It was called Mare Nostrum (Our Sea) by Benito Mussolini and his Fascist stalwarts, but the Italian navy, or Regia Marina, still understood it was an open question as to who would rule the Mediterranean in 1941. In fact, Operation Gaudo, a plan to sweep the Royal Navy from the waters surrounding Crete, was intended to demonstrate, after a number of one-sided encounters, that the Italians were still a force to be reckoned with.

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Admiral Angelo Iachino, an experienced and intelligent naval officer, was given command of the operation. The plan called for a strong naval force to patrol the area north and south of Crete, sinking any British convoys or escort warships it might encounter. From the beginning, Iachino was disturbed by the dependence of the operation upon forces outside his control, namely air support. He could only request Italian and German aircraft through Italian naval headquarters, a fatal division of command for the mission. Cooperation between the various branches of the Italian armed forces was nonexistent. The Regia Aeronautica (Italian Royal Air Force) repeatedly made its appearance at the end of a battle. Perhaps even more frustrating, the Italian airmen frequently bombed their own ships as well as British vessels.

The deteriorating military situation in Africa and Greece in 1941, however, made it clear that some offensive response by the Regia Marina was necessary if these theaters were to remain viable for the Axis powers. The Germans were now becoming more insistent that something be done to restore the situation in the Mediterranean. At their urging, and because of the general feeling at Supermarina (Italian naval headquarters) that an attempt should be made to re-establish the dynamics of conflict in the area, Operation Gaudo was born.

Supermarina committed the brand-new Littorio-class battleship Vittorio Veneto, sporting nine 15-inch guns and displacing 45,000 tons, as well as six of its seven 10,000-ton heavy cruisers and two of its best light cruisers to the operation. Usually reluctant to risk its capital ships, Supermarina had outdone itself for this mission. The Italians were further motivated by Luftwaffe reports on March 15, 1941, indicating that two of the three British battleships in the Mediterranean had been severely damaged and were not operational. Perhaps Supermarina officials would have been less sanguine had they known that those two battleships and their sister ship were not damaged, but anchored comfortably in Alexandria Harbor and quite ready to fight. Moreover, the British ships were led by one of the most competent and aggressive sailors in the Royal Navy.

Admiral Sir Andrew B. Cunningham, affectionately known as ‘ABC to his men, had entered the Royal Navy as a cadet at age 14. While nurtured in a battleship navy, he was an early convert to air power. Cunningham had taken over a superb fleet whose training included night combat, which at that time was considered apostasy by most navies around the globe and ruled out as a matter of course. The British Mediterranean Fleet, however, excelled in night actions during prewar maneuvers and applied the lessons learned during the war years.

Cunningham understood that the Germans, exasperated by Italian military reverses, were assigning both men and materiel in large quantity to the North African theater. Among the German reinforcements, and most dangerous to the British fleet, was the Luftwaffe’s newly arrived Fliegerkorps X, or X-CAT (X Commando Aereo Tedesco). He realized his task was to bring the Italians to battle as quickly as possible before these new forces could become fully operational. The Italians, however, proved uncooperative, generally remaining either in port or in their own coastal waters for protection. Cunningham solved this dilemma in part by going after Italians wherever they could be found.

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