Battle of Shiloh: The Devil’s Own Day » HistoryNet - From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher

Dawn was just starting to break over the Union army camp in southwestern Tennessee on Sunday morning, April 6, 1862. It was an unusually peaceful morning for the young men in Federal blue. Their Army of the Tennessee had recently emerged victorious in engagements with Rebel forces at Forts Donelson and Henry. More than 15,000 Confederates had been taken prisoner in those two actions. All organized Rebel resistance in the area appeared to be shattered; the nearest Confederate force of any size was at Corinth, Mississippi, 20 miles away.

So confident were the army’s leaders of their safety that no defensive works had been constructed around the Union camp, and their commander, Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant, was 20 miles away at a meeting with Maj. Gen. Don Carlos Buell, head of the Army of the Ohio. Grant had not even bothered to leave an officer in temporary command during his absence. The Army of the Tennessee awoke that sleepy Sunday morning near the old Shiloh Meeting House, some three miles west of Pittsburg Landing, secure in the knowledge that all the fighting was over for the immediate future.

They were wrong. Less than two miles to their south were 40,000 Confederates, organized into four corps of the Army of the Mississippi, under the command of General Albert Sidney Johnston, one of the most respected military minds on either side of the Mason-Dixon Line. Johnston, dispatched to the Western theater of the war by an increasingly alarmed Confederate high command, was faced with both a seriously deteriorating situation, on one hand, and a golden opportunity, on the other.

Johnston’s situation that April was serious, if not desperate. At the beginning of 1862, the Confederate defense in the West was anchored on the Mississippi River, with a fortress at Columbus, Ky. The center was held by Forts Henry and Donelson on the Cumberland River near the Kentucky-Tennessee border; the right flank was anchored near Bowling Green in central Kentucky. The year opened with a blow on the eastern flank, when Union Brig. Gen. George Thomas shattered a Rebel force under Maj. Gen. George Crittenden at Mill Springs, Ky. Thomas’ victory was followed shortly by Grant’s astonishing successes at Forts Henry and Donelson. The Rebel hold on Tennessee’s state capital at Nashville was effectively broken.

With his right flank shattered and his center pierced, Johnston had no choice but to evacuate the heavy fortifications at Columbus and fall back deeper south. At the beginning of April, Grant was following close behind at Pittsburg Landing, with Buell following the eastern bank of the Tennessee and a joint army-navy task force closing in on Memphis.

Despite the favorable strategic situation, the Union forces had some serious tactical disadvantages. They lacked a unified command structure, with their forces scattered throughout three separate commands–Buell’s 25,000-man Army of the Ohio, Grant’s 42,000-man Army of the Tennessee and Maj. Gen. John Pope’s joint riverene force moving south along the Mississippi. The three forces were in no position, therefore, to immediately support one another.

By evacuating the Columbus forts and the Nashville garrison, as well as stripping seaport garrisons on the eastern seaboard, Johnston succeeded in putting together a force of 40,000 men at Corinth. His nearest foe, the Army of the Tennessee, was a scant 20 miles north, with only 37,000 men (another 5,000 had been left behind at Culp’s Landing). The Yankees, overconfident and undertrained, were blissfully unaware of the danger they were in.

Johnston knew that if he struck quickly, he could engage Grant’s force with numerical superiority before Buell’s troops could move to reinforce. Coupled with the elements of luck and surprise, it would be a strong hand to play. If the Union army could be destroyed or routed, its up-to-now highly successful offensive in the West would be stopped cold. Confederate recapture of middle and eastern Tennessee would be a virtual certainty, and an invasion of the North would also be in the cards. Johnston took the gamble; he quickly moved his force toward Shiloh.

The Union soldiers waking that morning didn’t know it, but within the next 72 hours they would fight what was at that time the largest land battle on the North American continent, involving nearly 100,000 infantrymen from three armies and various naval units. This day would prove to be the costliest day of the entire war in proportion of casualties to numbers of men involved–more than 23,000 would fall before the last shot was fired on Monday evening. The casualty rate of 24 percent would be exactly the same as suffered by the combatants at Waterloo.

Although there had been spirited action between pickets and cavalry for the past several days, no high- ranking Union officer believed there was serious Confederate opposition any closer than Corinth. In fact, Brig. Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding the army’s 5th Division, notified Grant by dispatch that very morning that he believed the Rebel force consisted of only two regiments of infantry, a battery of artillery and some cavalry.

Two officers disagreed with Sherman’s assessment. One was the commander of the 53rd Ohio Regiment. A badly frightened and seemingly paranoid man, Colonel Jesse J. Appler had sounded so many false alarms during the advance that the regiment was given the derisive nickname, ‘the Long Roll Regiment,’ by other troops. Sherman was so annoyed by Appler’s panicking that he sent over a staff officer with the caustic comment, ‘General Sherman says: ‘Take your damned regiment back to Ohio.’ ‘

The other doubter was an insomniac brigade commander in Brig. Gen. Benjamin Prentiss’ 6th Division. Colonel Everett Peabody, a former railroad engineer and a-by-the-book sort of officer, had complained already about the ‘kind of loose’ camp life of the army. He had suggested to Prentiss that the division be placed on combat alert, but his cautious suggestion was hooted down by the general and his aides.

Still, there were signs of an impending Confederate attack. Several black camp followers had reported seeing Rebel cavalry on the afternoon of April 5, and Prentiss’ own pickets had reported seeing about a dozen ‘butternuts’ skulking through the underbrush near their camp. More ominously, captured Rebel skirmishers had taunted, ‘If you ain’t mighty careful, they’ll run you into hell or the river before tomorrow night.’

Captain Gilbert D. Johnson of the 12th Michigan Infantry, on picket duty, reported that night that he could see long lines of campfires and hear bugles and drums in the distance. He and another officer went to Prentiss with the disturbing news, but Prentiss brusquely told them that everything would be all right. When Peabody heard the same report, however, he sent out five companies of the 25th Missouri and 12th Michigan, saying he did not intend to be taken by surprise.

The Union skirmishers moved toward an open cotton field as the first streaks of dawn showed on the horizon. Shortly before 5 a.m., shots rang out and a second lieutenant from the Missouri regiment fell–Shiloh’s first casualty. By no means would he be the last.

The unlucky patrol had run headlong into the 9,000-man assault corps of Confederate Maj. Gen. William Hardee. For over an hour, the Federal force refused to give ground, even as more and more enemy attackers continued to approach. The sudden increase in the volume of firing at length was noted at 6th Division headquarters, and reinforcements from the 16th Wisconsin and 21st Missouri regiments were dispatched to the patrol’s aid.

Soon, all four regiments were thrown back in great disorder, stumbling back toward Prentiss’ position, as well as Sherman’s. (Ironically, the men retreated directly into the camp of the 53rd Ohio, whose panicky colonel had so irritated Sherman the day before.) The eleventh-hour warning, brief though it was, gave other Union forces just enough time to prevent them from being surprised in their bunks–all because a brigade commander had been unable to sleep.

That alert officer, Colonel Peabody, hearing the firing, had ordered his men to arms. As they were preparing to advance,an angry Prentiss rode up and accused Peabody of bringing on the battle by sending out the ill-fated patrol. ‘Colonel Peabody,’ he shouted, ‘I will hold you personally responsible for bringing on this engagement!’

Peabody curtly noted that he was ‘personally responsible’ for all his actions. Hurrying south of camp, he deployed his brigade along a ridgeline and tried to staunch the army’s wound. But exultant Confederates continued pouring through the woods, shouting their high-pitched Rebel yell. Peabody, already bleeding from four wounds, tried one last time to rally his men. Then, as he was shouting an order, a fifth enemy bullet struck him in the face, killing him instantly. With macabre foresight, Peabody had predicted his death earlier that morning, shaking hands with his staff and bidding them farewell.

Sherman, racing toward the 53rd Ohio’s camp, caught a flash of movement in the woods to his right, 50 yards away. Raising his spyglass to scan the movement, he whirled around as an Ohio officer called, ‘General, look to your right!’ Just then an entire Confederate brigade burst from cover, heading straight at the general and his party. ‘My God,’ blurted Sherman, ‘we are attacked!’

A volley of bullets zinged through the air, striking an orderly at Sherman’s side. At the same time, a load of buckshot struck the general in the hand. Dropping his telescope, Sherman dashed toward the rear, calling back to the Ohioans to hold their position while he brought up more troops.

Luckily for the Federals, they were in a position where they could only be directly assaulted from the south. The Tennessee River was on their east, Snake Creek bordered the north and Owl Creek guarded the west. Along the exposed southern front, Sherman’s badly rattled 5th Division held the forward position, along with Maj. Gen. John McClernand’s 1st Division and Prentiss’ 6th Division. They were supported by the divisions of Maj. Gen. W.H.L. Wallace and Brig. Gen. Stephen Hurlbut. Several miles north of the immediate fighting was Maj. Gen. Lew Wallace’s 3rd Division, at Crump’s Landing.