Some historians believe that without the successful drive of Major General William T. Sherman’s army group through northwest Georgia in the spring and summer of 1864, the South could well have won the war. Despite the still contentious debate surrounding Sherman’s conduct of the Atlanta campaign, there is little doubt that his relentless march sounded the death knell for the Confederacy.
Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant was having great difficulty in his campaign to break General Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia or drive it back to the Confederate capital during the summer of 1864. And even when Grant, accompanying Maj. Gen. George G. Meade’s powerful and well-equipped Army of the Potomac, succeeded in pushing Lee back on Richmond, the defenses there held and Grant was forced into siege operations at Petersburg while “Marse Robert” unleashed one more daring offensive of his own.
In addition, other Federal campaigns that Grant hoped would aid his efforts were failing miserably. Supporting offensives under Maj. Gens. Benjamin Butler, Nathaniel Banks and Franz Sigel resulted in embarrassing defeats. The U.S. Navy struggled on the Red River and at Charleston and was delayed at Mobile. Without Sherman’s relentless push through the South, war weariness might have shaken the Northern people by the time national elections were held six months later, and the armistice platform of the Democratic Party might have prevailed.
Sherman’s campaign is as fascinating as the man who led it, those he led and those he opposed. Once branded as crazy, the red-haired Ohioan had been seasoned under Grant’s tutelage and understood the orders of his younger superior and friend. Sherman’s drive to bring the concept of total war to the heart of the South was exactly what the North needed to launch the final phase of the war and ultimately achieve victory.
Today touring along the route of this campaign reveals a landscape of incredible beauty and evidence of bitter fighting while tracing the lives, and sometimes deaths, of some of the Civil War’s most interesting characters. The first part of the 16-week campaign, which can be termed the Road to Atlanta, will be covered in this column and in January’s installment. The second part, known as the Battles for Atlanta, will be the subject of a future column. The roughly 100-mile route from Ringgold, Ga., to the Chattahoochee River encompasses a large number of interesting sites, and their haunting silence stands in direct contrast to the crack of gunfire, clanking of equipment and shouts of men that permeated the air a little more than 142 years ago.
Despite the importance of the Civil War history in the area, the sites do not receive as much visitation as other battlefields. Yet there is much to see and do along the I-75 corridor. Because there are so many interesting places to visit, the history of Sherman’s campaign as covered in this column will be brief. However, the last Web site in the contact information lists a number of excellent treatments of the campaign, including that of Atlanta historian William R. Scaife, who has been a great help in identifying relevant sites. Although not covered here, points of interest pertaining to John Bell Hood’s late 1864 offensive and the Andrews Raid of 1862 will be mentioned in terms of geographical proximity. An in-depth tour of the area, starting at Chattanooga and ending in Atlanta, should last three to six days. In addition to discovering some fascinating Civil War sites, visitors will have access to nature trails and bike paths, camping opportunities, water recreation at state parks and the Chattahoochee National Recreation Area and the wonderful hospitality offered by the people who live in this region.
When Grant was placed in command of all Federal armies in March 1864, Sherman assumed leadership of the Military Division of the Mississippi. Unhappy with Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans’ handling of the Battle of Chickamauga, Grant had received permission the previous October to replace him with Maj. Gen. George Thomas, who took over the Army of the Cumberland. The force formerly headed by Grant and Sherman, the Army of the Tennessee, was now commanded by Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson, who had impressed Grant at Vicksburg. A relatively unfamiliar commander from the trans-Mississippi, Maj. Gen. John Schofield, led a new Army of the Ohio. From these forces Sherman assembled a massive army group of more than 110,000 men and 254 guns. The Confederates, then in winter camp at Dalton, Ga., were commanded by General Joseph E. Johnston, who had replaced General Braxton Bragg after the Rebels were driven from Chattanooga. Johnston had roughly half as many men and 144 guns when Sherman began his campaign on May 4, 1864.
This was not only a campaign of strategy and tactics; it was one of personalities—starting with the commanders. Sherman, second in importance only to Grant in the U.S. Army, displayed a seasoned temperament and mental toughness and had Washington’s full support. Thomas, the “Rock of Chickamauga” and one of the most successful Union generals of the war, was known as a plodder. His army, the largest of the three, was to attack Johnston’s defenses directly. Sherman trusted the eager and energetic McPherson to take the Army of the Tennessee on bold flanking maneuvers. Schofield was to do the same, but his initial role was less defined. Notably, his Army of the Ohio executed two of the most significant Federal flanking maneuvers in this part of the campaign, at Kolb’s Farm and Sope Creek.
The Confederate commanders had distinct personalities as well. Johnston was a master of preparation and defense. While he was always at odds with Richmond, he was respected and liked by his men. Never one to give battle unnecessarily, he hoped to slow the Federal advance and lure the enemy into a fight in which he had an advantage. Johnston’s corps commanders included Lt. Gen. William J. Hardee, a reliable veteran of the army since its inception, and the impulsive and daring Lt. Gen. Hood, an aggressive fighter who had proved himself in the East and at Chickamauga. Joining the campaign later was the inimitable bishop-general Leonidas Polk, who was typically slow to act. Both sides had a number of competent commanders leading divisions and brigades and ranks filled with veteran soldiers.
The battles on the Road to Atlanta can be divided into six phases: Rocky Face Ridge, Resaca, Cassville, Dallas, Kennesaw Mountain and the River Line. On May 4, Sherman gave orders to his army commanders to advance south on a broad front. The first action was at Tunnel Hill on May 7, against some stubborn resistance offered by members of Maj. Gen. Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry corps. After the Rebel cavalry was scattered, Sherman’s men were exposed to the awe-inspiring sight of Rocky Face Ridge, a 10-mile-long northsouth range that protected Johnston’s camps at Dalton. Only three gaps penetrated the ridge, and Sherman pinned his hopes on a wide flanking maneuver by McPherson through the winding Snake Creek Gap to get at Johnston’s rear along the rail line at Resaca. On May 8, offensives were launched by the other two Federal armies against Rocky Face and Mill Creek gaps, where wagon and rail routes pierced the ridge, and to the east near Varnell’s Station. None of these feints succeeded. Rebel pioneers dammed Mill Creek and flooded the pass. The heaviest Federal casualties were sustained assaulting the steep, rocky Dug Gap.
The feints did succeed in masking the early part of McPherson’s march, however. It was not until shortly before he arrived in Sugar Valley just west of Resaca that the Rebels discovered the move. On May 9, McPherson probed the Resaca earthworks that Johnston had built in advance—a trademark of this campaign. Cadets of the Georgia Military Institute at Marietta acted as skirmishers during McPherson’s first attack but only briefly, and they weren’t nearly as effective as their VMI counterparts would be at New Market, Va., less than a week later. Seeing the manned fortifications and lacking cavalry, McPherson backed off from the attack and lost the element of surprise. Disappointed at surrendering the initiative, Sherman on May 11 ordered most of his remaining force to follow McPherson’s route. Johnston evacuated his remaining troops from Rocky Face Ridge on the night of May 12 and, with excellent interior lines, filled the Resaca trenches by daybreak on May 13.
Proceed south from the Chattanooga area on I-75 to exit 345. Those with more time can exit to U.S. 41 north of Ringgold and visit the 1930s-era Works Progress Administration way stations describing the opening of Sherman’s campaign and other actions in the area, then drive four miles east on Ga. 2 to Varnell. Prater’s Mill and the Varnell House both stood at the time the armies clashed in the nearby Crow Valley. From exit 345 take Ga. 201 west into Tunnel Hill to U.S. 41 and go south a short distance to Oak Street. Turn left and proceed to Clisby Austin Drive. The Clisby Austin House served as Sherman’s headquarters from May 7-12, and Hood recovered from his Chickamauga wounds here for a time. Nearby is the north entrance to the 1,477-foot railroad tunnel. The smaller of the two entrances is the wartime structure. It is now open for touring. The locomotive General raced through here, closely pursued by Texas during the Andrews Raid. Johnston wanted to plug the tunnel to deny the enemy its use if captured, but the Confederate government wouldn’t allow it until it was too late. Exhibits at a new museum, recently acquired property and historic markers near the Clisby Austin House interpret the historic events here.
Follow U.S. 41 south toward Dalton. Just before reaching I-75, the road crosses Mill Creek. Georgia Historical Commission markers here and to the south describe the action. Buzzard’s Roost, a key Rebel artillery position on the crest of the ridge, is visible from here. A trail east of the creek leads to a flume where Brig. Gen. James D. Morgan’s brigade made a significant attack on the defenses. Some of the Confederate earthworks are open for inspection. Continue south to the city of Dalton. In front of the 1852 Western & Atlantic railroad depot is the only statue in the South of Johnston. Other wartime buildings can be found here as well. The city was the site of Confederate camps during Sherman’s campaign and had been attacked the previous February by Thomas. (The Rebels held, but the Federals gained a good reconnaissance.) Later in 1864, the Union garrison there was attacked and surrendered to Hood. For more local information on the earthworks and the city, see the contact list at the end of the article.
Continue south from Dalton and pick up U.S. 41 again. Turn right on Walnut Avenue/Dug Gap Battle Road. Dug Gap Battlefield Park, at the top of the ridge, is open on weekends and maintained by the Whitfield-Murray Historical Society. The panoramic view is outstanding, and the rock palisades offer a good sense of the defense used against Maj. Gen. John Geary’s force that was advancing from the west. There are also remnants of Confederate breastworks.
Return to U.S. 41 and proceed south toward Resaca. There, the Federals would experience some of the frustration their brethren in the East were facing. The difference was that unlike Lee’s hastily constructed “Mule Shoe” line at Spotsylvania Court House, the fortifications at Resaca were built in advance at a strategic location. Sherman’s men moved into position on May 13, and the bulk of the two armies faced each other in an L-shaped line. Two days of assaults on the works and heavy fighting beginning on the 14th were fruitless for both sides. However, on the 15th a division of the Federal XVI Corps established a pontoon crossing of the Oostanaula River at Lay’s Ferry, six miles south of Resaca, and Sherman turned Johnston’s position. Both armies left the area on May 16.
On U.S. 41 just north of Resaca is the village of Tilton. Major General Oliver O. Howard’s corps advanced south through this area. After the battle the Federals built a blockhouse here that was later assaulted by Hood in October. General stopped here for wood on its journey north in 1862. Just south of Tilton, turn left on Chitwood Road, where the heaviest fighting occurred on the Rebel right flank and Hood almost achieved a breakthrough from his position on the wooded ridge to the north. A mile south of the Whitfield County line is another WPA way station, this one describing the battle of Resaca. The main Confederate line ran just west of I-75, and most of the earthworks have been obliterated by its construction. Turn left at the way station, the paved road leads to the Resaca Confederate Cemetery, the first established in Georgia. A little farther south, as you enter the community of Resaca, turn right on Ga. 136. A vantage point just west of the Camp Creek crossing is a good place to view the two ridges on either side of the creek. The Federal line is to the west, and the Confederate line to the east. The last part of the Federal march through Snake Creek Gap was along present-day Ga. 136, which leads west into the Chattahoochee National Forest. Continue south of Resaca about five miles to Calhoun. Lay’s Ferry was over the Oostanaula River just west of Calhoun. It is north of Ga. 156 but currently inaccessible. However, the area can be seen with some local guidance. Continue south on U.S. 41 to Calhoun.
The next phase of the campaign was a series of maneuvers and responses without a major battle. As Johnston evacuated his army from Resaca on all roads leading south to Calhoun, he could not locate a satisfactory position at Calhoun and Adairsville in this region of rolling hills and fields. In an effort to slow down Sherman’s pursuing columns, he unleashed a series of rear-guard actions on Sherman’s separated forces. The first and most vicious of these was at Rome Crossroads on May 16, when the lead elements of McPherson’s corps were attacked by Hardee. Before other Federals could join the action the following day, Hardee disappeared to the south. One Federal division was diverted to Rome, an important manufacturing center on the Coosa River. The Confederates initially sent a division that had just arrived from Mississippi to defend the city, but then reversed strategy and gave up Rome without a fight. The newly arrived forces marched east to join Polk, their corps commander.
Johnson finally found the defensive position he was looking for at Cassville and even saw an opportunity for offensive action against Schofield’s army, marching in a separate column to the east supported by Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s XX Corps. But an order to Hood to attack this column was mishandled when the Kentucky general was surprised by Brig. Gen. Edward McCook’s cavalry on two different roads. Hood pulled his corps back, ruining Johnston’s first defensive position. However, the Rebel commander formed a new line east of Cassville, facing his former position west of the town, and presented a strong front.
Alarmed at the miss that almost destroyed one of his armies, Sherman regrouped, bringing most of his remaining men to Cassville from the railroad junction at Kingston. The Federal soldiers quickly filled the former Rebel works west of the town. A major action seemed likely, but a meeting among the Confederate commanders revealed some role reversals. Hood was worried about well-placed Union artillery enfilading his line. He was supported by Polk, though Hardee was ready to stand and fight. The lack of cohesion forced Johnston to give up the position on the night of May 19 and march his army across the Etowah River, the last great water barrier before the Chattahoochee River on Atlanta’s outskirts.
See next issue’s column as the Road to Atlanta continues.
Originally published in the December 2006 issue of Civil War Times. To subscribe, click here.
