Beyond any doubt, nazi Germany lost the Battle of Kursk in 1943.I’m not a communist, but This battle showed a strong Red Army.No other nazi Germany offensive was launched in the east, after this battle.

The Red Army surrendered in 1991, whitout any shoot.

By Dalton C. Rocha on Jul 28, 2008 at 3:13 pm

Red Army surrendered in 1991, without a shot, but is back ;-) thank God

By Ivan on Aug 28, 2008 at 9:07 pm

Yes, the battle of Kursk can be considered a loss for the Germans given the attrition loses and objective failures. This resulted in Germany passing the initiative to the Russians for the remainder of the war. However, had the attack started in May as originally scheduled, I strongly believe it would have resulted in a decisive German victory. The delays imposed by Hilter in order to wait for his wonder weapons (mostly panther tanks) forced the Germans to attack incredible well fortified positions. Ironically, almost all the panthers either broken down or were lost in the first days of the battle and played no part in the later tank battles. If it hadn’t been for the Russians mistakenly believe the main thrust would occur in the north, the German southern push would have amounted to even less. Even so, the Germans could have come out of the battle with a strategic victory had Manstein been allowed to continue his push and use his reserves.

By Ara Bulbulian on Sep 11, 2008 at 1:33 pm

The tank battle in the south salient began on July 7 and finish on 13 July,the battle on 12 July was only a little episode.Despite this was fought by all the 4 panzer army.

By diego on Sep 18, 2008 at 7:25 pm

Napoleon said: ” History is what the victors have agreed on”
The Kursk/Prokhorovka myth shows what intentional blatant lies can do to history.
The reality shows that the soviets were still not able to overcome german panzer tactics by 1943, not even with numbers heavily in their favour and
the wehrmacht obviously lacking “supertanks”. they had to take six times or more losses compared to the panzer-divisions.
60 years of tenacious myths still in existence show, however, that the soviets excelled in just one thing: propaganda lies…

By Prince Valiant on Oct 28, 2008 at 11:34 am

Even though the Battle of Kursk has been called a victory for the Russians I think it would be fair to say it was in fact the Germans last Victory. This is a personal conclusion drawn on the losses on both sides, comparing the number of planes, troops, light and heavy armament on either side before the battle it was clear that the German army was at a distinct disadvantage. For the German army to have held the masses of the Russian army at bay for such a period of intense fighting showed a great difference in skill, planning and tactics. It is again agreed that if the German army had the military supply support that the Russian army had the out come of the battle would have been a decisive win for the German army.
In my conclusion the fact that the Russian army had an overwhelming advantage of the number of troops and machinery the Russian army should have had an easy win. The losses sustained both in Troops and machinery for the Russian army shows a definite victory for the German army. Just because the German army’s Goal of taking Kursk failed does that mean they lost the Battle, No, they failed to reach there objective. The German army won many battles but still lost the War in the end, so does that mean that because Germany Lost the War there victories are now also seen as losses? There was however one thing highlighted at this pivotal point on the Eastern Front and that was that the German War Machine could no longer keep up with the demand the War demanded both in Troops and machinery and it was this fact that changed the tide of the war and not the outcome of the battle of Kursk.

By Andrew on Mar 16, 2009 at 8:02 am

the whole scenario in wwII was driven by political drives from Hitler, he forgot that once war was at a stake, the popularity contest was over and reason, tactics and strategy will dictate the course to victory. The hold ground ‘at all cost’ was a political doctrine not to show weakness to the enemy, Stalingrad was of not significant strategic value just because the name tag was Stalin (another political drive), the detour from Moscow was another political mistake (his generals insisted that this siege was of a tactical and strategic value), the assembled high command with Keitel and Jodl was also made on political grounds to have ass kissers yes-sir staff, etc, etc. , these in fact showed how political poisoned was the whole campaigns and as you know politicians are not the best in running war matters.

By Hitler EGO-Stuborn lost the war for the west on Apr 28, 2009 at 4:08 pm

As a long-standing historian of the battle, it apperas that most followers of this battle fail to realize that the battle was never winable for Germany. Germany simply lacked the manpower and equipment to succeed in a slugfest affair. By July 43, Russia had increased its manpower by over a million men on the front while Germany was nearly 100,00 short of minimal goals. Added to that the tremendous disparity in tank production and the results are preset. For those that believe the final commitment of remaniing tank reserves could have saved the day, this would have led to the total destruction of the Second Army in the late summer Soviet offensive. Finally, any efforts to achieve an early spring victory fail to account for the weather and the lack of sufficient forces. The best option, although seldom discussed, was to draw the Russians away from the defenses and use mobility to wear them down. This always worked following failed attacks, but was never a “first option” approach.

By Ken Geesey on May 3, 2009 at 7:16 pm

the germans had 2 options to victory- 1. draw the soviets away from the prepared positions, retreat and move forces aside allowing deep penetration of soviet armies, and then strong counterattacks as the soviets lost momentum due to supply and logistical problems. 2. Move the axis of attack far more North and South to bypass and surround the heavily fortified soviet positions, effecting a much larger pincer. As it became apparant that the key element of blitzkrieg, suprise, was missing, the Germans needed to change things at the last moment to avoid playing into the soviet trap.

By Karl Eriksen on May 4, 2009 at 12:19 am

One of the Most big Mistakes,of Adolf Hitler was to attack Russia ! Same Mistake that Napoleon did. Also Adolf Hitler, opened to many Fronts,and that made German Supremacy wasting Lots of Power !
At my advice Hitler should Open A front at time,solve and win the War, with a Country at time,then move against the other countries,and also not to attack Russia on Winter time !!

By Stefano Berti on May 5, 2009 at 7:52 am

many of the e.mails talk of the heavy losses the red army had to take in comparison to the german army and this is no doubt correct but, the russians took heavy losses throughout the war and still won.even if the ss divs. had broken through in the south where were they to go without large reserves to support them.also zhukov,stalin etc would have reacted differently I am sure of this. blitzkreig needs powerfull tank forces but,also powerful reserves(which the germans didnt have).the german army was the best of ww2 as most historians agree on but, attacking the ussr and then declaring war on the usa all in a space of six months they were doomed to defeat

By oliver craig on Jun 1, 2009 at 10:13 am

Manstein was a genius indeed, but he was not the God of War himself as some people might believe in here. He made a terrible strategic mistake in Kursk and never recognized it. Guderian, the masterminf of Blitzkrieg and the man who knew better than any other the real situation of Panzer units, was totally against the offensiove. But Manstein convinced both Kluge and Hitler to go ahead instead. The clash of tanks in the south was only part of Kursk battle, and nos a decisive one. The Red Army had already started to counter-attack in the north salient by the time Manstein was making his way in the south. Kluge had to face the most powerful enemy forces and had no reserves to do so. What exactly Manstein would do if he had “won” in Prokhorovka - would he take Kursk all by himself? Just how the german infantry forces would cope with the tanks if there were still thousands of russian soldiers fighting between them?
Fact 1: in the meeting in late July with Hitler, Manstein said the enemy was beaten and had no further reserves and he needed just another panzer army to achieve victory.
Fact 2: in early August, the same Manstein told OKW that he lacked 1000 tanks and more than 100.000 troops just to hold the line.
What happened in these few days that could change the whole scene in the east: was the Red Army miraculously reinforced or was Manstein absolutely deluded about the enemy he thought he knew so well? If I were Hitler, I’d fire him the moment I received this request, for it would be evidence that, or Manstein lied about the Red Army reserves before, or he never had the slightest idea of the real strenght of the enemy. Either options would be most embarassing for the only Wehrmacht general who refused to accept his defeats, prefering instead to consider them “lost “victories”.

By Edison Silva on Jun 10, 2009 at 5:06 pm

This is an interesting site and some wonderful insights are included. Ken Geesey makes a point that I have believed was true for many years.

The Germans used extensive aerial surveillance before the attack. They should have known about the extensive Russian defenses. Heinz Guderian knew that Blitzkrieg meant fast moving and deep penetrating panzer divisions disrupting the enemy from behind and encircling enemy formations. This tactic was not used in Citadel; the entire operation turned into a slugfest.

Had the Germans used a northern faint using older tanks backed up with 88s in a slow advance, the main force could have struck from a hundred miles south of the salient and then employed Blitzkrieg tactics to encircle the static defenses at Kursk. This would have been a devastating defeat for the Russians. They would have lost thousands of vehicles and armor in addition to at least a million men. Depending on German losses and fuel reserves, they may well have been able to push on to Moscow. I don’t think the Russians could have recovered from losses like that again. The initiative would have been reestablished and with the new weapons (which were far superior to anything the Russians had) I think Germany would have prevailed.

The big mistake with Barbarossa wasn’t in the idea of attacking Russia, it was the strategic tactics again and not using all the weapons the Germans had. First, the Germans should have made sure Japan would attack the Russians in the east. That would have pinned down the Siberian divisions. Second, instead of three army groups, I would have used two (middle and north) and just played defense in the south. The two attacking armies would have a main priority of capturing Leningrad. With Leningrad captured, the Germans would have had a port to make supply much easier. The capture of Leningrad would have been easy in my plan because instead of wasting the German surface navy in stupid Atlantic raids, I would have used the great ships like Bismarck, Tirpitz, the pocket battleships and other ships along with the army and Luftwaffe to take Leningrad. Those ships would have pounded the hell out of Russian defenses. It is true that forward airbases would need to be established to protect the ships before their arrival.

Once the port was secured, supplying the army would have been much easier. A winter offensive might have even been possible to cut Russian supplies from their northern ports or later in 1942 a major offensive to capture Moscow would have been possible. In any event, the idea of only going so far and then resupplying would have served the Germans far better and using their naval firepower effectively instead of wasting their ships would have easily put them over the top at Leningrad.

By Larry Arnold on Jun 19, 2009 at 11:49 pm

My apologies, I meant i agreeded with Karl Eriksen.

By Larry Arnold on Jun 20, 2009 at 7:18 pm