Beyond any doubt, nazi Germany lost the Battle of Kursk in 1943.I’m not a communist, but This battle showed a strong Red Army.No other nazi Germany offensive was launched in the east, after this battle.

The Red Army surrendered in 1991, whitout any shoot.

By Dalton C. Rocha on Jul 28, 2008 at 3:13 pm

Red Army surrendered in 1991, without a shot, but is back ;-) thank God

By Ivan on Aug 28, 2008 at 9:07 pm

Yes, the battle of Kursk can be considered a loss for the Germans given the attrition loses and objective failures. This resulted in Germany passing the initiative to the Russians for the remainder of the war. However, had the attack started in May as originally scheduled, I strongly believe it would have resulted in a decisive German victory. The delays imposed by Hilter in order to wait for his wonder weapons (mostly panther tanks) forced the Germans to attack incredible well fortified positions. Ironically, almost all the panthers either broken down or were lost in the first days of the battle and played no part in the later tank battles. If it hadn’t been for the Russians mistakenly believe the main thrust would occur in the north, the German southern push would have amounted to even less. Even so, the Germans could have come out of the battle with a strategic victory had Manstein been allowed to continue his push and use his reserves.

By Ara Bulbulian on Sep 11, 2008 at 1:33 pm

The tank battle in the south salient began on July 7 and finish on 13 July,the battle on 12 July was only a little episode.Despite this was fought by all the 4 panzer army.

By diego on Sep 18, 2008 at 7:25 pm

Napoleon said: ” History is what the victors have agreed on”
The Kursk/Prokhorovka myth shows what intentional blatant lies can do to history.
The reality shows that the soviets were still not able to overcome german panzer tactics by 1943, not even with numbers heavily in their favour and
the wehrmacht obviously lacking “supertanks”. they had to take six times or more losses compared to the panzer-divisions.
60 years of tenacious myths still in existence show, however, that the soviets excelled in just one thing: propaganda lies…

By Prince Valiant on Oct 28, 2008 at 11:34 am

Even though the Battle of Kursk has been called a victory for the Russians I think it would be fair to say it was in fact the Germans last Victory. This is a personal conclusion drawn on the losses on both sides, comparing the number of planes, troops, light and heavy armament on either side before the battle it was clear that the German army was at a distinct disadvantage. For the German army to have held the masses of the Russian army at bay for such a period of intense fighting showed a great difference in skill, planning and tactics. It is again agreed that if the German army had the military supply support that the Russian army had the out come of the battle would have been a decisive win for the German army.
In my conclusion the fact that the Russian army had an overwhelming advantage of the number of troops and machinery the Russian army should have had an easy win. The losses sustained both in Troops and machinery for the Russian army shows a definite victory for the German army. Just because the German army’s Goal of taking Kursk failed does that mean they lost the Battle, No, they failed to reach there objective. The German army won many battles but still lost the War in the end, so does that mean that because Germany Lost the War there victories are now also seen as losses? There was however one thing highlighted at this pivotal point on the Eastern Front and that was that the German War Machine could no longer keep up with the demand the War demanded both in Troops and machinery and it was this fact that changed the tide of the war and not the outcome of the battle of Kursk.

By Andrew on Mar 16, 2009 at 8:02 am

the whole scenario in wwII was driven by political drives from Hitler, he forgot that once war was at a stake, the popularity contest was over and reason, tactics and strategy will dictate the course to victory. The hold ground ‘at all cost’ was a political doctrine not to show weakness to the enemy, Stalingrad was of not significant strategic value just because the name tag was Stalin (another political drive), the detour from Moscow was another political mistake (his generals insisted that this siege was of a tactical and strategic value), the assembled high command with Keitel and Jodl was also made on political grounds to have ass kissers yes-sir staff, etc, etc. , these in fact showed how political poisoned was the whole campaigns and as you know politicians are not the best in running war matters.

By Hitler EGO-Stuborn lost the war for the west on Apr 28, 2009 at 4:08 pm

As a long-standing historian of the battle, it apperas that most followers of this battle fail to realize that the battle was never winable for Germany. Germany simply lacked the manpower and equipment to succeed in a slugfest affair. By July 43, Russia had increased its manpower by over a million men on the front while Germany was nearly 100,00 short of minimal goals. Added to that the tremendous disparity in tank production and the results are preset. For those that believe the final commitment of remaniing tank reserves could have saved the day, this would have led to the total destruction of the Second Army in the late summer Soviet offensive. Finally, any efforts to achieve an early spring victory fail to account for the weather and the lack of sufficient forces. The best option, although seldom discussed, was to draw the Russians away from the defenses and use mobility to wear them down. This always worked following failed attacks, but was never a “first option” approach.

By Ken Geesey on May 3, 2009 at 7:16 pm

the germans had 2 options to victory- 1. draw the soviets away from the prepared positions, retreat and move forces aside allowing deep penetration of soviet armies, and then strong counterattacks as the soviets lost momentum due to supply and logistical problems. 2. Move the axis of attack far more North and South to bypass and surround the heavily fortified soviet positions, effecting a much larger pincer. As it became apparant that the key element of blitzkrieg, suprise, was missing, the Germans needed to change things at the last moment to avoid playing into the soviet trap.

By Karl Eriksen on May 4, 2009 at 12:19 am

One of the Most big Mistakes,of Adolf Hitler was to attack Russia ! Same Mistake that Napoleon did. Also Adolf Hitler, opened to many Fronts,and that made German Supremacy wasting Lots of Power !
At my advice Hitler should Open A front at time,solve and win the War, with a Country at time,then move against the other countries,and also not to attack Russia on Winter time !!

By Stefano Berti on May 5, 2009 at 7:52 am

many of the e.mails talk of the heavy losses the red army had to take in comparison to the german army and this is no doubt correct but, the russians took heavy losses throughout the war and still won.even if the ss divs. had broken through in the south where were they to go without large reserves to support them.also zhukov,stalin etc would have reacted differently I am sure of this. blitzkreig needs powerfull tank forces but,also powerful reserves(which the germans didnt have).the german army was the best of ww2 as most historians agree on but, attacking the ussr and then declaring war on the usa all in a space of six months they were doomed to defeat

By oliver craig on Jun 1, 2009 at 10:13 am

Manstein was a genius indeed, but he was not the God of War himself as some people might believe in here. He made a terrible strategic mistake in Kursk and never recognized it. Guderian, the masterminf of Blitzkrieg and the man who knew better than any other the real situation of Panzer units, was totally against the offensiove. But Manstein convinced both Kluge and Hitler to go ahead instead. The clash of tanks in the south was only part of Kursk battle, and nos a decisive one. The Red Army had already started to counter-attack in the north salient by the time Manstein was making his way in the south. Kluge had to face the most powerful enemy forces and had no reserves to do so. What exactly Manstein would do if he had “won” in Prokhorovka – would he take Kursk all by himself? Just how the german infantry forces would cope with the tanks if there were still thousands of russian soldiers fighting between them?
Fact 1: in the meeting in late July with Hitler, Manstein said the enemy was beaten and had no further reserves and he needed just another panzer army to achieve victory.
Fact 2: in early August, the same Manstein told OKW that he lacked 1000 tanks and more than 100.000 troops just to hold the line.
What happened in these few days that could change the whole scene in the east: was the Red Army miraculously reinforced or was Manstein absolutely deluded about the enemy he thought he knew so well? If I were Hitler, I’d fire him the moment I received this request, for it would be evidence that, or Manstein lied about the Red Army reserves before, or he never had the slightest idea of the real strenght of the enemy. Either options would be most embarassing for the only Wehrmacht general who refused to accept his defeats, prefering instead to consider them “lost “victories”.

By Edison Silva on Jun 10, 2009 at 5:06 pm

This is an interesting site and some wonderful insights are included. Ken Geesey makes a point that I have believed was true for many years.

The Germans used extensive aerial surveillance before the attack. They should have known about the extensive Russian defenses. Heinz Guderian knew that Blitzkrieg meant fast moving and deep penetrating panzer divisions disrupting the enemy from behind and encircling enemy formations. This tactic was not used in Citadel; the entire operation turned into a slugfest.

Had the Germans used a northern faint using older tanks backed up with 88s in a slow advance, the main force could have struck from a hundred miles south of the salient and then employed Blitzkrieg tactics to encircle the static defenses at Kursk. This would have been a devastating defeat for the Russians. They would have lost thousands of vehicles and armor in addition to at least a million men. Depending on German losses and fuel reserves, they may well have been able to push on to Moscow. I don’t think the Russians could have recovered from losses like that again. The initiative would have been reestablished and with the new weapons (which were far superior to anything the Russians had) I think Germany would have prevailed.

The big mistake with Barbarossa wasn’t in the idea of attacking Russia, it was the strategic tactics again and not using all the weapons the Germans had. First, the Germans should have made sure Japan would attack the Russians in the east. That would have pinned down the Siberian divisions. Second, instead of three army groups, I would have used two (middle and north) and just played defense in the south. The two attacking armies would have a main priority of capturing Leningrad. With Leningrad captured, the Germans would have had a port to make supply much easier. The capture of Leningrad would have been easy in my plan because instead of wasting the German surface navy in stupid Atlantic raids, I would have used the great ships like Bismarck, Tirpitz, the pocket battleships and other ships along with the army and Luftwaffe to take Leningrad. Those ships would have pounded the hell out of Russian defenses. It is true that forward airbases would need to be established to protect the ships before their arrival.

Once the port was secured, supplying the army would have been much easier. A winter offensive might have even been possible to cut Russian supplies from their northern ports or later in 1942 a major offensive to capture Moscow would have been possible. In any event, the idea of only going so far and then resupplying would have served the Germans far better and using their naval firepower effectively instead of wasting their ships would have easily put them over the top at Leningrad.

By Larry Arnold on Jun 19, 2009 at 11:49 pm

My apologies, I meant i agreeded with Karl Eriksen.

By Larry Arnold on Jun 20, 2009 at 7:18 pm

A faint was actually used in the north, since Model had much less power than Hoth, and there was a lot of fake german movements in the Orel salient to convice the russians that the main assault would be launched in the north, towards Moscow. The ‘Kempf detachment’ was Manstein’s secret weapon, and its advance behind enemy lines took the russians completely by surprise, with a dramatic impact in the morale of their troops in that sector.

But that is not the point. The very idea of encircling all the soviet force in Kursk area, just like the maneuvers of 1941-42, was absurd at that time. Russian generals were not stupid as they seemed before. Kursk was just too obvious, germans could never convince the russians they would not attack there. And due to the fact that russians themselves were already preparing their attack, it would not be wise to provoke them with ‘faints’ in the very area they intended to strike shortly after.

Most of russian armor were not deployed in the salient, but instead was withdrawn and spread around the vicinity for imediately engaging AFTER german offensive was done. They could never be encircled. Manstein hmself pointed that on his book, when arguing that the Kursk operation should’ve take place 2 months before, when russians were not yet prepared and their armor was still in the salient.

So, even if Masntein could actually encircle Kursk (which is absolutelly unlikely), he would still have to face a russian armored counterattack, for he could never destroy all enemy tanks in the area. It would be, at the very best, a Pyrrhic victory instead of a “lost victory”. And to even dream of Moscow after all this nightmare, well..

And that’s not all, folks. It’s widely accepted today that the soviets lost about 50% of their tanks in the whole operation. But how could they lose so many tanks in the south of the salient since they’ve placed most of their power in the north, where they were expecting to face german’s main attack? Most of all: how could they breach and advance so fast in order to liberate Kharkov if they were so beaten by Manstein’s forces? And, what’s most interesting: how could they NOT ADVANCE in the north? I believe the answer is quite obvious. The Hagen Line blocked russian advance and certainly have cost a lot of tanks to them. Kluge was right in his intuition to prepare a defensive line, so he could hold ground even facing the enemy’s large force. But Manstein didn’t do so. No surprise he would change his own opinion about the real enemy’s force in a matter of weeks. And those who have read his book should pay attention to the conditions he established to achieve victory in Kursk. Not only his south wing should be reinforced with another Panzer Army and SS divisions, but also de north wing should keep the pressure in order to neutralize the enemy’s capability of maneuver. In other words, he wanted Model to bleed to death losing all his few tanks so he could achieve victory in the south, but he never asked himself why Model refused to do so. And in the end, it was Model’s parcimony that ensured the survival of Army Group Center for at least a year more. Army Group South instead was so depaupered in the Kursk battle that would therefore become a minor force in the whole campaign in the Eastern Front.

By Edison Silva on Jul 4, 2009 at 9:08 pm

I am not aware that Prokhorovka has been much-trumpeted as a Soviet “victory”. Why the writer says this is a mystery. Before I read this article, I was aware that the Soviets, had, once again, suckered the Germans into a battle of attrition rather than maneuver. The specific losses are not critical. As long as both sides take losses, the Soviets would be replacing their’s more easily. Even if the Soviets give up 100 tanks to 10 German tanks, they would be recovering faster. Like Grant in Virginia in 1864, the Soviets realized that they did not need to “win” battles, they just had to keep making their adversary take losses.

Germany was basically defeated in WWII not by neat military maneuvers, but by brute-force casualties. By war’s end, 50% of 1939 German male population were casualties. The Germans were run out of men, and Kursk contributed to that, same as all the other battles, regardless of who “won”.

By Steve on Jul 11, 2009 at 10:36 pm

One aspect of the battle of Kursk that is often forgotten, is the impact of air power. Three examples of Shturmovik attacks on Panzer divisions during the battle might put things into perspective. 9th Panzer lost 70 tanks in 20 minutes the 7th of July 1943, 3rd Panzer lost 270 tanks and 2000 men in two hours, and 17th Panzer lost 240 of its 300 tanks in four hours, effectively being destroyed.
These facts and the accounts of the appaling kill to loss ratio when Soviet tanks met German head on, at Prokhorovka and other places, leads to one important conclusion: It was air power that won this “tank battle” for the Red Army.

By Johan R on Aug 2, 2009 at 2:32 am

The Germans did not lose the war on the eastern front, the Soviets won it.

They did it using Soviet equipment, Soviet manpower, and most of all Soviet tactics.

Any study of Soviet mobile warfare viewed from a narrow tactical level is pointless as the Soviets themselves view it as repeated combat situations needing no true inspiration or direct guidance. Basically tactical situations repeat themselves over and over again and there is no need to gain ‘tactical skills’ as those skills are learned on the battlefield not in the classroom.

If Kursk is viewed from the Operational/Strategic level, the view the Soviets consider important, then the Germans were out fought, out thought, and out maneuvered. Look at the battle from the start until the end of the Soviet counter-attacks. Soviet reserves were well placed to avoid getting ‘trapped’, and in position to blunt any real gains the Germans made. The Soviet operational plan, which Zhukov used again and again against the Germans before the Battle of Kursk, was to allow them to bleed themselves white against defensive positions. Once the Germans had reached their limit Zhukov counter-attacked, often with devastating results.

Hitler complained to Guderian that the “Army isn’t achieving the victories it did early in the war.” To which Hurry Heinz replied, “Change your methods.” The Soviets had learned and the Germans hadn’t changed. Proof, the Soviets fired a preliminary bombardment against the Germans before the start of their offensive. They knew from past experience when, where, and more importantly, at what time the German’s would reach their jump off points. The Germans got plastered and it delayed the entire offensive by a couple of hours.

Kursk looked at from this view shows the Germans to have placed themselves in a position to suffer defeat even before the first shot was fired.

While it is ‘nice’ to toss around tank loss ratios they miss the entire point of what actual victory on the battlefield is. Napoleon won the Battles of Quatra Bras and Ligney-Sombreffe but he lost the Battle of Waterloo, and therefore lost the war. The Germans may, or may not, have won a tactical victory at Kursk but in the end it didn’t matter because the Soviets ended up in control of Orel and Kharkov after the smoke had cleared. So in the end the Soviets achieved their conditions for victory while the Germans didn’t even come close to obtaining their aims.

Fact: The Germans had only a handful of Panthers and Tigers at Kursk the majority of their hardware was PzIIIs and PzIVs, both of which were outclassed by the T-34.

Fact: The army taking ground, which the Germans were when the offensive started, suffers fewer tank losses because they can recover their damaged tanks on the field the opponent cannot. It is only natural that the Soviet tank losses were higher at the start of the offensive. One then needs to look at German tank losses when the Soviets started their counter-offensive, and viola, they rocket upwards.

Fact: For all of 1943 the Panther was a ‘barn baby’ which spent most of its time in the repair depots getting repaired. In general, compared to both Soviet and US tanks, the German equipment was too complex to maintain and spent too much time broken instead of working. I would rather ride into battle in a reliable T-34, then risk my skin in an unreliable Panther, because if it breaks in the heat of battle (when the fuel pump goes or the front stabilizer crashes), then I am as good as dead.

Fact: People are often too blinded by the German ‘technical skills’ and supposed ‘tactical skills’ to see that it was the Germans who had lost the edge by 1943. It was they who had failed to learn and suffered for it. The same excuses that are used to explain German defeats are exactly the opposite of those used to explain German victories. The Allies had more and better tanks then the Germans in 1940 yet the Germans won. The same applied in Russia in 1941 and 1942, and yet the Germans were still winning. But hit 1943 and 1944 and suddenly it is the faceless hordes of Soviet men and equipment that just swamps the Germans under. You cannot use the same excuses for both. The Germans where still good, and well led in the field, but the truth is that the Soviets and the Allies had both caught up a good margin on both levels and it was therefore the Germans who failed to maintain their lead.

By William Cwiklinski on Aug 17, 2009 at 3:32 pm

There is one and only one major influencing factor in this battle. This information was only recently released and relates to the secret X intelligence obtained by the British who had long since broken the ULTRA secret codes.
This defined the complete German order of battle as well as the political strategy underpinning the military assault.
The communists were supplied with this information on Churchills direct orders and Stalin was then able to flood resources into Kursk in the full knowledge that he had an overwhelming advantage of intelligence far beyond that of any single German commander who was only privy to his own individual battle plan.
This brilliant combination of British secret intelligence and Soviet power, far more than American tanks or planes, was the single factor that won WW2 for the western nations.

By teldon on Aug 31, 2009 at 8:18 am

The Germans favored the more sophisticated, and woefully complex panzers, such as Tigers, in sharp contrast to the Russians cheap but efficient T-34s. The Tiger, though undeniably powerful, was hard to manuever and harder still to replace, the Russians on the other hand favored the T-34s simple controls and simple tech requirements for productions. In the end, for every T-34 destroyed by the Germans, ten more were standing by for replacement.

To say that the Russians were inferior to German tactics is a fallacy. The Russians were able to improvise and develop strategies for beating the German Blitzkrieg and they also enjoyed the advantage of mass production of tanks and a nearly inexhaustible supply of manpower. The Germans, for all their tactical and fighting prowess (especially that of the 2nd SS Panzer Corps) could not afford such high losses.

By Winter on Aug 31, 2009 at 11:49 pm

it is interesting that many are cognizant of soviet and even west german propaganda to re-write history in their favor and yet seem oblivious to the existence of american propaganda in its own attempts at re-writing history.

1. Von Manstein served under West Germany and obviously wrote his memoirs to shift all the blame in Hitler like many other Nazi generals that lived thru the war. At the same time, Manstein and his kind served their US masters to downplay Soviet successes.

2. To say that the Nazis had no chance of winning in Kursk or the entire war at that point in time is to say that they were all fighting in futility. Not very likely given the admiration these German professional generals actually elicited. The objective of Citadel was clear enough – to say it was futile is to say entire German High Command were madmen like Hitler. Prokhorovka itself shows that Soviet reserves were brought to action to counter German ‘ breakthrough ‘ notwithstanding all the Soviet defense preparation. Everything was therefore still hanging in the balance and Germany’s defeat though maybe foreseeable was not absolutely certain. After all, Model himself was present to try stop Normandy landings in June 1944. And from this time July 1943, the Nazis fought up to Berlin in 1945.

3. All these therefore trample on the poor pretense that Soviet tactics at this time were close to par with German military. Germany was simply overwhelmed and was eventually fighting on 3 fronts.

4. So the question, which side won the battle at Kursk? this issue will of course never be settled. some people try to play safe and say its a draw. still, if the figures are to be believed, Soviet losses were 3 or 4 times more than the Germans. though Germany is generally considered to be unable to replace its losses in the manner that the Soviets could, the fact remains – at that ration of 4:1 losses, the German forces of 900,00 at Kursk even if totally lost would take out 3.6 million Soviets. something to ponder.

By Duke Armstrong on Sep 6, 2009 at 10:00 am