The July 2014 issue of Armchair General® presented the Combat Decision Game “Battle on Golan Heights, 1973.” This CDG placed readers in the role of Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Captain Meir Zamir, commander of a company of 10 Centurion (or Sho’t) main battle tanks in 82d Tank Battalion, 7th IDF Tank Brigade. Zamir’s mission on the night of October 6-7, 1973, was to defeat a much larger Syrian mechanized force of 40-50 tanks and armored vehicles moving northwest along the Ramtania-Nafakh road toward his company located at Nafakh.
Earlier in the day on October 6, during the Jewish holy day of Yom Kippur, Israel’s neighboring Arab states of Egypt and Syria had launched a two-front surprise attack, with Egyptian army forces targeting the Sinai in the south and Syrian army forces targeting the Golan Heights in the north. This was the beginning of the 1973 Yom Kippur War.
The massive Syrian army attack in the north posed the most serious and direct threat to Israel, since the narrow Golan Heights region separated the borders of Israel and Syria by only 15 miles. It was vital that the heavily outnumbered IDF defenders positioned on the Golan Heights delay the Syrian army until Israeli reservists could be mobilized and sent to turn back the attack. If Zamir’s company failed to defeat the enemy force advancing on Nafakh, the Syrians not only would overrun the IDF major headquarters command post located there but also move on to invade northern Israel before the reservists could arrive to stop them.
HISTORICAL OUTCOME
Zamir recognized that tanks bring three main elements of combat power to armored warfare: mobility, firepower and shock action. He judged that by capitalizing on firepower, he could give his company the best chance of victory in the tactical situation it faced.
Zamir therefore decided to deploy his tanks in an L-shaped ambush, with four tanks under his command blocking the Ramtania-Nafakh road, and six tanks under his deputy commander taking up firing positions along the east side of the road (CDG COURSE OF ACTION TWO: AMBUSH). By 3 a.m., his crews were ready and waiting in the darkness with their tank engines off to ensure they did not alert the approaching enemy.
About 15 minutes later, the unsuspecting Syrian column, composed of a tank battalion and mechanized battalion from 43d Mechanized Brigade, 9th Infantry Division, moved into the company’s “kill zone.” The enemy’s 40-50 armored vehicles (a mixture of T-54/T-55 and T-62 tanks, BMP-1 fighting vehicles and BTR-60 personnel carriers) were spread out along the column, which also included a substantial number of unarmored vehicles transporting ammunition and supplies.
Zamir’s deputy commander suddenly switched on his tank’s xenon searchlight, illuminating the enemy vehicles and signaling the beginning of the ambush. The company’s other two searchlights were then switched on, followed by rapid fire erupting from the 105 mm main guns of all 10 IDF tanks. The highly skilled Israeli gunners and loaders worked frantically, blasting dozens of Syrian vehicles within minutes.
Although the Syrians’ return fire knocked out the Israelis’ searchlights, the glow cast by the large number of burning enemy tanks and vehicles provided Zamir’s gunners plenty of visibility to continue wreaking carnage on the column. The Syrian vehicles that survived the devastating barrage turned around and fled back down the road, leaving behind 50 blazing wrecks, including at least 25 tanks.
However, not one IDF tank was knocked out. In fact, Zamir led his crews in pursuit of the fleeing remnants of the Syrian column, and at dawn they took out 20 more tanks that had escaped the initial ambush.
For the IDF, this night tank battle on the Golan Heights represented the high-water mark of the Syrian advance in the central Golan. To the astonishment of Syrian commanders, in less than 24 hours the Israelis had mobilized four reserve tank brigades and moved them into combat along the Golan Heights.
By October 10, IDF forces had pushed the Syrians back to the start line of their attack. The next day, the Israelis launched an offensive into Syrian territory that advanced to within 30 miles of Damascus, Syria’s capital. On October 25, all fighting on the northern front against the Syrians and on the southern front against the Egyptians came to a halt as a cease-fire brokered by the United Nations took effect.
READER SOLUTIONS
ACG judges based their selections for winning Reader Solutions and those receiving honorable mention on submissions that chose COURSE OF ACTION TWO: AMBUSH or those whose explanations demonstrated a solid understanding of the key principles for a tank unit defense. (See “After Action Report,” p. 66.) This plan allowed Zamir’s company to overcome the great disparity in numbers it faced by capitalizing on surprise and rapidly delivered, overwhelming firepower. The L-shaped ambush formation placed the maximum number of IDF tanks in positions with clear fields of fire from which their well-trained gunners could aim at the enemy vehicles lined up along the road like targets in a shooting gallery.
COURSE OF ACTION ONE: HAMMER AND ANVIL not only split Zamir’s company in the face of a greatly superior enemy force occupying a central position, it also required the “hammer” element to attempt the extremely difficult task of maneuvering off-road in the darkness. Moreover, this plan put the company at risk of incurring friendly fire casualties as the “hammer” force closed on the “anvil” force. Finally, the rounds from the IDF tanks’ main guns would be less effective and accurate under this option, since the “hammer” element would have to fire while on the move.
COURSE OF ACTION THREE: SPOILING ATTACK was likely the worst plan for this tactical situation, since a head-on attack carried several risks: it reduced the number of IDF tanks that could fire effectively at the Syrian vehicles; it made targeting the vehicles in the center and back of the column difficult, if not impossible; and, as in COA One, it required the IDF tanks to fire while on the move, thereby making their rounds less accurate. Furthermore, any knocked-out Syrian vehicles near the front of the column could have blocked the road and impeded the IDF company’s progress, while vehicles in the center and rear of the column not initially engaged could have escaped or maneuvered against Zamir’s tanks.
And now for excerpts from the winning Reader Solutions to “Battle on Golan Heights, 1973.”
Gordon Brock, Canada: “Ambush offers the best opportunity to use your strengths – knowledge of the axis of attack, surprise, use of darkness and superior gunnery skills. Mark out fields of fire as best you can to minimize risk of friendly fire incidents.”
Terrence Murphy, Maine: “You must capitalize on your excellent firepower and armor. Use terrain to your advantage and some elements of surprise. Make sure to knock out the leading Syrian vehicles first, which will block the road. Don’t leave the searchlights on for too long.”
Lieutenant Colonel D.C. Tabor, Tennessee: “At night, a low-lying position enables one to silhouette enemy vehicles against the horizon. Once the first and the last tank in line are hit, resultant fires will illuminate multiple targets. Utilizing our superior gunnery, communications, command and control, and the elements of surprise should win the day.”
Thank you to everyone who participated in this Combat Decision Game. Now turn to page 56 and test your tactical decision-making skills with CDG #65, “Chinese Defense at Shanghai, 1937.” This engagement during the Second Sino-Japanese War places readers in the role of Chinese army Lieutenant Colonel Xie Jinyuan, commander of 524th Infantry Regiment, 88th Division. With the fiercely contested Battle of Shanghai more than two months old and Japanese army forces close to completing their conquest of the city, Xie’s mission is to lead his regiment’s 1st Battalion in a final defense of a portion of Shanghai’s Zhabei district against powerful Japanese attacks. Use the CDG map and form on pages 59 and 60 to explain your solution and mail, email or fax it to Armchair General by October 31, 2014. Winners will be announced in the March 2015 issue, but those eager to read the historical outcome and analysis can log on to armchairgeneral. com/cdg after November 3, 2014. O
*Editor’s Note: For each Combat Decision game, ACG typically receives numerous Reader Solutions that have selected the course of action that ACG judges have deemed the best COA for that CDG. However, our judges are required to choose winners and those earning an honorable mention from submissions whose explanations, in the judges’ opinion, best reflect an understanding of the principles and key points of the CDG’s tactical situation.
Originally published in the November 2014 issue of Armchair General.