Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo was one of the greatest leaders of Nero’s legions—until the emperor demanded the ultimate test of loyalty.
Gnaeus Domitius Corbulo has been heralded as one of the greatest Roman generals of the 1st century AD. He first made his reputation as a strict disciplinarian when he was commanding Roman forces in Lower Germany in AD 46-47. That reputation was greatly enhanced by his restoration of proficiency and discipline among the lethargic and inefficient legions in Syria when he was appointed to command in the Parthian war in AD 54. Corbulo reorganized and retrained the legions, then brilliantly led them into Armenia to capture the fortified cities of Artaxata and Tigranocerta. He was known as a tough, loyal, aggressive and charismatic leader.
Ironically, the leadership and loyalty that contributed to Corbulo’s success as a general likely also contributed to his ultimate reward for outstanding service to his emperor: an order to take his own life.
Corbulo was probably born between 4 BC and AD 1. His younger half-sister was first the mistress and then the consort of Gaius Julius Caesar Augustus Germanicus, better known as Emperor Caligula. One source states that Caligula, hastily traveling to Upper Germany in September AD 39 to thwart the conspiracy schemes of the army commander there, paused only long enough to replace the consuls of the year with two men he trusted, one of whom was Corbulo. Other than that presumed consulship, basically nothing is known of Corbulo’s early life until his appointment as legate of Lower Germany in AD 47.
The Roman historian Publius (or Gaius) Cornelius Tacitus mentions Corbulo frequently in his Annals of Imperial Rome. Apparently referring to the legate’s command in Lower Germany, Tacitus records that “Corbulo’s careful methods soon won him the fame that dates from this campaign. Bringing up warships by the main channel of the Rhine River, and other warships (according to their build) by creeks and canals, he sank the enemy’s boats and ejected Gannascus.” It seems that shortly after assuming command, Corbulo wisely planned an offensive operation that included the use of naval forces to soundly defeat the Canninefates and the Frisii.
According to Tacitus, Corbulo found the legionaries stationed on this fringe of the empire “relaxed in sloth, attentive to plunder, and active for no other end.” He immediately set about restoring what were referred to as the “traditional standards of discipline.” He prohibited soldiers from falling out of marches and required them to be fully armed while performing all tasks and duties, day and night. Deviation from or failure to comply with standards was not tolerated.
Tacitus alleged that “two of the men…were put to death as an example to the rest; one because he labored at the trenches without his sword; and the other for being armed with a dagger only.” This strict discipline increased the vigilance and proficiency of his soldiers and enhanced unit cohesion—and weakened the morale of the natives. The restoration of discipline among the legions and the severity of Corbulo’s punishments set the tone for his whole military career.
Corbulo was undoubtedly ambitious, and according to Tacitus the general secretly set an ambush to trap and kill the leader of another warring tribe. Corbulo’s trap was successful, but gossip at Rome accused him of attempting to stir up trouble that would “offend the inactive emperor— and so endanger peace.” The result was that Caligula’s successor, Tiberius Claudius Drusus Nero Germanicus (Claudius), forbade Corbulo to continue any offensive operations and ordered Roman troops and garrisons withdrawn west of the Rhine River. When Corbulo received the emperor’s orders, he is said to have exclaimed, “Happy the commanders who fought for the old republic!”—recalling the days when Roman generals operated more independently and generally free from any interference. Nevertheless, Corbulo loyally carried out his orders and withdrew his forces.
Emperor Claudius inexplicably recalled Corbulo. To prevent his legionaries from regressing to an ill-disciplined state while he was in Rome, Corbulo issued orders that kept them busy digging a 23-mile canal connecting the Meuse and Rhine rivers. Another Roman historian, Dio Cassius Cocceianus, introduces Corbulo in AD 47 as a praetor, a senior magistrate. He further attributes Corbulo’s recall to the jealousy of Claudius, “who on ascertaining his [Corbulo’s] valor and his discipline would not allow him to climb to greater heights.”
Even though recall by Claudius apparently deprived Corbulo of victory and martial glory, the returning general was granted a public triumph, in itself a great distinction. Although the emperor seems to have regarded Corbulo’s popularity as a potential threat, an additional factor to consider is Claudius’ imperial policy. Claudius inherited from Caligula an empty treasury, coupled with fear and dissension among many at home. But there were no serious problems on the imperial frontiers. To draw public attention away from Rome and domestic problems, Claudius extended Roman power, primarily in Britannia. On the other hand, he adopted a defensive policy along the Rhine, concerned mainly with the development and “Romanization” of this area while minimizing expenditures for the legions stationed there.
There were also other significant situations throughout the empire during this period that may have affected Claudius’ strategy. Herod Agrippa, a competent client-king, died in AD 44, resulting in the reannexation of Judaea as a Roman province. Two years later Claudius annexed the turbulent province of Thrace. After suppressing a violent civil war in Mauretania, Claudius reorganized the region into two imperial provinces. These distracting and expensive activities may have been factors in Claudius’ reluctance to expand the empire’s northern frontier.
In AD 54 Claudius died from an undetermined cause—possibly from eating poisonous mushrooms. He was succeeded by his 17-year-old adopted son, Nero Claudius Caesar Augustus Germanicus (Nero), the son of his second wife, Agrippina the Younger, from her first marriage. Nero inherited a precarious situation along the eastern frontier of the empire, stretching from eastern Anatolia through Syria to the Red Sea. The imperial policy pertaining to that region under the Julio-Claudian emperors was based on a chain of client states, the buffer of Armenia and the four legions of the Army of Syria.
After years of internal strife, the Parthian king Vologeses invaded Armenia in AD 52, deposing the Romanbacked ruler Radamistus and installing his brother Tiridates on the throne. After a short time, the Parthians withdrew, enabling Radamistus to return. The restored satrap’s vengeful cruelty led to rebellion, however, and in its wake Radamistus fled from Armenia. An Armenian delegation traveled to Rome requesting assistance, and during its absence Tiridates returned and reoccupied the throne. Armenia was in effect no longer a buffer but under the direct control of the Parthians.
Nero and his advisers responded quickly and energetically to this challenge, choosing Corbulo to command the expedition. Tacitus noted: “The appointment of Domitius Corbulo to the command of the army in Armenia gave universal satisfaction. The road to preferment, men began to hope, would, from that time, be open to talents and superior merit.” Corbulo’s appointment had abrogated Claudius’ earlier insult and gained Nero respect by ostensibly showing that he did not share his predecessor’s fear and distrust of military distinction and independent-mindedness in his subordinates.
Corbulo seems to have been given the special command of the province of Cappadocia-Galatia and of all legions formed especially for this expedition. The elderly outgoing governor of Syria and general, C. Ummidius Durmius Quadratus, resented Corbulo and his authority. “The fact was, Corbulo possessed many advantages” over Quadratus, Tacitus wrote, “in his person manly, of a remarkable stature, and in his discourse magnificent,” and that Corbulo “united with experience and consummate wisdom those exterior accomplishments, which, though in themselves of no real value, give an air of elegance even to trifles.”
Corbulo received two legions from Quadratus, Legions III Gallica and VI Ferrata, while Legions X Fretensis and XII Fulminata remained in Syria. Shortly thereafter part, if not all, of Legion X Fretensis was reassigned to Corbulo’s command, and IV Scythica was transferred from Moesia (a full legion normally had about 5,500 soldiers). According to Tacitus, Corbulo found these Syrian legions demoralized and undisciplined, and he had “to struggle with the slothful disposition of his army; a mischief more embarrassing than the wily arts of the enemy.” They had been so “enervated by the languor of peace, that they could scarce support the labors of the army.”
Many of those soldiers, Tacitus went on, had never performed guard duty and did not have helmets and breastplates, having served “the term prescribed in garrison-towns…thinking of nothing but the means of enriching themselves.” Corbulo realized he could not hope to win a battle with such a ragtag army, and initiated a relentless program of retraining, coupled with harsh discipline. All legionaries unfit or otherwise undesirable were quickly discharged, and the legions were brought up to full strength by local conscription.
Corbulo spent more than two years patiently training the legions. He then took his reinvigorated force with him to spend the winter of AD 57-58 encamped under canvas on a bleak plateau near Erzerum, at an elevation of more than 6,000 feet above sea level. Tacitus wrote that “by the inclemency of the season, many lost the use of their limbs, and it often happened that the sentinel died on his post.” Tacitus even told of one wood-gathering soldier whose frozen hands, “cleaving to the faggot, dropped from his arms, and fell to the ground.” Though that was clearly an exaggeration, it provides some idea of how the hardships they had to deal with were perceived by the troops, and also embellished upon by others.
Corbulo resolutely led by personal example during that winter of trials and tribulations. Tacitus wrote that “he was busy in every quarter, thinly clad, his head uncovered, in the ranks, at the works, commending the brave, relieving the weak, and by his own active vigor exciting the emulation of his men.” Corbulo was physically and mentally robust, but a number of his soldiers deserted when faced with such harsh conditions. This situation required immediate action, and Corbulo decreed that deserters would suffer death when caught. Tacitus relates, “The number of desertions, from that [edict, and the enforcement thereof,] fell short of what happens in other camps, where too much indulgence is the practice.” Such severity seems to have been unusual even for that time, since Corbulo’s draconian methods attracted the attention and comment of his contemporaries.
Dio Cassius Cocceianus also mentions Corbulo’s strictness and other leadership abilities as reasons for his appointment to command in the East: “He resembled the primitive Romans in that besides coming of a brilliant family and besides possessing much strength of body he was still further gifted with a shrewd intelligence: and he behaved with great bravery, with great fairness, and with great good faith toward all, both friends and enemies. For these reasons Nero dispatched him to the scene of war in his own stead and had entrusted to him a larger force than to anyone else, being equally assured that the man would subdue the barbarians and would not revolt against him [Nero]. Corbulo proved neither of these assumptions false.” Dio also relates that Corbulo had united the “scattered bodies of soldiery” in Syria, and had “trained them sedulously after a period of neglect.”
Tacitus mentioned one severe breach of discipline by an officer, Pactius Orphitus, who disobeyed Corbulo’s orders not to engage the enemy before receiving reinforcements and was thus routed. Corbulo passed “the severest censure” on this officer, ordering “him, his subalterns, and his men, to march out of the intrenchments [sic], and there left them in disgrace, till…he gave them the leave to return within the lines.” This seems to be the same incident mentioned by the Roman chronicler Marcus Julius Frontinus, in which Corbulo ordered units that had “given way before the enemy…to camp outside the entrenchments, until by steady and successful raids they should atone for their disgrace.”
After wintering at Erzerum, Corbulo decided that his small, disciplined and seasoned force, confident in itself and its leader, was at last ready for action. Tiridates, still on the Armenian throne, was attacked by Corbulo in coordination with other allied Roman forces, but neither side managed to engage the other effectively. Negotiations ensued during which Tiridates invited Corbulo to a conference, to which the two leaders would advance “without their breastplates and their helmets.” Corbulo suspected the meeting was a trap, a “stroke of eastern perfidy,” and took along many of his legionaries to the designated meeting site. Neither leader was willing to risk approaching the other, and hostilities soon resumed.
Tacitus noted that Corbulo wanted the war to end quickly, and to “compel the Armenians to act on the defensive,” he “resolved to level their castles to the ground.” He reserved the destruction of the largest fort, Volandum, for himself, and sent his two primary subordinates with their forces to demolish other fortified cities. Corbulo personally reconnoitered the fort and urged his men to action with an inspiring speech. He then arrayed his soldiers in echelons, with each unit given specific tasks during the assault. They attacked the fort from all sides. In less than four hours the bastion was captured by the Romans, who put to the sword all defenders capable of carrying weapons. The women and children were sold into slavery. Corbulo’s two other lieutenants met with similar successes, and panic spread throughout the Armenian countryside.
Corbulo, encouraged by his victories, decided to lay siege to the capital of the kingdom, Artaxata. Rather than take the obvious, direct approach, he took a route that he hoped would catch the Armenians off guard.
Tiridates considered ambushing the Romans while they were on the march, but when his forces revealed themselves, Tacitus states that Corbulo was not alarmed, because he had “prepared for all events, he had marshaled his men either for action or a march.” Corbulo positioned his forces to repulse an attack from any direction, and none came. Tiridates timidly failed to advance, and instead withdrew his forces at the end of the day.
Corbulo immediately sent his lightly armed cohorts to Artaxata, whose inhabitants threw open the gates and surrendered to the Roman vanguard. Corbulo destroyed the city in AD 59, an act that Tacitus rationalized by pointing out that Corbulo did not have sufficient troops to garrison the fortress, and “if the city were left unhurt, the advantage, as well as the glory of the conquest, would be lost.” For this victory, Tacitus added, “Nero was saluted Imperator.”
Corbulo then began to march on the major fortress city of Tigranocerta. The Armenians reacted in different ways when confronted by the advancing legions, and Corbulo treated them according to the varying manner in which they responded to the Roman advance. Tacitus noted that “to the submissive he behaved with mercy; he ordered the fugitives to be pursued with vigor, but for such as lay in subterraneous places he felt no compassion,” burning them in their caves.
The arduous march continued through the rugged, sunbaked countryside, with food and water becoming scarce. Tacitus wrote that there was “nothing to animate the drooping spirits of the army but the example of their general, who endured more than even the common soldiers.” Eventually, he noted, an area full of crops was reached, where a “barbarian of high distinction…was found lurking with a concealed dagger near the general’s tent.” Seized and tortured, he confessed his role in a plot to assassinate Corbulo and revealed the names of his accomplices, who were summarily executed. Undoubtedly intimidated, ambassadors from Tigranocerta soon arrived at Corbulo’s camp, declaring the gates of their city open to receive the Roman army. A number of stalwart factions apparently tried to defend the fortress-city, but they were quickly defeated. Dio states, however, “Tigranocerta submitted to him [Corbulo] voluntarily, and he performed other brilliant and glorious deeds.”
The historian Frontinus explains a highly successful stratagem by Corbulo that helped persuade those in Tigranocerta that organized resistance was futile:
“When Domitius Corbulo was besieging Tigranocerta and the Armenians seemed likely to make an obstinate defense, Corbulo executed Vadandus, one of the nobles he had captured, and shot his head out of a ballista, and sent it flying within the fortifications of the enemy. It happened to fall in the midst of a council that the barbarians were holding at that very moment, and the sight of it (as though it were some portent), so filled them with consternation that they made haste to surrender.”
This is a good example of Corbulo’s resourcefulness as well as the savagery of warfare during that period.
Nero, knowing the Parthians were still engaged in an insurgency, took advantage of their distraction and appointed Tigranes V king of Armenia. After installing Tigranes, Corbulo left a garrison of 1,000 legionaries to support the new ruler. Moreover, Armenia was reduced in size, with portions of the kingdom placed under supervision by neighboring Roman client-kings. It was hoped this would encourage Tigranes’ loyalty and good behavior. With the war apparently over, in AD 60 Corbulo withdrew his legions and returned to Syria to assume the governorship, since Quadratus had recently died.
Nero’s solution to the Armenian situation proved to be disappointingly ineffective. Soon afterward, Tigranes invaded Adiabane, a Parthian dependency, provoking the Parthian king, Vologeses, into attacking and besieging Tigranocerta. Corbulo quickly responded by sending Legions IV Scythica and XII Fulminata, both under able and trusted subordinates to assist Tigranes.
Syria was of great importance to Rome because it served as a buffer for Egypt, which in turn provided one-third of the empire’s supply of grain. But it was highly vulnerable to a Parthian attack, and Corbulo seems to have understood this. Accordingly, he requested that Rome appoint a commander for Cappadocia while he stayed in command in Syria. Tacitus described him as preparing to defend Syria by forming “a chain of posts along the banks of the Euphrates, and, having made a powerful levy of provincial forces, he secured all the passes against the inroads of the enemy.” With impressive forethought, Corbulo also established a series of strongpoints near springs and other sources of water, to deprive the enemy of this all-important resource.
The Parthians were unable to force Tigranocerta into submission. Tacitus wrote that Corbulo, “not of a temper to be elated with success,” sent an emissary to the king, Vologeses recommending that he open negotiations with Rome or face the prospect of a two-pronged attack on his kingdom. While those discussions were taking place, Nero withdrew his support of Tigranes, apparently deciding that puppet rulers were unsatisfactory and that Armenia needed to be annexed.
Rome sent Lucius Caesannius Paetus to command in Cappadocia. Paetus arrived in Syria in AD 62. Tacitus noted the jealousy between Corbulo and Paetus, and how the latter, whom he described as a catastrophically incompetent man, “despised the fame acquired by Corbulo.”
Vologeses’ representatives, meanwhile, returned from Rome without a treaty or agreement. The war inevitably resumed. Paetus then had three legions under his command, with which he failed to take Tigranocerta. He retired to winter quarters, a half-built camp not fully provisioned, near Rhandeia. Meanwhile, Tacitus relates, “Corbulo never neglected [his defensive preparations] on the banks of the Euphrates,” and lauds him for his ingenious engineering techniques in successfully building a bridge over the Euphrates while under harassment from the Parthians.
An overconfident Paetus considered the campaigning season over, and permitted many of his soldiers to go on leave. While it was in a weakened state, his encampment was surrounded by the Parthians. Paetus requested help from Corbulo, who personally led the relief force, only to find the scattered and demoralized remnants of Paetus’ army, which had surrendered three days earlier.
Dio states that “Corbulo with inconceivable swiftness reached the Euphrates and there waited for [Paetus’] retreating force.” That impression of his single-mindedness was echoed by Tacitus, who acknowledges that Corbulo’s army, “without halting night or day, pursued their march with alacrity and vigor,” arriving in time to meet Paetus in flight. Paetus had agreed to an ignominious and humiliating surrender, which included Roman evacuation from Armenia. He also hastily evacuated his camp, leaving behind his wounded.
Vologeses was smart enough to realize that Corbulo was no Paetus, and the Parthian king agreed to send envoys to Rome to negotiate a peace agreement. Paetus was recalled to Rome soon thereafter. In the spring of AD 63, Corbulo was granted supreme authority in the East, which Tacitus described as “little short of what the Roman people committed to Pompey in the war against the pirates.” Corbulo was also reinforced with a seventh legion, the high-quality Legion XV Apollinaris, which had been transferred from Pannonia.
The Parthian envoys were unsuccessful in Rome, but after witnessing Corbulo’s immense show of force, Vologeses agreed to meet with him. They reached a compromise in which Vologeses’ brother would receive his crown in Rome from Nero, thus acknowledging his position as a Roman vassal. Tacitus regarded Corbulo’s personal prestige as an important factor in those talks: “The name of Corbulo was not, as is usual among adverse nations, hated by the enemy. He was, on the contrary, held in high esteem, and, by consequence, his advice had great weight with the Barbarians.” Moreover, Corbulo’s moderation, skill, displays of fairness and good faith, in addition to what Tacitus called his “graceful qualities of affability and condescension,” helped ensure the success of the negotiations.
Dio also briefly relates these negotiations, adding: “Corbulo, in spite of the large force that he enjoyed, did not rebel and was never accused of rebellion. He might easily have been made emperor, since men thoroughly detested Nero but all admired him in every way.” Corbulo was definitely loyal—perhaps too loyal. While in Rome, Tiridates is reported to have said to Nero, “Master, you have in Corbulo a good slave,” a remark generally interpreted to mean that Tiridates was surprised at Corbulo’s continued loyalty.
In spite of the Parthians’ ceremonial concession, 10 years of war had essentially ended in stalemate. Still, Nero needed a victory to boost his fragile prestige in Rome, and he exaggerated this one for all it was worth.
Corbulo remained in command in the East. In AD 65 there was a conspiracy against the throne that involved many noblemen as well as senators. Nero’s retribution was swift and merciless. A second plot, known as the “Vinician conspiracy,” was apparently led by Annius Vinicianus, Corbulo’s son-in-law, who was also one of his legion commanders. It seems likely that the leaders of both conspiracies wanted to replace Nero with Corbulo. It is unknown whether Corbulo had direct knowledge of those plots, but Nero probably suspected the general.
When Nero was on a tour in Greece, he summoned Corbulo, as well as two brothers who were the governors of Upper and Lower Germany, to meet him in Greece for consultations. When the three generals arrived in Greece in late AD 66 or early 67, they were greeted with orders to commit suicide. Loyal and honorable to the end, Corbulo uttered one word, the Greek axios—a term used in the acclamation of winners in the games, meaning “you deserved it”—then seized a sword and fell on it.
Dio interprets Corbulo’s last remark as meaning, “Now for the first time in his [Corbulo’s] career was he ready to believe that he had done ill both in sparing the zitherplayer [Nero] and in going to him unarmed.” Perhaps. In any case, such was the end of Corbulo, a magnanimous and charismatic warrior who had held imperial power in the East for 12 years. In the process, perhaps unwittingly, he had become a formidable threat to, and a perceived adversary of, the emperor in whose name he had won glory, prestige and the respect of his troops. Corbulo was rewarded for his loyalty, sense of honor and services by being ordered to take his own life.
Harold E. Raugh Jr. is the command historian of the Defense Language Institute Foreign Language Center and Presidio of Monterey, Calif. He is also the author of the recent book The Victorians at War, 1815-1914: An Encyclopedia of British Military History. For additional reading, he recommends: A History of Rome, by Cyril E. Robinson; and Nero: The End of a Dynasty, by Miriam T. Griffin.
Originally published in the August 2006 issue of Military History. To subscribe, click here.