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A Magnificent Disaster: The Failure of Market Garden, The Arnhem Operation, September 1944

By David Bennett. 286 pp. Casemate, 2008. $32.95.

The Allied attempt in September 1944 to shorten the war by means of a daring airborne drop into the Netherlands, backed up by an armored advance, has all the ingredients of great drama, if not Greek tragedy. For over 30 years, the study of Operation Market Garden has been dominated by the long shadow of Cornelius Ryan’s masterful A Bridge Too Far. Written when many leading participants were still available for interviews, it has become the standard account. Yet in the decades since its 1974 publication, other authors have revised, broadened, and deepened our understanding of, for example, the importance of ULTRA code breaking, the German side of the battle, and the roles of some key players. Most accounts emphasize the valiant struggles of the three airborne divisions (the U.S. 82nd and 101st Airborne Divisions, and especially the British 1st Airborne Division, the “Red Devils” at the Arnhem bridge) and the too-slow advance of XXX Corps, the main relief force. They have much less to say about the important actions of the two Allied corps on the flanks, VIII and XII Corps. So there is certainly room for a new strategic and operational look at this battle, one that would broaden the focus and incorporate more recent findings. That is where David Bennett’s book comes in.

Bennett’s crisp narrative scores a number of goals. He provides a smooth and concise account of the battle’s major phases and turning points, well spiced with vignettes from the tactical level. He carefully compares the postwar testimony of participants with written materials originating at or near the time of the events described. While his account is largely free of sensationalist and tiresome myth busting, he does subject some traditional accounts to critical scrutiny, and manages to bring some legendary events, such as the delays afflicting XXX Corps’ advance or the bridging at Son, into sharper focus. His conclusions are judicious and well supported. Rather than pointing to specific failures by individual commanders, he concludes that the British Army of the day, in terms of its doctrine, training, and equipment, was ill suited for this type of operation.

In an operational narrative of this type, it is easy to overlook the appendices, but here that would be a mistake. In addition to a useful chronology, Bennett’s appendices include a superb discussion of the British 21st Army Group’s supply situation (it is impossible to fully understand Market Garden without considering its logistical underpinnings); an examination of air support for the operation; an account of the subsequent disgrace of Polish general S. F. Sosabowski; and Maj. Brian Urquhart’s poignant postwar reflections on intelligence matters. Bennett also provides an excellent bibliography and notes on his sources, including commentary on film treatments of the battle—both 1977’s epic A Bridge Too Far and the less well-known 1945 film Theirs is the Glory, in which members of the British 1st Airborne Division played themselves.

This is not a book for the uninitiated. Bennett assumes a pretty fair knowledge of previous scholarship on Market Garden and of the situation on the western front in the late summer of 1944. You won’t find basic information about the organization, capabilities, or tactics of Allied airborne units or German SS Panzer divisions. Bennett’s brief examination of Allied strategic planning is perhaps too brief, although a fine foreword by Carlo D’Este covers some of this ground. That said, this is a very impressive first book by a new author, demonstrating that even well-studied campaigns can use a fresh look.

 

Originally published in the January 2009 issue of World War II. To subscribe, click here