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World War II: General George S. Patton’s Race to Capture Messina

6/12/2006 • American History Magazine

Inside Seventh Army headquarters on the southern coast of Sicily, a scowling Lieutenant General George S. Patton, Jr., greeted Lieutenant General Omar Bradley with bad news. ‘We’ve received a directive from Army Group, Brad,’ Patton said between puffs on a cigar. ‘Monty’s to get the Vizzini-Caltagirone road in his drive to flank Catania and Mount Etna by going up through Enna. This means you’ll have to side-slip to the west with your 45th Division.’

‘My God,’ Bradley replied angrily, ‘you can’t allow him to do that!’

But Patton had nothing else to say on the subject. ‘Sorry Brad,’ he said evenly, ‘but the changeover takes place immediately. Monty wants the road right away.’

To Patton, Bradley, and just about every other senior United States Army officer, British General Sir Bernard Montgomery got his way entirely too often. This time, just four days into Operation HUSKY (the code name for the Allied Invasion of Sicily), Montgomery had convinced 15th Army Group Commander General Sir Harold Alexander to grant his Eighth Army exclusive use of a highway previously promised to the Americans. Patton and Bradley considered the decision an insult to American military prestige.

On July 10, 1943, Allied ships had deposited Patton’s Seventh U.S. Army on the beaches along the Gulf of Gela, on Sicily’s southwest coast. Montgomery’s British Eighth Army went ashore to the east, south of Syracuse. The Allies targeted the city of Messina, at the northeast tip of the triangular island. Capturing Sicily would eliminate persistent Axis attacks on nearby Mediterranean supply routes, and if Messina could be taken quickly, the invaders would snare thousands of Axis prisoners and gain a convenient jump-off spot for the upcoming invasion of Italy.

By July 13, Bradley’s II Corps had advanced inland to within 1,000 yards of the Vizzini-Caltagirone road (Route 124)–a major transport route that cut east to west across the center of the island. Meanwhile, dug-in German troops had blunted Montgomery’s advance up the island’s east coast, hemming Eighth Army in on the plain of Catania between towering Mount Etna and the sea. In a sudden change of plan, Montgomery decided to send a flanking force west around Etna. To do so he needed Route 124, and Alexander, who had overall command of HUSKY’s ground forces, gave it to him. The Americans, one of Patton’s frustrated staff officers said, were left to’sit comfortably on our prats while Montgomery finishes the goddam war!’

The British generals thought little of American fighting ability. In February, German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel’s Afrika Korps had thrust across the hot sands of North Africa and smashed through inexperienced and poorly led U.S. troops at Tunisia’s Kasserine Pass. The unfortunate performance of the young Americans–many of whom had never before seen battle–distressed the British commanders. Alexander declared, ‘they lack the will to fight.’ Montgomery believed ‘they have no confidence in their Generals.’

In the wake of the disaster at Kasserine Pass, the Allied Commander in the Mediterranean, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, sent Patton to Tunisia to take over U.S. II Corps. Patton quickly injected discipline and his fighting spirit into the corps and led it to victories at Gafsa and El Guettar. In mid-April as the Tunisian Campaign neared its end, Patton left the corps in Bradley’s hands and returned to French Morocco to take part in planning for the Sicily operation.

Despite the Americans’ improvement on the battlefield, Alexander and Montgomery remained unimpressed. For their part, Patton and many of his colleagues resented British impertinence, especially on the part of Montgomery. Arrogant, self-centered, and pushy, the 56-year-old general in the natty black beret irked his colleagues with outlandish statements and demands. In many ways he was not unlike Patton. At the age of 58, Patton was deeply religious, swashbuckling, ‘human dynamo’ who strutted around in a polished steel helmet with a pair of ivory-handled revolvers strapped to his waist. ‘His vigor was always infectious, his wit barbed, his conversation a mixture of obscenity and good humor,’ Bradley wrote. ‘He was at once stimulating and overbearing. George was a magnificent soldier.’ By the time he waded ashore on Sicily, Patton’s antipathy toward his British counterparts had also come to affect his relationship with his boss, Eisenhower. Patton’s long-time friend had the difficult job of holding together the young Anglo-American alliance. But Patton felt that American interests and honor too often took a back seat to British demands. ‘God damn all British and all so-called Americans who have their legs pulled by them,’ Patton wrote in his diary in Tunisia. ‘Ike is more British than the British and is putty in their hands . . . .’

For the first invasion of the Axis’ home turf, Patton commanded the new Seventh U.S. Army, including Bradley’s II Corps. Patton welcomed the chance to assert U.S. military might. Initially scheduled to land on the island’s northern coast and capture Sicily’s capital Palermo, American troops expected to go on the offensive in Sicily. But Montgomery favored a less dispersed landing to the south and in the end, his plan won out. Patton still expected Seventh Army to make its mark. But to Alexander, it was clear that ‘Eighth Army would have the glory of capturing the more obviously attractive objectives of Syracuse, Catania, and Messina . . . .’

From the outset Eighth Army strategy left little room for Patton to operate, and Montgomery essentially imposed his will on Alexander. Montgomery reasoned that if the Americans could simply ‘hold firm against any action from the west I could then swing hard with my right with an easier mind. If they draw enemy attacks on them my swing north will cut off enemy completely.’ Two days later, Alexander transferred use of Highway 124 to Montgomery. ‘They gave us the future plan of operations,’ Patton wrote bitterly, ‘which cuts us off from any possibility of taking Messina.’

Patton considered himself, with good reason, ‘the best damn ass-kicker in the U.S. Army,’ but he accepted this outrageous decision without a protest. This was not the time to raise a fuss. For the moment he saved his invective for his diary. ‘Ike has never been subjected to air attack or any other form of death. However, he is such a straw man that his future is secure. The British will never let him go.’

Yet Patton did not simply give up Highway 124 with a smile. He slyly secured authorization to expand the American perimeter west. Patton had his eyes set on Palermo, and, ultimately, Messina. The next day Patton and Major General Lucien K. Truscott, who headed up the 3rd Infantry Division, discussed a westward reconnaissance in force toward Agrigento and Porto Empedocle. Truscott felt that Alexander would not object to such a move, and Patton, Truscott wrote, ‘with something of the air of the cat that had swallowed the canary, agreed . . . .’ Patton had his foot in the door and he meant to swing it open.

On July 16 Alexander issued another directive that positively infuriated Patton. The order stipulated that Montgomery’s Eighth Army would advance on Messina on three fronts. The Americans were officially left with the distasteful task of protecting Montgomery’s left flank. Alexander lamely authorized Seventh Army ‘to capture Agrigento and Porto Empedocle’–something Truscott had done that very day. Patton blamed Montgomery. ‘Monty is trying to steal the show,’ he wrote to his wife, Beatrice, ‘and with the assistance of Divine Destiny [Eisenhower] may do so . . . .’

Patton had had enough. Alexander clearly had no intention of assigning Seventh Army anything other than mop-up duty in Western Sicily, while Montgomery’s Eighth marched to Messina and glory in the east. Patton felt his superior lacked ‘any conception of the power or mobility of the Seventh Army.’ On July 17 he climbed aboard a B-25 and flew to 15th Army headquarters in Tunisia to confront Alexander. Patton told the army group commander in no uncertain terms that he wanted his army unleashed. He explained ‘it would be inexpedient politically for the Seventh Army not to have equal glory in the final stage of the campaign.’ Patton asked for authorization to drive north to split the Axis forces and to clear out remaining resistance in the west. Alexander agreed, providing Seventh Army hold a crucial road network near Caltanissetta in the center of the island. ‘If I do what I am going to do,’ Patton confided to his diary, ‘there is no need of holding anything, but ‘it’s a mean man who won’t promise,’ so I did.’

Patton wasted no time putting his new plan into action. He created a Provisional Corps under the command of Major General Geoffrey Keyes, his deputy commander, and sent it northwest towards Palermo while Bradley’s II Corps set out for the north coast, knifing across the island’s center through tough German defenders. Facing light resistance from largely dispirited Italian troops, Keyes’ troops ‘moved so fast that often the German and Italian 88s [88mm anti-tank guns], which they captured en route, had not been pointed around or set up to shoot against them.’ On July 22 Truscott’s Division entered Palermo after covering an astonishing 100 miles in just 72 hours. Wild celebrations and ebullient Sicilians greeted the Americans. Support for Italy’s Fascist Dictator Benito Mussolini was nowhere to be seen. The next day the 45th Division of Bradley’s II Corps reached the coast at Termini, 25 miles to the east. Until he took matters into his own hands, Patton wrote in his diary, ‘Monty was trying to command both armies and getting away with it.’ Now Seventh Army was making its mark.

Meanwhile, Patton pushed his personal competition with Montgomery to comical new heights. On July 25 he flew across the island to Syracuse for a meeting with Alexander and Montgomery. On seeing his erstwhile British rival, Patton noted, ‘I made the error of hurrying to meet him. He hurried a little too, but I started it.’ At the end of the conference, during which, Patton noted, he didn’t receive lunch, ‘Monty gave me a 5¢ cigar lighter. Some one must have sent him a box of them.’ When Montgomery visited Palermo a few days later, Patton sent an escort to meet him at the airport and greeted him at his headquarters with a full band. ‘I hope Monty realized that I did this to show him up for doing nothing for me on the 25th,’ Patton wrote. At Syracuse, Montgomery surprised Patton by suggesting that Seventh Army capture Messina. While Keyes and Bradley had raced across Sicily, Montgomery’s Eighth Army had become completely bogged down in the east. Dug-in German troops continued to hold Montgomery at Catania, while his circling movement west around Etna proceeded slowly. With Seventh Army now poised, cat-like, ready to strike east, Montgomery realized that Patton was best positioned to take the city. Besides, by attacking east Patton would relieve the pressure on Eighth Army and allow him to finally punch past Catania.

Patton doubted Montgomery’s motives, but he needed no further urging. ‘This is a horse race in which the prestige of the US Army is at stake,’ he wrote to 45th Infantry Division Commander Major General Troy Middleton. ‘We must take Messina before the British. Please use your best efforts to facilitate the success of our race.’ Montgomery made little of this ‘race,’ but to Patton it became a personal crusade to win acclaim and respect for his much-maligned troops. British soldiers and officers undoubtedly wanted to beat the Americans into Messina. But Patton definitely hyped the contest.

On July 25, 1943, King Victor Emmanuel III, supported by leading Italian political figures, deposed dictator Benito Mussolini, and Italy began to negotiate peace terms with the Allies. (Italy would pull out of the Axis in September.) As German commanders planned to evacuate Sicily, Patton and Montgomery began squeezing Axis defenders into the island’s northeast corner. Eighth Army continued to probe German defenses at Catania while Canadian and British troops drove in a ‘left hook’ around Etna’s western slope. To the north, the 1st and newly arrived 9th American Divisions advanced east from the island’s rugged center, while the 3rd Division attacked down the north coast road. ‘The mountains are the worst I have ever seen,’ Patton wrote on August 1. ‘It is a miracle that our men can get through them but we must keep up our steady pressure. The enemy simply can’t stand it, besides we must beat the Eighth Army to Messina.’

On August 3, Patton stopped by an army hospital outside Nicosia and chatted with several injured soldiers; ‘All were brave and cheerful,’ he noted. Then he encountered a 1st Division infantryman who seemed unhurt. Patton asked him what was wrong. ‘I guess I can’t take it,’ the soldier replied. Patton erupted. Cursing the soldier as a coward, he slapped him with his gloves and pushed him out of the tent. Such men, Patton wrote,’should be tried for cowardice and shot.’ A week later at another hospital Patton came across another ‘alleged nervous patient,’ a private in the 13th Field Artillery Brigade whose case was diagnosed as severe shell shock. Again Patton’s anger overcame him; again he slapped and cursed the soldier. ‘I can’t help it,’ he said, ‘but it makes my blood boil to think of a yellow bastard being babied.’ Patton didn’t realize the seriousness of what he had done, but the incidents would soon change his life and career.

Patton’s relentless push for Messina also took its toll on his relationship with Bradley, a straight-laced subordinate who deplored Patton’s use of profanity and flamboyant style of command. ‘He traveled in an entourage of command cars followed by a string of nattily uniformed staff officers,’ Bradley wrote. ‘His own vehicle was gaily decked with oversize stars and the insignia of his command. These exhibitions did not awe the troops as perhaps Patton believed. Instead, they offended the men as they trudged through the clouds of dust left in the wake of that procession.’ Where Patton was eager to outshine Montgomery, Bradley failed to see the point in capturing Palermo. ‘Certainly there was no glory in the capture of hills, docile peasants, and spiritless soldiers,’ he wrote. To Bradley, racing Montgomery to Messina was equally unnecessary, for ‘However rapidly we pushed into that city, we could not cut the enemy’s escape route across to Italy.’

Yet Patton wanted more than a cheap victory over Montgomery. Despite galling BBC reports (soldiers called them Badly Biased Comments) ‘that the Seventh Army has been lucky to be in western Sicily eating grapes,’ the capture of Palermo had been a publicity coup for Patton’s army. The troops’ morale soared. The Americans’ non-stop marching and ability to operate tanks and other armored vehicles in rough terrain began to open the eyes of their Eighth Army counterparts. Capturing Messina promised more of the same.

As the final phase of the Sicily Campaign heated up, Patton drove his officers to push as hard as they could. Troina fell on August 6. To the south, British forces captured Adrano and–finally–Catania. Fighting a brilliant rearguard action, German army units crept back from their narrowing front toward the beaches of the Straits of Messina. There, German and Italian ships waited to ferry troops and equipment across the two-mile passage to the Italian mainland.

In an effort to by-pass enemy positions and speed up his advance, Patton authorized two amphibious landings along the north coast. On the night of August 7-8 Americans swept ashore virtually unopposed behind German lines at St. Agata. At the same time, troops from Truscott’s 3rd Division launched an attack on the high ridges inland and took 1,500 prisoners, bringing Seventh Army 12 miles closer to Messina. The second landing nearly proved a disaster. Truscott felt he would not have time to get his infantry up in time to support it, and wanted to postpone the attack for one day. Bradley agreed. But Patton was having none of it. Messina lay around the corner, and this wasn’t the time to slow down. Early on August 11 elements of Truscott’s 30th Infantry regiment went ashore at Brolo, 12 miles behind a German front. The Americans were quickly pinned down on a hill just above town. Nearly 30 hours passed before the balance of Truscott’s troops could relieve them. Progress had again been made, but at a high price.

On August 13 American troops captured Randazzo. To the south, British and Canadian troops forced the Germans from the slopes of Mt. Etna. Axis forces flooded toward Messina. On the night of August 15-16 Montgomery tried an amphibious landing of his own, putting elements of his commando and armored units ashore at Scaletta, just eight miles from Messina.

Patton ordered a third ‘leap-frog’ operation for that same night, but by then American troops were moving so fast that they had already passed the scheduled landing site by the time the ship borne force arrived. Around 10:00 p.m. on August 16 elements of Truscott’s 3rd Division entered bomb-scarred Messina. Patton immediately notified Eisenhower and Alexander, and called Bradley to tell him ‘we would enter Messina in the morning at 1000 hours.’

Early the next morning as the last of the Axis troops slipped off the island, Patton met Truscott, Keyes, and a host of reporters on a hill outside town. ‘What in hell are you all standing around for?’ he bellowed. Bradley remained conspicuously absent. ‘This is a great disappointment to me,’ Patton later wrote, ‘as I had telephoned him, and he certainly deserved the pleasure of entering the town.’ But Bradley wanted no part of Patton’s pomp and ceremony. Minutes later, a procession of army vehicles led by Patton’s command car roared into Messina, chased all the way by exploding shells fired by Axis guns on the Italian mainland.

After fighting their way over mined roads and around blown-up bridges in the early-morning hours, Lieutenant Colonel J.M.T.F. Churchill’s British commandos reached the city only to find the Americans already there. At about 10:30 a.m., Patton pulled into the city square just as a squadron of Brigadier J.C. Currie’s British 4th Armored tanks rumbled into town. Both Churchill and Currie had brought along a set of bagpipes to celebrate beating the Americans into town. ‘I think the general was quite sore that we had got there first . . . .’ Patton wrote. Currie climbed out of his Sherman tank to shake hands with a glowing Patton. ‘It was a jolly good race,’ Currie said with a smile. ‘I congratulate you.’

Patton’s victorious, hell-for-leather drive on Messina restored some luster to an otherwise badly managed campaign. Rather than firmly coordinating the moves of Seventh and Eighth Armies, Alexander had vacillated, first backing down to Montgomery and then allowing, almost forcing, Patton to set his own course. Poor decisions, such as the reassignment of Highway 124 to Montgomery (and poor air cover over the Messina Straits), ultimately cost time, and allowed Axis ships and ferries to evacuate roughly 60,000 Italian soldiers, 40,000 Germans, 10,000 vehicles, and 17,000 tons of equipment from the island–all of which would soon be used against the Allies in Italy.

The race had significant, if less tangible, repercussions for Patton and American fighting men. The fast-moving Seventh Army had proved itself the equal of Eighth Army and set a new standard in mobile warfare. The Americans, Montgomery admitted after the war, had ‘proved themselves to be first-class troops. It took time; but they did it more quickly than we did.’

Patton was entirely satisfied with his own performance. ‘Of course, had I not been interfered with on the 13th of July by a full change of plan,’ he wrote to his wife, ‘I would have taken Messina in ten days, but then I would have had to turn back to get Palermo, so it all came out O.K.’ Although Alexander would continue to rate British troops above the Americans, Patton had effectively exorcised the demons of Kasserine Pass.

Yet the Sicilian campaign almost ended Patton’s 34-year army career. Reports of the two slapping incidents made their way to Eisenhower and, even worse, a small group of reporters. Eisenhower was furious. He ordered Patton to apologize to the soldiers involved and warned him that such behavior ‘will not be tolerated in this theater no matter who the offender may be.’ Meanwhile he asked the reporters to refrain from publishing the story for the good of the Allied cause. Patton was his best general and would be needed again. They agreed.

The story finally broke in November but Eisenhower refused to relieve his old friend. Still, the public furor over the slapping incidents doomed Patton to many months of glum idleness while the war passed him by. Eisenhower dropped him from consideration for command of American ground forces in the inevitable invasion of Europe–an honor that eventually went to Bradley. When Patton finally returned to action in France in command of Third Army in August 1944, he was subordinate to both Bradley and Montgomery. Yet to Patton, that was secondary. Destiny had beckoned him and he would soon become, as one German officer said, ‘the most feared general on all fronts.’


This article was written by Eric Ethier and originally published in the April 2001 issue of American History Magazine. For more great articles, subscribe to American History magazine today!

29 Responses to World War II: General George S. Patton’s Race to Capture Messina

  1. Bill says:

    Historical research is supposed to be based on an analysis of events, materials and testimonies. This peice is nothing more a rehash than the script of the hollywood film ‘Patton,’ with all its flaws and anti-British bias.

  2. brett says:

    I am interected in this website because I am doing history fair project on George S. Patten with my cousin and I was wondering if you have anymore
    websites about him.

  3. Tim says:

    Pretty poor stuff fellas. Not exactly a historicaly objective peice is it?

  4. nateisa says:

    when we ask you some like who they represented give us a answer not websites

  5. cidpusa says:

    Patton was a real general, awesomem honest

  6. bennett says:

    This synopsis was good. It may have been based on the movie Patton (george c scott) but it filled in some holes that the movie did not cover so I appreciated reading it

  7. Bill Sanders says:

    I find it somewhat strange that Patton was so anti-british, considering that his ancestry was Scottish,[Mcdonald of the isle`s, clan] however Montgomery,another celt [Irish] did ruffle the feathers of most of his fellow british generals on many occasions.

  8. hihi says:

    this sight is cool!!!!!!!

  9. todd says:


  10. Alice Guarneri says:

    Does anyone know which General was responsible for going thru the Sicilan town of Campofiorito (south of Palermo) and the date.
    Alice Guarneri

    • Matt Davies says:

      Dear Alice,
      If I’m not mistaken, Campofiorito would have been taken by troops of the US 3rd Infantry Division commanded by Major-General Lucian King Truscott, Jr. As you can tell, they covered great distance to end up in Messina, but such speed and grind was part of Truscott’s reputation.
      Btw, the article’s a very good summary of a history that needs re-telling. It’s not anti-British to state how some British rulers kept sabotaging US efforts, even though such facts may seem unbelievable in such an important war.

      • Vlad Drakul says:

        It’s not as biased as some accounts and at least what is in there is at least correct but much is left out, that if you knew about it would make you understand that the most underrated man is Montgomery who not only recognized Pattons talents (and weaknesses) before anyone else but insisted AGAINST the advice of Bradley who HATED Patton and got on very well with Monty who liked both for many different reasons.
        Bradley was like him; if less educated and less brilliant. He was thoughtful, organized and logical cared about his men and NOT a glory seeker like Patton who was excellent at one thing only. Getting men to move ass.
        He was chosen by Monty to lead the 3rd army in France but not allowed to participate in the actual landings or fight for the breakout. He never had to face tough opposition until the Ardennes. Bascially he just drove tank troops faster than anyone when facing weak opposition which is why he was chosen. Patton was far more immature than either Bradley or Patton and his legend is overrated

    • Matt Davies says:

      Date of entry to Campofiorito? Judging from the maps in my reading: morning of 21 July 1943, but that’s only an educated guess.
      Matt Davies

  11. Alice Guarneri says:

    Dear Matt Davies,
    Thanks so much for your reply. This a an interesting website.
    Alice Guarneri

    • Vlad Drakul says:

      I completely agree. A great place only lacking more publicity and readers. I just read Monty; Master of the battlefield again (3rd time) by Nigel Hamilton. It is the 2nd of 3 books but it is the best as it gives you 800 pages of diaries by Patton , Eisenhower, Bradley, Montgomery, Cin C Army UK Brooke and Churchill as well as Monty’s.
      Reading the actual comments made by the various generals at the time makes 2 things clear. Many changed their stories or opinions after the war mostly for political reasons. The biggest surprise is to realize that contrary to myth the arguments were not American vs Brit but certain Americans and certain Brits against other Brits and Americans.
      It was Monty who insisted on getting Patton for the planned 3rd Army breakout and Eisenhower and Bradly who did not want Patton but insisted in the end on Monty to organize after the US Eagle D Day plan was revealed by Monty to Eisenhower to be incompetent and a defeat in waiting . After the war opinions congealed into the nationalistic myths we know see as history. A great book. A real eye opener if a little repetitive.

  12. Patrick says:

    It was foolish of Patton to see the British as his competition when the only real competition was the Axis, and in retort to his comment about Monty trying to “steal the show”, If he saw the most bloody conflict in human history as a “Show” then perhaps it was unwise of Eisenhower to give such a man command during such a important point in the war.

    • Matt Davies says:

      Patrick, maybe you’re taking GS Patton’s idioms too literally, missing how seriously he waged that very important war?
      Consider Patton’s comment after meeting Britain’s King George VI, whom he described to his wife as “just a grade above a moron”. Patton saw the British system as no real competition at all. Indeed that was the whole problem, when the British demanded their imperial primacy to actually “steal the show” and pose falsely as the war’s real winners: from the Tunis victory parade, to the Sicily invasion, to the whole Mediterranean effort and delaying of the invasion of France (and the end of the European war). Patton, Bradley, Marshall, King – and Ike too it seems – all bristled at the repeated British snobbery and inefficiency, and the very costly delays to victory.

      • Patrick says:

        It seems quite obvious to me that there was a good reason that the British did not respect the American Generals; Because it had been seen that the Americans were not experienced, and in a world war there was so little room for error. The events of North Africa were proof of this, Rommel’s Afrika Corps were able to easily exploit the US inexperience. Patton himself was appointed with the hope that he could “Improve US performance” and it was up to much more experienced Generals such as Montgomery to win sucsessive battles such as El Alamein.

  13. Matt Davies says:

    I invoke Rommel’s echoing voice here to perhaps best explain my point, and put the tenacious British propaganda to sleep (again!):
    “What was astonishing was the speed with which the Americans adapted themselves to modern warfare. In this they were assisted by their extraordinary sense for the practical and material, and by their complete lack of regard for tradition and worthless theories…
    “In Tunisia the Americans had to pay a stiff price for their experience, but it brought rich dividends. Even at that time, the American generals showed themselves to be very advanced in the tactical handling of their forces, although we had to wait until the Patton Army in France to see the most astonishing achievements in mobile warfare. The Americans, it is fair to say, profited far more than the British from their experience in Africa, thus confirming the axiom that education is easier than re-education”.
    [excerpt from ‘The Rommel Papers’, B.H. Liddell Hart (Ed.), pp.521, 523]
    Note that Monty and pals were often quite the epitome of “tradition and worthless theories” in Rommel’s description.

    • Vlad Drakul says:

      Montgomery was the man who was 100% responsible for the D Day landings. The American plan Eagle was crap and Monty was put in charge because NO ONE ELSE had the overall strategic insight enough to be able to train, organize and pull of D Day. Nothing is less true or more cliched than your implication that Monty, who more than anyone was against the old ways, was in fact like the very men he spent his whole career fighting and organizing against. He was HATED by the British Establishment as ‘the socialist general’ and he was only chosen by Churchill because like Lincoln he needed a man who could win battles which Monty did.
      More than anyone else Monty understood the depth of German military culture and education and had the difficult job of getting a civilian army to beat a nation of Spartans. He unlike Patton and Churchill was not a war romantic and was very careful to avoid defeat even at the cost of annoying the clueless. He understood how poor UK tankers were and thus Patton became his first choice for tank commander.
      In his own diary Patton admitted that ”Monty is a prima donna, an arrogant know it all but he is a man and knows his stuff. he is the only British commander I have met who does”.
      That’s why he had to compete with him (and no one else) while Monty just smiled and saved Patton’s ungrateful career. Without Monty’s 100 % support Patton’s career would have ended in Sicily. Patton and Monty were both arrogant and opinionated men but Patton was the immature one who needed controlling which is why he was kept out of Normandy until the very last moment to take over the 3rd Army.
      So much for the Brit vs Yank propaganda and myths. Rommel and later Kluge were destroyed by Monty’s calm calculated policy of using the Brits to take on the SS and Panzer forces in the East to prevent German reserves from stopping a US Western breakout. Which is exactly what happened as it was planned to 6 months earlier even if the actual flow of events were not exactly as planned due to weather wrecking the Mulberries used to supply the US army and the need of the Brits to help Bradley after the Omaha beach debacle which delayed the ability of the Brits to take Caen as early as planned.
      Still on D day + 90 the front line was exactly that predicted by Monty in March 1944. Monty was not the best improvising fighting general of WW II (Manstein, Zhukov, Nimitz, certain Japanese commanders and Rommel were). His unequaled brilliance was the set piece battle which is why he get’s accused of being a WW I style general when in fact he was not only the first allied senior commander to insist on Army Air rapport but the first to put it into practice (Desert Air Force under Broadhurst). He was the very opposite of the WW I breed in all other ways (caring about the men, always visiting troops and arguing for better tanks) and modernized the whole British Army.
      He got dumped on after the war. Resented by the now (1950’s) super power USA under Eisenhower and hated by the establishment he was the victim of post war PC. He was the only truly great allied senior commander on the European sector.
      Forget about even El Alamain an you still have him in history for saving the Brit army in 1940 (his single tank divisions attack on Guderians Pz Corps caused havoc as he sacrificed his soon to be abandoned Matilda tanks in an attack that was only stopped by Guderian himself leading 88 AA guns in defense of his own HQ. This caused Hitler to panic and call for a halt to prevent the Panzers getting encircled. This was very bold and untypical for Monty; he hated the inherent risks of disorganized plans. His other attempt at this was his only real failure Arnheim. Nevertheless he would take casualties and take risks IF necessary but understood that the German army with it’s long term training and education was far better at improvisation.
      This attack in 1940 saved the Brit Army and French troops there making Dunkirk possible by giving the retreating army time to organize the evacuation and perhaps saved Britain itself. With that, Alemain and D day we already have a genius of unequaled scope in modern British history. The most underrated commander of WWII (and Monty Python did not help his image; he is the role model for Graham Chapmens ever present General always saying; ‘now STOP THIS! This is getting SILLY!!

  14. […] the generals crept closer to Messina, they began making reckless decisions that cost hundreds of lives, all to be the first one standing in Messina, wagging his dick when the […]

  15. Robert says:

    It was Patton’s idea to apologize to the soldiers and his army, not Eisenhower’s according to an episode of Fact or Ficton program on Patton and U.S. Grant on the Military Channel.

  16. Andrea says:

    We are a group of between 10 to 20 people from Malta. We are interested in history and so next March we will be visiting Sicily to visit some remains especially those that has to do with Operation Husky in which Malta was also indirectly involved. Can you please send me any relevant information regarding what to visit and were are museums, remains and others situated.


  17. David Thayer Sr. says:

    Eisenhower,kept backing Montgomery why I don’t know,Patton was the best,without Patton America would have lost the war in Europe.montgomery was a plain war there is no place for cowards,those 2men should have been sent home with dishonorable discharges,Patton should not have slapped them,Thier dignity and respect were already taken from them,Patton should of just sent them home.and Patton I think was correct fight the Russians now while we have the advantage or we will be fighting them later in the future,Patton was correct.eisenhower was affraid and did have political ambitions,that interferes with his thinking.if he did not relieve Patton of the 3 Rd army Patton would of still been alive,Patton was right he acted more British than american.he kept giving Montgomery the fuel and munitions instead of giving it to his own armies.eisenhower would of been nothing without Patton,he was a true soldier and followed orders even though he knew they were wrong.patton was killed because of Eisenhower and his jealousy.this is my opinion from what I have read

    • itsabig says:

      Notice who was chosen to command the European invasion, it wasn’t Patton.

      His troops called him ,”Old blood and guts”…..his guts, and our blood.

  18. Cavallino Rampante says:

    My parents we there. My mum was 9 years old and in the town of Torre Faro at the very tip of Sicily at the point closest the mainland. The shellings from the mainland were ferocious as were the bombings before that. A bomb exploded right outside my grandfather’s house. My dad was 16 years old and in the town of Falcone to the west of Messina. He was strafed several times and one of his younger brothers was hit by bomb shrapnel.

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