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Union General John A. McClernand and the Politics of Command

by Christopher C. Meyers, McFarland

John Alexander McClernand rarely receives much sympathy from Civil War buffs. In addition to his being lumped together with the likes of Benjamin Butler and Daniel Sickles by historians lamenting the North’s use of “political generals,” his reputation has been scarred by virtue of the fact that he’s one of the principal antagonists in the much-loved tale of Ulysses S. Grant’s rise to greatness.

To his credit, Christopher Meyers does not ignore McClernand’s less savory character traits—above all, his penchant for self-promotion—in his effort to provide a more balanced account. Meyers ably recounts McClernand’s distinguished antebellum career in Illinois and Democratic Party politics, especially his staunch alliance with Stephen A. Douglas, providing an important backdrop to McClernand’s intertwined political and military efforts in the Civil War.

It must be said that readers interested in McClernand’s wartime contributions will find greater value in Richard L. Kiper’s outstanding 1999 study. But while Meyers repeats old chestnuts about the evils of a place-oriented strategy and the virtues of a “Clausewitzean” army-oriented strategy, he merits praise for his assessment of McClernand’s efforts at Belmont, Shiloh, Vicksburg and elsewhere. In the process, he makes a strong case for eschewing the traditional caricature of McClernand as an incompetent schemer and revising our view of the general and his contribution to the war.

 

Originally published in the June 2011 issue of Civil War Times. To subscribe, click here.