Blueprint for Blitzkrieg

Blueprint for Blitzkrieg

By Stephen G. Hyslop
5/11/2007 • World War II

For Colonel Heinz Guderian and other German officers whose careers spanned the tumultuous period between the two world wars, the death of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg on August 2, 1934, marked the end of an era. A war hero who overcame defeat by the Allies in 1918 to win election as president, Hindenburg was reduced to a figurehead by Adolf Hitler, who abolished his office when he died and assumed his role as commander in chief. Officers would now have to swear allegiance to a former corporal who distrusted military leaders and feared they might thwart his efforts to remake the armed forces and restore Germany to greatness.

Even innovators like Guderian, who had impressed Hitler earlier in the year by demonstrating how tanks could break through enemy lines, had qualms about submitting to a supreme commander with no command experience, whose plans for rearmament defied strict limits imposed by the Allies at Versailles. “Tomorrow we swear the oath to Hitler. An oath heavy with consequence!” Guderian wrote his wife. “The army is accustomed to keep its oaths. May the army be able, in honor, to do so this time.”

Guderian’s pledge to obey the Nazi leader proved fateful for him and for the nation he served. He and the 45-year-old Hitler were contemporaries, born 10 months apart, and were united in opposing the Versailles Treaty, which carved up the powerful state of Prussia—Guderian’s homeland and the heart of the old German empire—and ceded part of it to Poland. Guderian favored Hitler’s plan for a resurgent German empire, known as the Third Reich, and shared his enthusiasm for new weapons and tactics. Only belatedly would he recognize that Hitler’s dictatorial ways threatened German mili­tary traditions and spelled disaster.

The German army had recently gained a formidable reputation for its astute General Staff, which examined past conflicts and planned future campaigns through rigorous analysis and debate, and for an officer corps noted for the drive and initiative it displayed in battle. In years soon to come, it would draw on those strengths and launch the modern era of mechanized warfare through a tactic that became known as blitzkrieg—literally “lightning war”—involving quick, deep strikes into enemy territory, spearheaded by armor with close air support. But honor would prove fleeting for Guderian and his colleagues as the dynamic tactics that brought them swift victory over France in 1940 inflated the strategic objectives of the leader they swore to follow. They succeeded in harnessing lightning, only to see Hitler let it loose in explosive struggles against superior powers that left Germany in ruins.

Eager and ambitious, Guderian saw Hitler’s rise as an opportunity and sought his support for the creation of an independent panzer force that would lead Germany to swift victories in the next war. In promoting and developing this armored force, Guderian was guided by his commander, General Oswald Lutz, and by his training as a signals officer, which taught him that reliable radio communications were crucial to the effectiveness of armor.

Without radio, tanks could clear the way for advances by foot soldiers, as they did during World War I. But tank commanders could not exploit their mobility and drive deep into enemy territory unless they were in radio contact with other elements of the panzer force Guderian and Lutz envisioned, which included motorized infantry, artillery and reconnaissance units. The goal was to free this mobile force from reliance on troops advancing on foot and make sudden, rapier-like armored thrusts that would paralyze the opposition. Lacking such capacity, Guderian warned, the army must “give up all hope of quick decisions in the future” and resign itself to sluggish, brutal combat like the trench warfare that exhausted Germany’s resources in the last war.

Anything that promised quick victory was of keen interest to Hitler, whose military ambitions exceeded the nation’s productive capacity. After Guderian demonstrated panzer tactics to him on the army training ground in early 1934, he felt he’d gained a champion in Hitler. The then-chancellor was much taken “by the speed and precision of movement of our units,” Guderian recalled, “and said repeatedly, ‘That’s what I need!’” Hitler could not afford everything he wanted, however, and the army and its budding panzer divisions had to vie with the navy and Luftwaffe for funding and materiel. By his own estimate, it would take 10 years to prepare Germany for war.

Hitler could not resist the opportunities for expansion that arose along Germany’s borders in the late 1930s, however. As conflict loomed, commanders had to make do with the weapons at their disposal. Guderian was not yet fully equipped to serve as Hitler’s armored fist. The prototypical German tank, the Panzerkampfwagen Mk. I, had armor barely a half-inch thick and carried just two machine guns in its turret, making it no match for heavier models produced by rivals such as France and the Soviet Union. Bigger battle wagons were in production such as the Pzkw Mk. IV, which was armed with a 75mm cannon, but even the heftiest tanks would be sitting ducks if they broke down or ran short of fuel, as many did when Hitler occupied Austria in 1938. Guderian responded by instituting a painstaking system of supply and maintenance that allowed his panzers to advance faster and farther than skeptics believed possible.

As war approached, skepticism about what an armored force could achieve in battle persisted at high levels in Germany and prevailed in France and Great Britain, where officers were well aware of what Guderian had in mind. He had learned much from the writings of J.F.C. Fuller, a British tank commander who pioneered attacks by massed armor in World War I, and had recently revealed his own tactical thinking in a 1937 training manual titled Achtung! Panzer! The doctrine Guderian espoused had outspoken proponents abroad such as Fuller and French Colonel Charles de Gaulle. But only in Germany did it receive sufficient support to give armor a leading role in battle plans. Britain and France were thinking defensively and put more trust in natural barriers like the English Channel or man-made ones like the Maginot Line, the network of defensive fortifications along France’s border with Germany, than in the offensive potential of tanks.

Germany had its own fortified line—the West Wall facing France—but its military leaders, in confronting potential enemies on both flanks, sought to avoid a prolonged struggle on two fronts by developing plans of attack that stressed speed and surprise above everything else. “Considering our geopolitical position,” one German strategist declared, “we must always aim for a short war and lightning-like decisions.”

That tendency worked to Guderian’s advantage, as did the Versailles Treaty, which restricted Germany to a 100,000-man army and forced many older officers into retirement before Hitler defied the treaty and expanded his forces. On the eve of World War II, the German officer corps was younger and more receptive to new ideas and technologies than its counterpart in France.

Contrary to the stereotype of the German soldier as a man who simply followed orders, German officers expressed their opinions freely to superiors, had wide latitude in fulfilling their assigned missions, and were encouraged to lead from the front—all of which suited Guderian’s conception of armored warfare as fast moving and free wheeling. “Once armored formations are out on the loose,” he insisted, “they must be given the green light to the very end of the road.” Support from Hitler helped Guderian and those who shared his views overcome official skepticism and refine their doctrine by combining massive armored thrusts with air strikes to produce the convulsive effect that is known today as “shock and awe.”

Some journalists and historians hailed the German conquest of Poland that launched World War II in September 1939 as a blitzkrieg, but much of that campaign was conducted conventionally, by artillery and infantry advancing on foot with horse-drawn vehicles. Operations that took advantage of more sophisticated military hardware contributed to the outcome, including an aerial blitz by the Luftwaffe that neutralized the Polish air force and an impressive drive by General Guderian’s XIX Corps, consisting of one panzer division and two motorized infantry divisions. But the Polish campaign was not revolutionary. Not until the battle for France unfolded in 1940 did the Germans concentrate their armor at the Schwerpunkt, or “main point of effort,” and achieve a breakthrough of historic proportions.

The original plan for that campaign, drawn up in late 1939, called for the army to make a big push from the northeast, down through Belgium into coastal France, much as it had at the start of World War I. “You won’t get away with an operation like that twice running,” Hitler told his chiefs. But they’d put forward the predictable scheme partly to buy time and keep their Führer, known for being impulsive, from launching an offensive too soon. Any thought of proceeding with the plan was abandoned in January 1940, when a plane carrying German staff officers crash-landed in Belgium, a neutral nation leaning toward France and Britain, and documents revealing their intentions fell into French hands.

Hitler demanded a new approach, based on “secrecy and surprise.” The result was Operation Sickle Cut, a bold alternative devised by General Erich von Manstein with input from Guderian. Manstein’s idea was to draw French and British forces northward into Belgium and Holland by staging convincing attacks there, while the main thrust unfolded to the south, around Luxembourg. That meant advancing through the Ardennes, a forested region with few roads, considered impassable by tanks. Guderian knew the area well, however, and felt sure panzers could get through so long as the Luftwaffe shielded them from Allied air raids. Beyond lay the French border and the Meuse River, flanked on the far side by an extension of the Maginot Line that was under construction. Once they had broken through that barrier, panzers would sweep westward across France like a scythe until they reached the Channel, cutting off Allied forces to their north.

The success of this plan depended on concentration and coordination. The French had more tanks than the Germans did, but most were dispersed along the front in support of infantry, and they had few reliable radios. By contrast, the Germans placed seven of their 10 armored divisions at the forefront of Army Group A, which would make the big push across the Meuse while Army Group B preoccupied the Allies to the north and Army Group C kept French forces pinned down behind the Maginot Line to the south. Guderian, whose corps now boasted three panzer divisions, would cross the Meuse at Sedan—the site of a crushing German victory over France in 1870—while other panzer leaders, including the hard-driving Maj. Gen. Erwin Rommel, would cross nearby.

Guderian hoped they’d be given a green light once they breached enemy defenses, but that remained to be seen. General Franz Halder, the army’s chief of staff, expected that panzer forces, after securing bridgeheads across the Meuse, would wait for the bulk of the army to catch up before launching a “properly marshaled attack in mass.” Guderian argued against that cautious approach, urging that panzers be allowed to exploit breakthroughs without delay and “drive a wedge so deep and wide that we need not worry about our flanks.” He soon won Halder over. But would Hitler, a former infantryman who believed in securing his flanks, prove daring enough as supreme commander to see this high-stakes gamble through to a triumphant conclusion?

On May 10, 1940, German troops launched conspicu­ous attacks in Holland and Belgium to draw French troops and the British Expeditionary Force northward into the trap while panzers advanced through the Ardennes. Intended to be furtive, that advance resulted in massive traffic jams, with vehicles clogging the roads for more than 100 miles between the German border and the Meuse River. Tank commanders looked anxiously aloft for Allied warplanes. One officer wrote that his strung-out panzer division presented an ideal target as it moved “slowly forward on a single road. But we could not spot a single French reconnaissance aircraft.” Quick work by the Luftwaffe destroyed many Allied planes on the ground and kept those that took off from detecting the advance by Army Group A before it gained momentum. Anticipating a long war, the French had removed hundreds of military aircraft to runways far from Germany, where they escaped harm but did nothing to deter this developing blitzkrieg.

Guderian had promised to reach the Meuse in four days. He got there in three. His attack at Sedan began on May 13, 1940, with a thunderous air raid by the Luftwaffe that did little damage to the bunkers across the Meuse but unnerved the defenders. A French lieutenant there recalled the maddening sound of Stuka dive bombers swooping down with sirens howling. The noise “drills into your ear and tears at your nerves,” he wrote. “You feel as if you want to scream and roar.”

Toward evening, Guderian sent infantry and engineers across the river in inflatable rafts to blast defenders out of their bunkers and construct pontoon bridges for the tanks and other vehicles. Many of the French units holding the unfinished extension of the Maginot Line in this sector were little more than construction crews and lacked combat training. Their opponents, by contrast, had drilled meticulously for this operation in Germany by crossing the Mosel River under live fire. By nightfall, the defenders were retreating in droves, clogging roads and spreading panic. “Tanks are following us!” they shouted, although no tanks would in fact cross the Meuse before daybreak. Their commander, Brig. Gen. Henri-Jean Lafontaine, wasted precious hours that night shifting his command post rearward and seeking detailed orders from superiors. By the time he counterattacked the next morning, Guderian—who habitually led from the front and made snap decisions—had enough armor and artillery across the river to repulse the belated French challenge and secure his bridgehead.

Guderian then overcame objections from superiors, who wanted to consolidate forces at Sedan before advancing, and pushed ahead with two panzer divisions, leaving a third behind to defend the bridgehead. He was taking a big risk, for Allied warplanes were swarming over the Meuse, and the French were massing heavy armor at Stonne, south of Sedan. Between May 15 and 17, Stonne changed hands more than a dozen times as panzers battled in the streets with hulking French Char B heavy tanks, so thickly armored that shells bounced off them like buckshot. Those gas guzzlers could not operate long without refueling, however, and few had functioning radios. Many eventually fell prey to lighter but more maneuverable panzers and to German artillery, including fearsome 88mm anti-aircraft guns that doubled as tank killers with their barrels lowered. The French were defeated at Stonne, and a spirited effort by Brig. Gen. Charles de Gaulle’s Fourth Armored Division to halt Guderian at Montcornet, west of Sedan, failed as well. “A few of his tanks succeeded in penetrating to within a mile of my advanced headquarters,” Guderian observed, but de Gaulle’s lonely bid faltered for lack of support.

Operation Sickle Cut was succeeding beyond expectations. To Guderian, it was “almost a miracle,” and others up front felt equally confident. To some at headquarters, however, the relative ease of victory seemed too good to be true. Surely the Allies would make concerted efforts from the north and south to pinch off the advancing panzer columns before they reached the Channel.

What German chiefs did not know was that their stunning breakthrough had spread despair and defeatism not just among defenders along the Meuse but all the way up the chain of command. When General Alphonse-Joseph Georges, commanding French forces at the northern end of the front, learned that the enemy had punched through at Sedan, he “flung himself into a chair and burst into tears,” one officer recalled. “He was the first man I had seen weep during this campaign. Alas, there were to be others.” Georges regained his composure, but he and his fellow chiefs never regained the initiative. Their supreme commander, General Maurice Gamelin, had committed the bulk of his reserves to stop what he assumed was the main German thrust to the north and had completely lost hope, declaring that the French army was “finished.”

It was left to commanders at lower levels like de Gaulle to mount isolated counterattacks. One such assault by British armor, launched against the right flank of Rommel’s 7th Pan­zer Division as it neared the French coast on May 21, was repulsed at some cost and rattled Hitler, who was not reassured when Rom­mel, overstating the threat, reported fighting off “hundreds of enemy tanks.”

On May 24, fearing that his fast-advancing armor might be cut off by a pincer movement, Hitler upheld an order by General Gerd von Rundstedt, commander of Army Group A, halting the panzers within 10 miles of Dunkirk, where Allied forces were assembling for evacuation across the Channel. Von Rund­stedt wanted to give trailing infantry divisions time to close up with panzer columns and protect their flanks. But his superiors, Chief of Staff Halder and Commanding General Walther von Brauchitsch, were convinced the Allies were beaten and urged Hitler to lift the order. In a stinging rebuke to the army chiefs, Hitler left the decision to their subordinate von Rundstedt, who did not give the panzers the go-ahead until May 26. By then, the Allies had bolstered their defenses at Dunkirk, where they held out long enough for nearly 340,000 troops to be evacu­ated by sea, including most of the British Expeditionary Force.

Although the British narrowly escaped disaster at Dunkirk, Operation Sickle Cut doomed France by stranding more than 1 million Allied troops in Belgium and eliminating them from the final phase of the campaign, which ended in June with the occupation of Paris and French surrender.

Yet this staggering triumph proved far more instructive for the losers than the winners. Germany’s foes were quick to adopt mechanized tactics and defensive measures such as deploying anti-aircraft guns against tanks. Hitler, by contrast, ignored the cautionary lessons of a contest that was far closer than it appeared.

If the Allies had better coordinated their efforts and concentrated more firepower at Sedan or Stonne or Montcarnet, they might have stopped the Germans in their tracks and forced them into a prolonged struggle for which they were ill-prepared. Intoxicated with success, Hitler came away thinking of blitzkrieg as a strategic silver bullet that could puncture the defenses of great powers and bring them to their knees within months. This grandiose blitzkrieg strategy did not develop until after the French campaign, concludes the German military historian Karl-Heinz Frieser in his revealing book, The Blitz­krieg Legend: “It was not the cause but rather the consequence of the victory.”

After failing to defeat Brit­ain later in 1940 with an aerial blitz that exposed Germany to strategic bombing in return, Hitler made plans to break his nonaggression pact with Josef Stalin and invade the Soviet Union. In so doing, he took the risk of inviting war on more than one front, for the British were taking on Axis forces in North Africa and hoped one day to invade occupied France.

That was a nightmare scenario for the German army, yet few officers at high levels openly questioned the wisdom of invading Russia. Many shared the belief that no theater was too vast to be dominated by their fast-moving forces. Ultimately, they would lose both the war and their honor in Russia, where generals became enmeshed in Hitler’s murderous campaign against Jews and other targeted groups, carried out by special forces called Einsatzgruppen that operated in conjunction with the army. Guderian’s claim that he knew nothing of such atrocities as he led his Panzergruppe 2 toward Moscow in late 1941 conflicts with reports from those responsible for the killings that they had “no difficulties” securing cooperation from commanders in his sector.

If he somehow had escaped knowledge of the death squads, Guderian surely knew by this time that Hitler was not a leader he could follow in good faith. Spirited debate had long been part of the army’s decision-making process, but Hitler would not tolerate dissent or a free exchange of ideas. “Everybody is scared of the Führer and nobody dares say anything,” Guderian wrote his wife as the fateful Russian campaign unfolded. Rapid advances by panzers over the summer gave way to agonizing delays and fitful progress amid worsening weather and mounting resistance.

In December, facing intense cold and a blistering Soviet counterattack, Guderian defied a standfast order from Hitler and pulled his Panzergruppe 2 back from within 100 miles of Moscow to a more defensible position. After being relieved of command for insubordination, he was approached by German officers who were plotting against Hitler but declined to join them. He would not break his oath to the Führer and, in late 1944, became acting chief of staff as Hitler’s disastrous blitzkrieg strategy unraveled and defeat loomed.

“Such was Germany’s dictator,” Guderian wrote afterward, “a man going on in solitary haste from success to success and then pressing on from failure to failure, his head full of his stupendous plans, clinging ever more frantically to the last vanishing prospects of victory, identifying himself ever more with his country.” In the end, Hitler brought that country and its once-mighty armed forces down with him.

This article by Stephen Hyslop was originally published in the June 2007 issue of World War II Magazine. For more great articles, subscribe to World War II magazine today!

12 Responses to Blueprint for Blitzkrieg

  1. paul penrod says:

    German industry was unable to supply the equipment for the panzer forces. Even in 1940, 20% of total strength consisted of the obsolete Pzr I’s. Two of the panzer divisions were fitted out with captured Czech tanks. The motorized infantry didn’t receive their armored carriers unti 1942. In 1941 there were 20 panzer divisions for Barbarosa, but this could only be achieved by halving the tank regiment strengths!! In 1941 there were still Pzr 1s, Pzr IIs and the Czech light tanks in these divisions. To complicate matters, the army pressed for more sturmgeshutzen, which were to be under the umbrella of the artillery, and by 1942 the SS and the Luftwaffe drained tank production for their elite formations. For some odd reason it wasn’t until 1942 that Germany found a way to make mobile their most powerful chess piece-the 88mm gun. Even when the did this, with the Tiger,it was not cost effective. The killing power and range of the 88mm should have been the “armor” on the vehicles mounting them. A page should have been taken from the Allies (Shermans and T-34s) by adapting the solid Pzr IV for all tank, tank-killer and SP gun roles, and constructing a Tankograd-like complex in western Ukraine-out of USAAF and RAF bombing range

    • Steve Ramsey JD says:

      Mr. Penrod-My highest compliments on your grasp of German armour and German armour formations in WWII. Since you have such authority on the subject, let me pose to you a question that many OSTFRONT buffs have wondered about. Supposing that Germany had not chosen to invade Greece in Spring 1941, thus giving them extra time in the Summer of 1941. Would reaching Moscow have effectively knocked Russia out of the war and caused them to sue for peace? Please reply.

  2. Jaye Mallott says:

    Italy invented blitzkrieg, combining leg, motorized, tank and air forces, pioneered in Libya. A mention of this in an article purporting to be inclusive, would have been helpful.

  3. Robert Alexander says:

    There are three schools of thought on this issue:
    1. The conventional wisdom holds that a six week earlier start would have made it possible to take Moscow in 1941 and this could well have proved decisive by enabling the Germans to shelter in Moscow and further disrupting Russian industrial production and possibly inducing Stalin to sue for piece;
    2. The second school of thought holds that the delay was of little significance because spring mud in Russia would have made blitzkrieg operations impossible by greatly impairing mobility;
    3. The third school of thought holds that the immense vastness of Russia, the huge mismatch in industrial production and population made German victory impossible. This view is probably the least widely accepted.
    While I don’t have anything approaching professional knowledge, in my admittedly amateur opinion, I suspect that German victory was impossible unless Stalin were to be removed as leader because he would never have surrendered. It is particularly important to realize that after the immense captures of the opening months of the campaign, the Germans encountered previously unknown Russian Army groups – not merely armies while Stalin was perfectly willing to spill the blood of others in any quantity to ensure his own survival. I also feel that the vast mismatches discussed in 3 above are usually not given their proper weight in these analyses.
    I hope that others will weigh in on these issues as well.

    • Chris Bryant says:

      One of the keys is to understand that BOTH sides made mistakes. Both NATIONAL LEADERS made mistakes and their Generals made plenty, too. In the beginning, Stalin performed terribly; eventually, he made some good decisions, and the Soviet military improved over the course of the war. Hitler and many Generals underestimated the Soviet Union. Hitler had little room for error, though. Soviet forces improved with time; those who weren’t lost early learned to fight better. Nobody knows if, in fact, the fall of Moscow would have won the war for the Germans, and there’s no guarantee that Moscow would have fallen, anyway. The longer the war went, though, the worse the chances became for Germany, because Germany wasn’t prepared for a long war. There was a point at which they might have made peace but neither side was going to make a serious offer as long as they thought they were winning. The other Allies FEARED that it might happen and that’s most of the reason for lend-lease going to the Soviet Union- to keep Stalin in the war.

      Another key point is that Germany was never really prepared for war. They didn’t really gear up for war until long after they were in it. The bombing didn’t hurt them that much because they weren’t operating near capacity, anyway. Hitler miscalculated: he didn’t the think the Allies would fight. He looked pretty brilliant early on, not so brilliant later. He started believing he knew more than his Generals and quit listening to them. It’s true that the German military was very good, but they had their limitations like anybody else. Robert Citino, among others, is good to read on this.

      I think in the end we can say that Germany MIGHT have won, but it would have been VERY tough. They couldn’t keep killing Russians at the same rate forever, after a while the other side started to catch on and fight a little smarter. There are lots of things the Germans could have done to improve their chances, but that’s hindsight, and even then it would have been difficult. I mention this to point out that the Germans saw the war in the east as a war of extermination. The Holocaust and the war in the east are pretty much one and the same. To the Nazis, it was all part of the same effort but the Holocaust took resources away from the German war effort. I could go into more detail but I think I’ve said enough for now.

      • Robert Alexander says:

        Response to Chris Bryant & Steve Ramsey

        A few other considerations to ponder:
        The distance from Moscow to Warsaw is about 700 miles;
        The distance from Moscow to the Sea of Okhotsk is about 3500 miles;
        so even if the Wehrmacht could have matched their successes of June-December 1941, it would have taken at least one further summer campaign just to reach the Urals where the topography was not suitable for Blitzkrieg but would heavily favor defensive operations;
        Even though the Wehrmacht achieved spectacular initial successes, these were very costly. Wikipedia puts German losses at 800,000 casualties, almost 3000 tanks and over 3800 aircraft. While Russian casualties were roughly 10 times larger, the Russian industrial base was as well equipped to re-supply the losses as the German and the Russian population advantage was sufficient to provide the Soviet Army with 300 divisions at War’s end. After December of ’41, the United States sent massive amounts war materiel to the Soviet Union so the Wehrmacht was at a significant material disadvantage. Even if the Grants were no match for a T-34, they were at least as good as the T-70 light tank and stacked up very well against Pz II’s and III’s that were widely used even as late as the battle of Kursk in the Summer of ’43.
        Much of the Soviet industrial capacity was relocated beyond the Urals in the opening months of the war and so would have been available for use in re-supply for the next summer.
        In all, it can be appreciated that while German victory was far from impossible, the Wehrmacht had taken on a very, very tall order with Barbarossa.

  4. Robert Alexander says:

    I tried to weigh in on your question by responding to your response but somehow it showed up as response 4 below.

  5. […] influential Germans in the first part of the twentieth century, such as Helmuth von Moltke and Heinz Guderian, to be reminded that ground forces provide just as workable fodder for such hopes. The old canard […]

  6. […] reasons behind the Wehrmacht’s early successes were the innovative tactics of its leaders, particularly the visionary theorist Colonel Heinz Guderian. Understanding that an inefficient chain-of-command would undermine his lightning-fast […]

  7. […] Originally Posted by Sam-Nary Rommel was only a division commander in 1940. The man who was the "father of tanks" was Guderian and the man who is credited with the plan that won in 1940 was Manstien. Rommel was a decent tactical commander, but he himself transferred to the panzers from the infantry, and in the African desert would take criticism from his subordinates regarding his handling of the siege of Tobruk regarding how he used his tanks. They had De Gaulle, who was France's real tank theorist in the interwar years, taught largely by the commander of France's WWI tank formations. The issue that him was the fact that the French government and military leadership largely kept De Gaulle in smaller scale posts and limited what he could do… wasn't De Gaulle trying to push modernizing the tanks and making better use of them before any hostilities broke out? Blueprint for Blitzkrieg – Heinz Guderian and the Early Successes of Nazi Germany […]

  8. John Radzilowski says:

    There is no single originator of Blitzkrieg. De Gaulle’s ideas about mobile warfare were shaped by his experiences a military adviser in Poland in 1920 and by the work of Polish general Wladyslaw Sikorski who wrote widely on the future of mechanized warfare in Polish and French. Sikorski had successfully employed small motorized forces in deep strikes against Soviet forces in 1920. He had previously used a combination of mobile forces (motorized, cavalry and trains) to provide defensive screen. His forces would strike the advancing Reds, retreat, strike again elsewhere. This anticipated the types of mobile defense used by Nazi forces in the later years of WWII.

    The article is quite interesting but repeats the nonsense about the Polish air force in 1939.

    I would also say that the Polish campaign was not conducted in a conventional way that the author asserts. Initially, Nazi tank and motorized forces tried to run over Polish defenses and at times got badly mauled (e.g., Mokra, Mlawa). However, they quickly learned to bypass Polish strongpoints and outflank them. The heavy Nazi losses in the campaign were the result of the fierce infantry battles that occurred after some of those initial breakthroughs occurred since Nazi infantry units were often left to deal with bypassed Polish formations that were still intact and quite lethal. The experience in 1939 was incorporated into Nazi doctrine and the results were obvious in 1940. Unfortunately, the French received detailed information from the Poles on Nazi weapons and tactics but dismissed it entirely.

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

, , , , ,

Sponsored Content: