Harpers Ferry, W.Va., that tranquil little town nestled at the base of a small mountain, at the point where the Potomac and Shenandoah rivers meet, often is afforded a mere mention in today’s Civil War histories. In 1862, however, this small town played a very important and strategic part in the schemes of generals who commanded armies on both sides.

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By the end of August 1862, General Robert E. Lee and his principal lieutenants, Maj. Gens. Thomas J. ‘Stonewall’ Jackson and James Longstreet, had displayed their brilliance as strategists. They had successfully outmaneuvered and thoroughly defeated the much larger Union Army of Virginia at Second Manassas (Bull Run), thereby crushing any hopes that Maj. Gens. John Pope and George B. McClellan had of capturing Richmond that summer.

Disgusted and worried, President Abraham Lincoln watched as the shattered Army of Virginia straggled back to the vicinity of Washington. After relieving Pope, Lincoln asked General McClellan to reassume command of a reconstituted Army of the Potomac, into which was incorporated the mauled remnants of the short-lived Army of Virginia. To McClellan thus fell the manifold tasks of defending Washington, reorganizing his battered army, keeping an eye on Lee’s movements, and pleasing the victory-hungry Washington politicians.

McClellan often has been criticized for his slow and cautious movements, but one must remember that he was dealing with meddling politicians, poor to nonexistent military intelligence, and an army that had been devastated by the course of events that summer. As McClellan himself wrote to the Union Army’s chief of staff, Maj. Gen. Henry W. Halleck, on the eve of September 16, 1862: ‘I left Washington on the 7th of September. At this time it was known that the mass of the Rebel Army had passed up the south side of the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg, and that a portion of that Army had crossed into Maryland; but whether it was their intention to cross their whole force with a view to turn Washington by a flank movement down the North bank of the Potomac, to move on Baltimore, or to invade Pennsylvania were questions, which at the time, we had no means of determining. This uncertainty as to the intentions of the enemy obliged me up to the 13th of September to march cautiously and to advance the army in such order as continually to keep Washington and Baltimore covered, and at the same time to hold the troops well in hand, so as to be able to concentrate and follow rapidly if the enemy took the direction of Pennsylvania or to return to the defense of Washington, if as was so greatly feared by the authorities, the enemy should merely be raising a feint with a small force to draw off our army, while with their main forces they stood ready to seize the first favorable opportunity to attack the Capital.’

‘Little Mac’ added that, in the meantime, ‘the process of reorganization rendered necessary after the demoralizing effects of the disastrous campaign upon the other side of the Potomac was rapidly progressing. The Federal troops were gaining confidence, and their formerly soldierly appearance and discipline were fast returning.’

Although McClellan did have his critics, few could dispute his talents as an able administrator or the fact that he was worshiped by his troops. After Second Manassas, as the Union army limped back to Washington, McClellan rode out to meet it. A great shout went up among the men, and many of them flocked to the little general as he sat upon his horse.

Meanwhile, General Lee had begun moving his army northward. From the 4th to the 7th of September, Lee and the bulk of his army crossed the Potomac near Leesburg and from there marched to Frederick, Md. On September 9, 1862, Lee and his Army of Northern Virginia made camp outside Frederick. Lee then called together his two corps commanders, Generals Jackson and Longstreet, and together they began to plan their strike to the north.

Lee’s strategy was to move the Army of Northern Virginia to the vicinity of Hagerstown, Md., where he would pause briefly to seize Federal supplies stored there and then push northward into Pennsylvania. But he faced a double-barreled problem. Both Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry (in what was then still Virginia) held substantial garrisons of Federal troops. The garrison at Martinsburg numbered about 2,500, under the command of Brig. Gen. Julius White, while the troops at Harpers Ferry numbered about 10,000, commanded by Colonel Dixon S. Miles. Lee realized that as long as Union forces occupied those strategic points, his army’s vital lines of supply and communications through the Shenandoah Valley could easily be cut, which would effectively isolate him from Richmond and his supplies.

To counter that possibility, Lee devised a plan for the capture and occupation of Martinsburg and Harpers Ferry. He would divide his forces by ordering Jackson and his three divisions to march to Williamsport, Md., cross the Potomac and capture the Federal garrison at Martinsburg; then make a lightning thrust upon Harpers Ferry from the rear, via Charlestown. Another division was to occupy Maryland Heights, which overlooks Harpers Ferry from north of the Potomac, while a fifth division was to claim Loudoun Heights across the Shenandoah and thus subject the town to a triple fire.

Once all those objectives were attained, Jackson’s forces were to rejoin the main body of Lee’s army at either Boonsboro or Hagerstown by September 16. The rather elaborate and risky plan was devised on the evening of September 9, and Jackson and his three divisions were on the move the very next morning. His route took him north through Middletown, across South Mountain at Turner’s Gap and to an encampment at Boonsboro, for the night.

The next morning, September 11, Jackson’s force pressed on and that afternoon crossed the Potomac at Williamsport. As Jackson then advanced on Martinsburg, from the west, Union scouts alerted the Federal commander there, General White, of Jackson’s movements–whereupon the Union general withdrew his forces during the night to join the garrison at Harpers Ferry.

On September 12, Jackson entered Martinsburg, whose citizens gave ‘Old Jack’ such a reception that the taciturn general remarked, ‘This is the height of happiness; these are the most delightful moments of my life.’

Upon discovering that General White had withdrawn, Jackson ordered his troops to seize any supplies the Federals had left and to make camp. The next day, September 13, Jackson and his men resumed their march toward Harpers Ferry. It was now that a soldier of the Union Army happened to discover the famous Special Order No. 191 from General Lee, dated September 9. It specifically stated Lee’s intentions in regards to military movements in Maryland, how his forces would be divided, and where they would rendezvous after accomplishing their respective missions. How the order was lost still remains largely a mystery. It was found by Private B.W. Mitchell, a soldier of XII Corps, 27th Indiana Volunteers. His regiment had stacked arms on the same ground that Confederate Brig. Gen. D.H. Hill had occupied the evening before.

The story goes that Hill, who was part of Jackson’s corps but for the time being had been attached to Longstreet to cover the Confederate rear, received Special Order 191 from Lee. Jackson, who was Hill’s commander, did not know of this and himself sent Hill a copy of the order. Therefore, Hill presumably received two copies of the same order (although after the war Hill denied having been given two copies).

When the 27th Indiana camped near Frederick the next day, Private Mitchell found a copy of the order wrapped around three cigars. The discovery was of great value to McClellan, because it enabled him to position the Army of the Potomac in front of Lee, thus forcing the bloodbath of Antietam (Sharpsburg), which was to erupt on September 17.

Meanwhile, two other key Confederates, Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker, were making their move on Harpers Ferry. Walker was to take his division across the Potomac at Cheek’s Ford. Upon making a reconnaissance of the area, however, Walker’s scouts discovered a superior Federal force at Cheek’s Ford, so Walker marched his men to Point of Rocks, Md., and crossed the Potomac there. This was all accomplished on September 11.

On the 12th, Walker’s forces reached Hillsboro, Va., and halted for the night. By 10 o’clock on the morning of the 13th, Walker arrived at the foot of Loudoun Heights. He detached two regiments the 27th North Carolina and the 30th Virginia under Colonel J.R. Cooke–to climb the heights and take possession of them but not to reveal the Confederate presence to the garrison at Harpers Ferry if he found the heights unopposed.

At 2 p.m., Cooke reported that the heights had been taken with no opposition. Walker now set up lines of communication in order to inform Jackson of his position and readiness to attack. By 8 o’clock the next morning, the 14th, Walker had placed five long-range Parrott rifled cannons on the mountain, and by 10:30 he had informed Jackson of that accomplishment.

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