“When you’re at Khe Sanh, you’re not really anywhere,” Marine Brigadier General Lowell English once declared. “You could lose it and you haven’t lost a damn thing.” The Marines were not interested in Khe Sanh and did not want to try to defend the large, unpopulated and jungle-covered expanse that spread out west of Camp Carroll and into Laos. But General William Westmoreland, the overall U.S. commander, disagreed with that assessment. Westmoreland saw Khe Sanh as the potential westernmost anchor of his, and therefore the Marines’, northern defensive line. Defending it when the time came, during the siege in early 1968, required extraordinary use of air power.

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United States Marines in I Corps Tactical Zone (I CTZ) saw their mission as defense of the border with North Vietnam and the major cities sector. The northernmost Marine defense paralleled the Cua Viet River just south of the Demilitarized Zone and extended inland some 30 miles, with major bases at Dong Ha, Quang Ngai and Quang Tri. The line then bent south and ended at two artillery firebases, the Rockpile and Camp Carroll. Twenty miles farther southwest, along the connecting overland artery Route 9, was Khe Sanh, just seven miles from Laos.

In the spring of 1966 when the Marines moved into Khe Sanh, the Army’s Special Forces abandoned their base there and moved seven miles west on Route 9 to a new position at Lang Vei. The Marines inherited what would come to be called the Khe Sanh Combat Base, situated on a 300-foot plateau above the countryside to the east and south. To the west and north, the base was surrounded by gradually sloping hills that rose 1,000 feet above it. Route 9 ran just below the base, and two miles away was Khe Sanh with its 1,500 inhabitants.

Khe Sanh Combat Base originally had a 1,900-foot runway suitable for light aircraft, small transports and helicopters. After the Marines took over, the strip was expanded to 3,900 feet of hard-surface aluminum planking. The runway ran on an east-west axis, with a cargo area within the last 1,000 feet of the west end. The addition of radar and a Tactical Air Navigation system made instrument landings possible.

Beginning in April 1967, patrols from Khe Sanh Combat Base came under ambush northwest of the base. Into July the Marines engaged in a series of battles—known as the “Hill Fights”—for control of the heights with regular, battalion-sized units of the North Vietnamese Army (NVA). The Marines secured Hill 861 three miles north of the base, and, another half-mile beyond, the twin peaks of Hills 881 South and 881 North. The Marines soon abandoned Hill 881N, but Hill 881S was particularly vital to the defense of the base because it was just off the axis of the runway and overlooked the entire complex.

The tops of Hills 861 and 881S were cleared of foliage and transformed into firebases, each with a 75×150-yard mined and barbed-wire perimeter, cleared fields of fire 200 to 300 meters down the hill, a helipad and garrisons of from 200 to 600 Marines. Hill 881S also mounted three 105mm howitzers whose range covered Khe Sanh Combat Base and Hill 861.

By late summer, two battalions and the regimental headquarters of the 26th Marines, 3rd Marine Division were at Khe Sanh. Colonel David Lownds, commander of the 26th, was the overall base commander. In August and September, the NVA cut off Route 9 and increased its offensive activity throughout I Corps; during the last two months of 1967, it increased patrol and supply activity around Khe Sanh. United States intelligence estimated that elements of two or more NVA divisions were in the area, totaling possibly 20,000 men.

On January 2, 1968, six NVA officers in American uniforms were killed at the wire outside the combat base while reconnoitering its perimeter. The intelligence estimate of NVA troops in the area was raised to possibly 50,000. General Westmoreland directed planning to ensure mass air support should the base be attacked. Some 250 sensors with electro-chemical, seismic, infra-red and acoustic heads were sown by air around the combat base. The sensors hung in trees, buried themselves in the ground or were camouflaged in deep vegetation and surrounded by mini-minefields. Although not accurate enough for individual target designations, they did provide warning and area identification of enemy troop and supply movements.

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