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Historical outcome and winning Reader Solutions to CDG #57, July 2013 issue.

The July 2013 issue of Armchair General® presented the Combat Decision Game “Canadian Infantry Attack, 1944.” This CDG placed readers in the role of Brigadier John Godfrey “Jock” Spragge, commander of 7th Infantry Brigade, 3d Canadian Division. In October 1944, Spragge’s brigade received the mission to attack across the Leopold Canal near the Holland-Belgium border, defeat German defenders and establish bridgeheads north of the canal. The attack was part of Operation Switchback, one of the Canadian-led efforts to clear German forces from the Scheldt River Estuary, the 50-mile-long region on both sides of the Scheldt River spanning from the river’s mouth on the North Sea coast to the deepwater port of Antwerp, Belgium.

Clearing the estuary was vital to the continued logistical support of Supreme Allied Commander General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s American, British and Canadian armies. Although the previous summer Allied forces had swept across France all the way to the German border, supplying such a massive effort required tens of thousands of tons of food, ammunition and fuel each day. Ike’s armies desperately needed a deepwater port to ensure the flow of supplies necessary to support their impending war-winning drive into the heart of Germany.

Antwerp was host of one of Europe’s finest deepwater ports. Although units of British Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s 21 Army Group had liberated Antwerp on September 4, 1944, the Germans still maintained control of the Scheldt Estuary, preventing the Allies’ use of the port. Thus, before the port could become the solution to Eisenhower’s logistical problems, the Allies had to wrench control of the estuary from enemy hands.

HISTORICAL OUTCOME

The objective of Operation Switchback, a key initial step in the long and arduous process of capturing the estuary, was to clear German forces from the Scheldt River’s south bank (approximately the area bounded by the river on the north and the Leopold Canal on the east and south). The attackers’ task was made more difficult by the flat, open ground that gave German defenders excellent longrange fields of fire and the low-lying region’s waterlogged terrain (including large areas of deliberately flooded “polders”) that restricted vehicle movement to dikes and raised embankments.

Spragge’s 7th Infantry Brigade was tasked with leading off 3d Canadian Division’s effort by seizing a bridgehead that would breach the Germans’ Leopold Canal defenses and provide a foothold for launching subsequent attacks. Spragge decided to initiate a two-pronged attack, with Canadian Scottish Regiment (followed by the Royal Winnipeg Rifles) assaulting between Oosthoek and Moershoofde in the center of the sector while the Regina Rifles struck Biezen on the left (CDG COURSE OF ACTION THREE: DUAL ATTACK). To maintain the element of surprise, there was no preceding artillery barrage.

At 5:30 a.m. on October 6, 1944, the assault kicked off with the brigade’s 27 “Wasp” flamethrowing Bren Universal Carriers aligned along the canal blasting sheets of fire at German positions on the opposite bank. Next, the dual attack began with the leading troops crossing the canal in assault boats and on engineer-built kapok bridges.

Although the flamethrowing “Wasps” initially drove German defenders from forward positions, the enemy rallied to restrict the Regina Rifles to a tiny toehold. Canadian Scottish Regiment, however, later reinforced by the Royal Winnipeg Rifles, seized a substantial bridgehead and engaged in heavy fighting to expand it. After three days of grinding combat, the two bridgeheads were finally linked October 9. By the time the expanded bridgehead was declared secured October 13, the Canadian brigade had suffered 111 killed in action and 422 wounded or captured.

In addition to securing a bridgehead on the canal’s north bank to support subsequent operations, by drawing in German reserves the brigade helped other 3d Canadian Division units achieve their objectives in the effort to clear the Scheldt Estuary. After several more weeks of hard fighting, the estuary was eventually cleared November 8. Twenty days later, once German naval mines had been swept from the waters, the first Allied shipping reached the port of Antwerp.

Because so much of the operation’s fighting took place in water-soaked terrain, Field Marshal Montgomery gave 3d Canadian Division the nickname “Water Rats” – an honor echoing the famed “Desert Rats” nickname earned by 7th British Armored Division in North Africa.

READER SOLUTIONS

ACG judges based their selections for winning Reader Solutions and those receiving honorable mention on submissions that chose COURSE OF ACTION THREE: DUAL ATTACK, or those whose explanations demonstrated a solid understanding of the key principles for a World War II water obstacle assault crossing. (See “After Action Report,” p. 64.) By striking at two locations, the Canadians forced the Germans to face multiple assault crossings and thus spread out their defenses. Weighting the attack in the center with two regiments increased the chances of seizing a substantial bridgehead. Even if the weaker, single-regiment attack on the left were unsuccessful, it still would draw German defenders away from the main attack in the center.

COURSE OF ACTION ONE: FLANKING ATTACK had several tactical disadvantages. First, by having the Canadian brigade attack at only one point, it risked committing the regiments piecemeal. Second, even if the attackers seized a small bridgehead, the flooded area restricted subsequent maneuvering by them. Finally, the plan allowed the enemy defenders to concentrate their firepower and troop strength on a single threatened point.

Although COURSE OF ACTION TWO: TRIPLE ATTACK forced the Germans to spread their defenses across the sector, it correspondingly diluted the Canadians’ strength – potentially producing three weak attacks, each unable to capture a bridgehead. Moreover, the plan did not provide a substantial (regiment-sized) reserve that Spragge could employ to reinforce any attack that looked promising.

And now for excerpts from the winning Reader Solutions to “Canadian Infantry Attack, 1944.”*

CRAIG BURTON, TEXAS: “Plan to take full advantage of artillery assets to destroy or suppress the Germans’ mortars, artillery and anti-tank guns. Merge the two battalions’ small bridgeheads into one to serve as the launch pad for the division’s follow-on attack.”

DONALD K. GILLEO, ARIZONA: “Launch two battalion cross-canal attack on front of sufficient width to prevent being hemmed in and providing for expansion and reinforcement. Use airpower to interdict movement of German reinforcements. Arrange identification signals to avoid friendly fire from Allied aircraft.”

EDWARD JENSEN, IOWA: “Surprise and multiple attacks are our best chance for success. The attack on the left capitalizes on the enemy’s weakest defense point. Artillery and air support will suppress the surrounded Germans and allow us to form one united bridgehead.”

Thank you to everyone who participated in this CDG. Now turn to page 54 and test your tactical decision-making skills with CDG #59, “Polish Motorized Infantry Attack, 1944.” This World War II battle places you in the role of Major Wladyslaw Zgorzelski, commander of 10th Dragoons (Motorized Rifle Battalion), 1st Polish Armored Division. Your mission is to attack and capture Chambois, France, and link up with American units advancing toward the town from the south, thereby closing the gap and trapping German 7th Army in the Falaise Pocket. Use the CDG map and form on pages 57 and 58 to explain your solution and mail, email or fax it to Armchair General by October 25, 2013. Winners will be announced in the March 2014 issue, but those eager to read the historical outcome and analysis can log on to armchair general.com/cdg after October 28, 2013.  

 

*Editor’s Note: For each Combat Decision game, ACG typically receives numerous Reader Solutions that have selected the course of action that ACG judges have deemed the best COA for that CDG. However, our judges are required to choose winners and those earning an honorable mention from submissions whose explanations, in the judges’ opinion, best reflect an understanding of the principles and key points of the CDG’s tactical situation.

Originally published in the November 2013 issue of Armchair General.