In May 1967 an organization known as CORDS—Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support—was formed to coordinate the U.S. civil and military pacification programs. A unique hybrid civil-military structure directly under general William C. Westmoreland, the COMUSMACV, CORDS was headed by a civilian, Ambassador Robert W. Komer, who was appointed as Westmoreland’s deputy.

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CORDS pulled together all the various U.S. military and civilian agencies involved in the pacification effort, including the State Department, the AID, the USIA and the CIA. U.S. military or civilian province senior advisers were appointed, and CORDS civilian/military advisory teams were dispatched throughout South Vietnam’s 44 provinces and 250 districts.

One such senior adviser was then Lt. Col. Philip Bolté, U.S. Army. Upon graduation from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point in October 1950, 2nd Lt. Bolté reported for duty with the 1st Cavalry Division in Korea. That November and December, Bolté participated in the Eighth Army’s retreat from North Korea, where he and his fellow soldiers “went 100 miles north and 200 miles south, for a net loss of 100 miles.” Wounded in action, he was taken to Japan for treatment. Years later, he would tell his soldiers in Vietnam, “If you have a choice to go to a cold war or a hot war, take the hot one!”

Retired from the U.S. Army with the rank of brigadier general, Bolté was interviewed by Al Hemingway in 1994 about his experiences with CORDS.

Vietnam: When did you arrive in Vietnam?

Bolté: In December 1967. I was assigned as a province senior adviser in Quang Tin province, I Corps section of South Vietnam. Tam Ky was the capital.

VN: What were the duties of a province senior adviser?

Bolté: My assignment was to advise the province chief in military operations, pacification efforts and civil affairs, which was virtually everything in that province.

VN: Who was the province chief at that time?

Bolté: My counterpart was Lt. Col. Haung Dinh Tho. He was later promoted to colonel. On my staff, I had a deputy sector adviser who was a lieutenant colonel. In addition, I had a military adviser for each of the staff members in intelligence, logistic, operations, etc. On the civilian side, I had a civilian deputy province senior adviser. Under him were refugee advisers, a Chieu Hoi adviser, two logistics advisers, an engineer adviser, etc. Two American Red Cross representatives were there also, and I supported them, although they were not under my command. We also had a military province hospital assistance team. Although they were a U.S. Navy unit, they were attached to me. In fact, a Seabee detachment located in Tam Ky was building a new province hospital.

VN: Sounds like a real ad hoc group.

Bolté: Oh, it was. We also had Marine Corps CAPs in our AO. Their headquarters were in Da Nang, and they were under the control of the III MAF. However, the RF and PF they worked with were commanded by my province chief.

VN: Talk about confusion.

Bolté: It really was. But things got done. I had a Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office adviser, a Marine lieutenant colonel on loan to the State Department and operating as a civilian involved in province communication efforts—handing out leaflets, coordinating the media, showing films to the public, that sort of thing. There was a bunch of Koreans building a province maintenance shop to maintain province official vehicles. All this was part of the advisory program. The facilities we built are probably being used by the Communists today.

VN: In Quang Tin province how many districts were there?

Bolté: Let me explain: Provinces are like states, and districts are similar to counties in those states. Under the districts were the villages and hamlets. Each district had a headquarters and a district chief. Each of the districts had an advisory team commanded by a major. They were all military personnel because the area was never that pacified. In Quang Tin, we ostensibly had five districts. Three were situated along Highway I and were basically friendly. Another one was a little farther west, and it, too, was friendly. However, it was isolated. This district had been cut off for four years, and it could only be resupplied by air. The adviser there was, in fact, a Special Forces captain not under my command, but we worked well together. The fifth district was farther out to the west, and it was nothing more than an outpost and did not have a permanent advisory team. So you see, nothing was simple.

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