, while Adolf Hitler has been accorded the status of perhaps the most evil politician in human history.
WINSTON CHURCHILL in July 1940
"When I look around to see how we can win the war I see that there is only one sure path. We have no Continental army which can defeat the German military power.. Should [Hitler].. not try invasion [of Britain].. there is one thing that will bring him back and bring him down, and that is an absolutely devastating, exterminating attack by very heavy bombers from this country upon the Nazi homeland. We must be able to overwhelm them by this means, without which I do not see a way through. We cannot accept any aim lower than air mastery. When can it be obtained?" [Extract from Winston S Churchill The Second World War (Volume 2 Their Finest Hour Appendix A), Memo from Prime Minister to Minister of Aircraft Production, 8.July 1940].
ADOLF HITLER in May 1940
Britain and France declared war on Germany, not the other way around. Hitler actually wanted peace with Britain, as the German generals admitted (Basil Liddell Hart, The Other Side of the Hill 1948, Pan Books 1983) with regard to the so-called Halt Order of 24 May 1940 at Dunkirk, where Hitler had the opportunity to capture the entire British Army, but chose not to. Liddell Hart, one of Britain’s most respected military historians, quotes the German General von Blumentritt with regard to this Halt Order:
"He (Hitler) then astonished us by speaking with admiration of the British Empire, of the necessity for its existence, and of the civilization that Britain had brought into the world. He remarked, with a shrug of the shoulders, that the creation of its Empire had been achieved by means that were often harsh, but ‘where there is planing, there are shavings flying’. He compared the British Empire with the Catholic Church – saying they were both essential elements of stability in the world. He said that all he wanted from Britain was that she should acknowledge Germany’s position on the Continent. The return of Germany’s colonies would be desirable but not essential, and he would even offer to support Britain with troops if she should be involved in difficulties anywhere.." (p 200).
According to Liddell Hart, "At the time we believed that the repulse of the Luftwaffe in the ‘Battle over Britain’ had saved her. That is only part of the explanation, the last part of it. The original cause, which goes much deeper, is that Hitler did not want to conquer England. He took little interest in the invasion preparations, and for weeks did nothing to spur them on; then, after a brief impulse to invade, he veered around again and suspended the preparations. He was preparing, instead, to invade Russia" (p140).
David Irving in the foreword to his book The Warpath (1978) refers to "the discovery.. that at no time did this man (Hitler) pose or intend a real threat to Britain or the Empire."
And.. it’s now official – there’s no actual shortage of Holocaust survivors:
Quote from The Holocaust Industry by Norman G. Finkelstein of the City University of New York, published by Verso in the year 2000:
'The Israeli Prime Minister's office recently put the number of "living Holocaust survivors" at nearly a million.' (page 83)
At the Nuremberg trials, captured German leaders were convicted of ‘crimes against humanity’ and ‘war crimes’ as defined in the London Charter signed on August 8 1945 by the Allied powers. The judicial procedures that were followed remain interesting. The Trials were judicial in appearance only. The judges were not neutral. The victors in the war commissioned their own judges, who were under pressure to provide justification for Allied policies. The Allies themselves were guilty of major war crimes, the most outstanding of which were
* the fire-bombing of the civilian residential areas of Dresden (no military significance) under Winston Churchill’s orders (David Irving The Destruction of Dresden (1966) pp. 96-100), Alexander McKee Dresden 1945 (1982) p 300, 306, 310); and
* the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9 1945, in spite of the fact that Japan had signalled her willingness to capitulate some weeks previously (Robert Junck Brighter than a Thousand Suns (1958) pp. 189-191, Martin J Sherwin A World Destroyed (1975) pp. 235-237).
To summarize the sequence of the important dates concerning the atomic bombing:
* Mid-July 1945: Japanese government communicates to US government their willingness to negotiate capitulation;
* August 6 1945: US drops atom bomb on Hiroshima;
* August 8 1945: US signs the 'London Charter', or Charter of the International Military Tribunal defining war crimes, including Principle 6 (b) ‘wanton destruction of cities, towns, or villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity.’
* August 9 1945: US drops atom bomb on Nagasaki.
With reference to the atomic bomb, Admiral William Leahy – Chief of Staff to both Roosevelt and Truman – commented, 'My own feeling was that, in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Age. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.' (Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War (1970) p725-6, JFC Fuller, The Decisive Battles of the Western World, 1792-1945 (1970) p584).
Awkwardly enough, for the sake of judicial impartiality, Churchill and Truman should themselves have been hung at Nuremberg for these undoubted crimes.
You are incorrect. Wars can be won by destroying women and children if you are ruthless enough about it.
History is written by the victors and history is a lie.
Adolf Hitler Zionist collaboration
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-0oDRYvoqPM
In my view, the biggest problem the Germans had in WWII was that they were completely lost in the realm of grand strategy. Tactically and operationally they were superior to their enemies, especially the Russians, but their top-level decisions were almost unbelievably bad. The Russians, on the other hand, were tactically inferior, but operationally and strategically competent. There's a lot more that could be said, but I think that fairly well sums it up; given Soviet industrial superiority along with their greater troop numbers, German strategic incompetence guaranteed the outcome.
[...] http://www.historynet.com/david-m-glantz.htm [...]
James you ate a world class clown to even dare to compare Churchill to the scum that was Hitler.
Remember we didn't start the war Hitler did , Hitler waged war throughput Europe while the UK was the only power to stand tall and win the first battle . You might remember it "The Battle Of Britain" while the US stood on the sidelines and the Russians cut deals with Hitler.
So remember it was a 39-45 war for the Uk , Canada and India.
Oh yeah Battle Of Britain , El Alemein , Radar , Bletchley Park , Enigma etc etc etc
Hitler hit Poland first; Why? Because he wanted a land-connect with the USSR; Why?Andrew Nagorski has the exact answer. August 11 1939; Hitler speaks privately with Commissioner Burckhardt (League of Nations)
" Everything I undertake is directed against the Russians. If the West is too stupid and blind to grasp this, then I shall be compelled to come to an agreement with the Russians, beat the West and then after their defeat turn against the Soviet Union with all my forces. I need the Ukraine so they can't starve us out, as happened in the last war"
World War Two explained by a madman days before he signed up with Stalin. Why did this stupid Commissioner not reveal this?
So how do you get in contact with Glantz to correct a glaring error in his book about Barbarossa?
Colonel Glantz, thank you very much for the series of books covering the Soviet-German War. Comprehensive and thoroughly referenced literatures are not easy to come by. I still have two hard-bound titles in my bookshelf: When Titans Clashed and Stumbling Colossus.
This repetitively suicidal attacks made by the Soviets remind me of a Romanian classmate of mine whose granddad had served on the Stalingrad Front. I was told that the Russians were making numerous suicidal assaults where his granddad's unit defended. It did not make much sense and I brushed it aside as a typical 'Axis perception' of that battle. But now that it is a fact that such a ruthless conduct of Stalingrad operation was integral to Soviet planning … wow!
Perhaps single thing that still astonishes me is how the Germans became sucked up into a war of attrition. They already got rough handled in 1941 and, by mid 1942, they should have known better. Yet, they allow themselves to become even more attrited. It is as though this war has ballooned into a war for the sake of to see who is literally the last one standing!