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Battle of Little Bighorn: Were the Weapons the Deciding Factor| Wild West | 12 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post It may be that the Battle of the Little Bighorn is the most written about subject in American history. For more than 120 years, people have speculated about how Lieutenant Colonel George A. Custer and five companies of the 7th Cavalry were overwhelmed in southeastern Montana Territory by a combined force of Lakota and Cheyenne Indians on June 25, 1876. Yet, the controversy does not appear any closer to resolution today. A number of reasons have been given for the defeat: Custer disobeyed orders, disregarded the warnings of his scouts, violated the principles of warfare by dividing his command, was ambushed or was the victim of a conspiracy; internal regimental jealousies caused the defeat; the regiment was too tired to fight; there were too many raw recruits or too many Indians; the Indians had better weapons; or the Army had defective guns. Most of the conjectures are moot, for they can be debated endlessly–with intellectual and emotional biases interfering with reasoned arguments. Given the nature of the evidence, however, one should be able to study the role the weapons played in the battle’s outcome with a modicum of objectivity. During the battle, the 7th Cavalry troopers were armed with the Springfield carbine Model 1873 and the Colt Single Action Army revolver Model 1873. Selection of the weapons was the result of much trial and error, plus official testing during 187173. The Ordnance Department staged field trials of 89 rifles and carbines, which included entries from Peabody, Spencer, Freeman, Elliot and Mauser. There were four primary contenders: the Ward-Burton bolt-action rifle; the Remington rolling-block; the ‘trapdoor’ Springfield; and the Sharps, with its vertically sliding breechblock. Although repeating rifles such as the Spencer, Winchester and Henry had been available, particularly in the post-Civil War years, the Ordnance Department decided to use a single-shot system. It was selected instead of a repeating system because of manufacturing economy, ruggedness, reliability, efficient use of ammunition and similarity to European weapons systems. Ironically, the board of officers involved in the final selection included Major Marcus A. Reno, who would survive the 7th Cavalry’s 1876 debacle on the Little Bighorn. The guns were all tested for defective cartridges, endurance, accuracy, rapidity of fire, firing with excessive charges, and effects of dust and rust. The Springfield was the winner. The Model 1873 carried by the 7th Cavalry was a carbine that weighed 7 pounds and had an overall length of 41 inches. It used a .45-caliber copper-cased cartridge, a 405-grain bullet and a charge of 55 grains of black powder. The best effective range for this carbine was under 300 yards, but significant hits still could be scored out to 600 yards. A bullet was driven out of the muzzle at a velocity of about 1,200 feet per second, with 1,650 foot-pounds of energy. The trapdoor Springfield could hurl a slug more than 1,000 yards and, with proper training, could be fired with accuracy 12 to 15 times per minute. The Colt Single Action Army revolver was chosen over other Colts, Remingtons and Starrs. By 1871, the percussion cap models were being converted for use with metallic cartridges. Ordnance testing in 1874 narrowed the field to two final contenders: the Colt Single Action Army and the Smith & Wesson Schofield. The Schofield won only in speed of ejecting empty cartridges. The Colt won in firing, sanding and rust trials and had fewer, simpler and stronger parts. The Model ‘P’ had a barrel of 7.5 inches and fired six .45-caliber metallic cartridges with 28 grains of black powder. It had a muzzle velocity of 810 feet per second, with 400 foot-pounds of energy. Its effective range dropped off rapidly over 60 yards, however. The standard U.S. issue of the period had a blue finish, case-hardened hammer and frame, and walnut grips. The Colt became ubiquitous on the frontier. To the soldier it was a ‘thumb-buster,’ to the lawman a ‘peacemaker’ or ‘equalizer,’ and to the civilian a ‘hog leg’ or ‘plow-handle.’ The revolver was so strong and dependable that, with minor modifications, it was still being produced by the Colt Company into the 1980s. Overall, the soldiers were pleased with their weapons. Lieutenant James Calhoun of Company L wrote in his diary on July 1, 1874: ‘The new Springfield arms and ammunition were issued to the command today. They seem to give great satisfaction.’ Although most of the men drew the standard-issue weapons, it was their prerogative to purchase their own arms. George Custer carried a Remington .50-caliber sporting rifle with octagonal barrel and two revolvers that were not standard issue–possibly Webley British Bulldog, double-action, white-handled revolvers. Captain Thomas A. French of Company M carried a .50-caliber Springfield that his men called ‘Long Tom.’ Sergeant John Ryan, also of Company M, used a .45-caliber, 15-pound Sharps telescopic rifle, specially made for him. Private Henry A. Bailey of Company I had a preference for a Dexter Smith, breechloading, single-barreled shotgun. It is well-known that Custer’s men each brought a trapdoor Springfield and a Colt .45 to the Little Bighorn that June day in 1876. Identification of the Indian weapons is more uncertain. Participants claimed to have gone into battle with a plethora of arms–bows and arrows, ancient muzzleloaders, breechloaders and the latest repeating arms. Bows and arrows played a part in the fight. Some warriors said they lofted high-trajectory arrows to fall among the troopers while remaining hidden behind hill and vale. The dead soldiers found pincushioned with arrows, however, were undoubtedly riddled at close range after they were already dead or badly wounded. The long range at which most of the fighting occurred did not allow the bow and arrow a prominent role. Not until archaeological investigations were conducted on the battlefield during the 1980s did the extent to which the Indians used gunpowder weapons come to light. Modern firearm identification analysis revealed that the Indians had spoken the truth about the variety and number of weapons they carried. The Cheyenne warrior Wooden Leg went into battle with what he called a’six-shooter’ and later captured a Springfield carbine and 40 rounds of ammunition. The Miniconjou One Bull, Sitting Bull’s nephew, owned an old muzzleloader. The Hunkpapa Iron Hawk and the Cheyenne Big Beaver had only bows and arrows. Eagle Elk, an Oglala, started the battle with a Winchester. White Cow Bull, an Oglala, also claimed to have a repeater. There were 2,361 cartridges, cases and bullets recovered from the entire battlefield, which reportedly came from 45 different firearms types (including the Army Springfields and Colts, of course) and represented at least 371 individual guns. The evidence indicated that the Indians used Sharps, Smith & Wessons, Evans, Henrys, Winchesters, Remingtons, Ballards, Maynards, Starrs, Spencers, Enfields and Forehand & Wadworths, as well as Colts and Springfields of other calibers. There was evidence of 69 individual Army Springfields on Custer’s Field (the square-mile section where Custer’s five companies died), but there was also evidence of 62 Indian .44-caliber Henry repeaters and 27 Sharps .50-caliber weapons. In all, on Custer’s Field there was evidence of at least 134 Indian firearms versus 81 for the soldiers. It appears that the Army was outgunned as well as outnumbered. Subscribe Today
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            Tags: 19th Century, American Indian Wars, Historical Conflicts, Native American History, The Wild West, Weaponry, Wild West
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12 Comments to “Battle of Little Bighorn: Were the Weapons the Deciding Factor”
One of the best analyses of Custer’s defeat I have ever read. Kudos to author Michno and Wild West magazine.
By Bob on Jun 21, 2008 at 2:03 pm
IN THE BOOK CUSTERS FALL BY DAVID HUMPHREYS MILLER. HE STATES THAT CUSTER WAS SHOT BY WHITE COW BULL AT MEDICINE TAIL COULEE.THIS WOULD GO SOME WAY TO EXPLAINING WHY INSTEAD OF CROSSING MTC THE TROOPS RETREATED BACK UP THE HILL WHEN IT SEEMED AS IF THE INDIAN VILLAGE AT THAT TIME WAS ONLY LIGHTLY DEFENDED.I WONDER WHAT VIEWS THERE ARE ON THIS
By MICHAEL O'CONNELL on Jul 7, 2008 at 1:52 pm
I love this info that is put up, I even choose this website for nhd (National
History Day
By austin pankey on Nov 17, 2008 at 5:41 pm
what kind of weapons use the Indians against the 7m Cavalry & General Custer?
By Alberto Gonzalez on Feb 24, 2009 at 1:49 pm
The original Springfield Rifle adopted by the army was not .45 caliber. It was a .50. Also the ammunition issued for the .45 jammed notoriously and was a factor in the battle. you might want to check these facts out to your satisfaction and posting improvement.
By Paul on Mar 28, 2009 at 3:40 pm
Paul,
You need to read the 1985-85 archaeolgical report at Little Bighorn. Jamming of weapons was more prevalent among the Sioux and Cheyenne weapons than it was for U.S. Army Springfields.
Crook’s 15 cavalry companies expended approximately 80,000 rounds of .45/55 ammunition aat the Rosebud on 17 June 1876 but experienced little to no documented jamming.
Custer was beat in a straight-up engagement. Bested by warriors who fought better than his immediate command. No excuses for his defeat are needed. He lost because the Sioux/Cheyenne won.
By Jeff Helmer on May 17, 2009 at 10:02 pm
Jeff: You need to look further and deeper than a archalogical report on a picked over battlefield. There are several books on the .45-70 and its overly soft copper case heads. The key word is REPORTED/DOCUMENTED jamming! Jammed springfiields were prevalent at the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Numerous busted pocket knives found of troopers trying to clear jams. Numerous indian’s reported trooper fighting with jammed trapdoors. They also reported throwing many jammed rifles into the river as they were useless. Perhaps 6 or 7 cases with blown heads. Only a small portion of what had occurred. Right after the battle Army Ordinance changed the ammunition and covered up the incident much like they did with the M16 in Vietnam!
Do not just be a reader of men’s viewpoints, be a researcher. The LBH was not a stand up fight, and the indian’s did not fight better than the soldiers. Custer broke his command into three sections, did not wait for the second half of his detachment, and went glory hunting on his own. Three small units, jamming carbines, hordes of indian’s. The results were predictable. This hardly makes great stand-up fighters of the indian’s.
There is considerable evidence to suggest the indians lost a far greater number than is accepted by dogma. In fact they may have actually lost thousands but that is politically not acceptable.
Whatever is finally said, the fact is it was the last great battle for the plains indian’s. Other than the Nez Peirce conflict the plains indian’s were destroyed. I hardly think losing only 33 indian’s would have caused that!
Yes, the early .45-70 ammunition was unreliable and cost many lives. Were it not for the Colt .45 the loses would likely have been much higher.
Custer was an incompetent and would have been courtsmartialed had he survived. DO NOT BE A READER, BE A RESEARCHER!
By Paul on Jun 9, 2009 at 12:06 pm
I agree with the view that the most plausible (and imo, ONLY) explanation for the flow of the battle and command suddenly going from offense to defense after the MTC crossing is that Custer was mortally shot at that point, rather then sitting uphill and watching Yates charge the village (which totally contradicts Custer’s charatcter and command expectations of the time of having the Genreal at the head of the command) or sending Yates to reconnoiter the village, which was lightly defended but yet not attacked. My only puzzle with this theory is was Surgeon Lord’s body was not found by last stand hill but rather with E/F further down towards the River. It would make sense that he would have stayed close to wounded Custer unless of course Custer was dead and nothing could be done for him. Weopon jamming could explain the sudden onset of despair evident by the seeming widespread evidence of suicide pacts (frequent occurance of two paired markers) . Salute.
By Mike on Jun 13, 2009 at 2:04 pm
Mike; Rather than refer back to my books I think I will just answer off the top of my head. As I remember Custer was reported as having three wounds on his body. One through the right chest, one creasing the head and one some where else of a minor nature. I probably should do the research to renew my memory! The point I am attempting to make is should he have been shot through the chest at the river, by the time he reached LSH he could have bleed out by the time he got there. A good possibility. This of course, is only theory
At the Battle of the Rosebud Gen. Crooks account never mentions any jamming of the Springfield’s during extensive ammunition expenditure that I can remember. Your own conclusions can be drawn from this. Crook was primarily saved by his own indian allies.
By Paul on Jun 22, 2009 at 1:19 am
The paired markers is a myth caused by the fact that markers meant for the Reno-Benteen battlefield were mistakenly placed on the Custer field. When the markers were placed, the were put in locations of “depressions” and “rank” vegetation. During the earlier burials earth was scraped up on either side of a body and piled on it. Resulting in two depressions next to one another. Two markers were therefore mistakenly placed where only one should have been and others to mark where horses might have fallen.
This has been supported by subsequent excavations at paired markers where only the disarticulated remains of one individual have been found. Still at others, the markers were offset from the remains and only part of the remains were recovered for reburial leaving as much as half or more in place. This says something about the dedication of the burial details and or the Montana summer heat.
Bottom line is these myths need to stop being repeated in the face of verifiable historical and scientific fact.
Suicide pacts indeed….
By Keith Patton on Sep 18, 2009 at 11:48 am
I am somewhat at a loss as to what Keith means by paired markers. The only conclusion i can draw is he means a paired marker indicates two soldiers each shot themselves rather than be captured. Or two soldiers fell near each other.
If this is so, I would not be so quick to scoff at suicide pacts. This was an situation where “save the last bullet for yourself” had real meaning. These soldiers were fighting a stone age Asian society where torture was freely practiced on their enemies. Being captured alive meant being skinned or burned alive or some similar end. Some Indian biographies note that quite a few soldiers shot themselves when they ran out of ammunition or their rifles jammed (look it up!).
So scoffing at suicide pacts is not an objective evaluation of this particular situation and is a personal opinion unsupported by any evidence.
By Paul on Sep 20, 2009 at 10:06 pm
Lakota and Cheyenne warriors were generally quick killers and didn’t go in for a lot of torture, though they certainly mutilated the dead afterwards. When Fanny Kelly was captured by the Lakota in 1864, they dragged her off into a teepee — and made them teach her how to read. She appears never to have been raped and when she owned a house in Washington she invited any Lakota who showed up with his wife to stay over. Perhaps the greatest myth of the American West is that Indians were “savages” who did all sorts of terrible things without the slightest provocation. This is hokum. Their most frequent initial response to white people was curiosity, sometimes followed by hospitality. Even when wars were in progress, Catholic priests and Quakers could circulate among the Plains tribes without fear because they were holy men who presented no threat. Once Episcopal Bishop Henry Whipple, visiting Lakota friends, got up on a cold night to bring his saddle into the teepee to prevent theft. “You didn’t have to do that,” his Lakota host told him. “You’re the only white man around for 50 miles….”
By John Koster on Oct 26, 2009 at 5:20 pm