The terrain in northwestern Louisiana was thickly wooded and little traveled, with only a narrow road threading its way to the Texas state line. For the past two days, 3,000 blue-clad Union cavalry had been making leisurely progress westward from the town of Alexandria, confident that another Federal army, descending from Arkansas, would draw off any Confederate opposition from their flank. Their overconfidence was rudely shattered on the afternoon of April 8, 1864, when a force of Confederate cavalry, comprised mostly of Texans but with a scattering of Louisianans, Missourians and Arkansans, broke from the surrounding woodland and crashed into the vulnerable Yankee column. In a matter of minutes, months of carefully laid plans for a Union march through the lowlands of east Texas were a shambles.

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The campaign that had led the Union troops to this confrontation at Sabine Crossroads was the culmination of mounting pressures — political, diplomatic and military — that compelled Union forces in Louisiana to expand the war west of the Mississippi River. To the politically appointed Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks, the lands west of the Mississippi represented little more than a sideshow. His real ambition was the investiture of Mobile, an important seaport on the coast of Alabama. Unfortunately for Banks, French Imperial forces were active in Mexico — under the pretext of protecting European interests against the revolutionary forces of Benito Juarez — and threatened to interfere with American interests in Texas. It was already apparent that there had been stealthy meddling on the diplomatic front; the French consul at Richmond had tried to convince Texan officials to re-establish the Lone Star Republic — and had been summarily rebuffed by Confederate authorities. Nevertheless, the French represented enough of a potential threat for Washington to want Union forces to take action — if not to knock Texas out of the war, at least to discourage further French meddling north of the border.

Banks was told to forget about Mobile for the time being and was ordered to focus on Texas. Major General Henry W. Halleck, the Federal chief of staff, indicated that he would like to see an operation up the Red River toward Shreveport, La., but with the approach of autumn 1863, the river was too low for water-borne transportation, and an alternate strategy had to be developed.

Accordingly, Banks organized a 3,500-man expedition to occupy a number of positions along the Texas coast. Everything went smoothly, including the occupation of Brownsville on November 3, 1863, but the captured ports played a puny role in controlling Texas trade, and the vulnerability of the widely separated Federal units made further reinforcing operations necessary. Rather than sanction operations so far from the main Union base in New Orleans, General Halleck still preferred his original Red River plan for the department's main military campaign that spring. A drive up the Red River soon became the only practical means for the Union to concentrate its strength with a short supply line from Louisiana. Also, Maj. Gen. Frederick Steele's 10,400 troops would descend from their base at Little Rock, Ark., to support Banks' troops as they penetrated the interior.

The only thing working against the campaign was time. Major General William Tecumseh Sherman was planning to march on Atlanta, Ga., that summer and wanted Banks' forces to reinforce him. To conform to that timetable, Banks would have to ascend the Red River as soon as the water level rose in the spring, cross the Texas border and then create his own swath of destruction through the more populous and productive eastern part of the state in time to join Sherman when needed.

Accordingly, in the early months of 1864 the Union commanders were busily occupied with coordinating the various roles they each would have in the coming campaign. The most crucial elements involved Steele's linkup with Banks and the level of the water over the falls above Alexandria, which would have to be deep enough to take the gunboats and transports of the Mississippi squadron to support the expedition.

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