Comments on: Worth the Cost? Justificaton of the Iwo Jima Invasion http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher Sat, 25 May 2013 03:21:04 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: Jimmy George http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm#comment-954152 Jimmy George Sat, 16 Mar 2013 08:44:59 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682258#comment-954152 I know not whether the taking of Iwo Jima during WW 2 was necessary or not but I thank God that It was still a semi-active base in 1961. During the Flying Tigers flight of my family from Travis AFB to Okinawa in October 1961, our aircraft the Lockheed L-1049C Super Constellion, suffered triple engine malfuncion. We emergency landed on Iwo Jima on one engine and a prayer. My family of 8 souls and about a hundred other military dependents were housed in a delipidated military barracks for two days under very deporable conditions but we thanked God to be alive. If it took the lives of thousands of Marines to make this happen, then I am forever grateful. I know not whether the taking of Iwo Jima during WW 2 was necessary or not but I thank God that It was still a semi-active base in 1961. During the Flying Tigers flight of my family from Travis AFB to Okinawa in October 1961, our aircraft the Lockheed L-1049C Super Constellion, suffered triple engine malfuncion. We emergency landed on Iwo Jima on one engine and a prayer. My family of 8 souls and about a hundred other military dependents were housed in a delipidated military barracks for two days under very deporable conditions but we thanked God to be alive. If it took the lives of thousands of Marines to make this happen, then I am forever grateful.

]]> By: Robert F. Dorr http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm#comment-821976 Robert F. Dorr Sun, 21 Oct 2012 23:47:38 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682258#comment-821976 I'm the author of "MISSION TO TOKYO," about B-29 Superfortress bomber crews in the war against Japan and very much wish I'd seen this thoughtful article before the book was published. The writer of this article provides a lot of detail to support an argument that the taking of Iwo Jima was unnecessary. I don't agree with all of his conclusions but I'm grateful for his effort to take a detailed, serious look at the issue from a different perspective. While I still believe the seizure of the island was necessary, this article has me wondering how much benefit the United States accrued from having four fighter groups on the island between April 7 and August 15. I'm the author of "MISSION TO TOKYO," about B-29 Superfortress bomber crews in the war against Japan and very much wish I'd seen this thoughtful article before the book was published. The writer of this article provides a lot of detail to support an argument that the taking of Iwo Jima was unnecessary. I don't agree with all of his conclusions but I'm grateful for his effort to take a detailed, serious look at the issue from a different perspective. While I still believe the seizure of the island was necessary, this article has me wondering how much benefit the United States accrued from having four fighter groups on the island between April 7 and August 15.

]]> By: Military Incompetence - Page 9 - World War 2 Talk http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm#comment-810549 Military Incompetence - Page 9 - World War 2 Talk Thu, 28 Jun 2012 02:33:28 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682258#comment-810549 [...] [...] [...] [...]

]]> By: THOMAS MURALLO http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm#comment-804975 THOMAS MURALLO Sat, 26 May 2012 15:04:33 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682258#comment-804975 the military leaders of world war two that planned iwo jima should have been court marshal;ed and if those military leaders had any consience,they should have refused the medal's they were given by their mlitary leaders! how does one justify the loss of 7,000 solidiers in one battle?? there two words to describe the military of that debacle................dumb and stupid!!!!!!!!!!!! my heart goes out to all the love ones of that era! tm frm ct. the military leaders of world war two that planned iwo jima should have been court marshal;ed and if those military leaders had any consience,they should have refused the medal's they were given by their mlitary leaders!
how does one justify the loss of 7,000 solidiers in one battle?? there two words to describe the military of that debacle…………….dumb and stupid!!!!!!!!!!!! my heart goes out to all the love ones of that era! tm frm ct.

]]> By: Amerikanernes hjertekrig: Iwo Jima | andreverdenskrig http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm#comment-791669 Amerikanernes hjertekrig: Iwo Jima | andreverdenskrig Tue, 06 Mar 2012 11:46:49 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682258#comment-791669 [...] [4] http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm [...] [...] [4] http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm [...]

]]> By: Mike http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm#comment-633694 Mike Fri, 08 Jul 2011 14:15:25 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682258#comment-633694 "...[James Vedder] could at least console himself with the thought that planners expected only a two-day offensive, with a third day dedicated to mopping up enemy resistance. U.S. commanders predicted that the assault force of 80,000 combat-hardened marines could rapidly traverse the island neutralized from bombardment, either destroying the Japanese in their defensive positions or mowing them down in waves if they launched desperate banzai attacks. The navy had originally scheduled these same three divisions for use in the Okinawa invasion just 30 days later, demonstrating that it did not consider the operation very difficult, at least initially." I realize it is considered bad form to criticize the Marine Corps. This article, these quotes make me think there was something wrong with the Navy/Marine Corps amphibious team in the Pacific. Iwo Jima was not the first time in the Pacific War that Navy/Marine Corps planners underestimated the Japanese. The people who planned Tarawa did not believe it would take the Second Marine Division three days, at a cost of 3000+ dead and wounded to take Tarawa. They believed it would be a walkover. HM Smith planned for V Amphibious Corps(2nd and 4th Marine Divisions) and III Amphibious Corps(3rd Marine Division and 1st Provisional Marine Brigade) would secure Saipan and Guam respectively by the end of June of 1944. Saipan was not secure until 9 July 1944. Guam was not secure until the middle of August, and those victories happened ater the commitment of additional troops. The Marine Corps General primarily responsible for the invasion of Peleliu, MG William Rupertus, believed the 1st Marine Division would secure Peleliu in 3 to 4 days. After several weeks, 1st Marine Division had suffered approximately 6500 casualties and had not secured Peleliu. Additional troops had to be committed to Peleliu. At least three times prior to Iwo Jima, the Navy/Marine Corps team went into a battle believing that the combination of overwhelming naval gunfire support and air support plus thousands of battle hardened Marines would rapidly overcome japanese resistance. Each time that strategy did not work. One question the author does not address is, why the Navy/Marine Corps amphibious team attempted that strategy again on Iwo Jima? Another is, when it was clear that strategy was not working, could additional troops have been committed to Iwo Jima? "…[James Vedder] could at least console himself with the thought that planners expected only a two-day offensive, with a third day dedicated to mopping up enemy resistance.

U.S. commanders predicted that the assault force of 80,000 combat-hardened marines could rapidly traverse the island neutralized from bombardment, either destroying the Japanese in their defensive positions or mowing them down in waves if they launched desperate banzai attacks. The navy had originally scheduled these same three divisions for use in the Okinawa invasion just 30 days later, demonstrating that it did not consider the operation very difficult, at least initially."

I realize it is considered bad form to criticize the Marine Corps. This article, these quotes make me think there was something wrong with the Navy/Marine Corps amphibious team in the Pacific.

Iwo Jima was not the first time in the Pacific War that Navy/Marine Corps planners underestimated the Japanese. The people who planned Tarawa did not believe it would take the Second Marine Division three days, at a cost of 3000+ dead and wounded to take Tarawa. They believed it would be a walkover. HM Smith planned for V Amphibious Corps(2nd and 4th Marine Divisions) and III Amphibious Corps(3rd Marine Division and 1st Provisional Marine Brigade) would secure Saipan and Guam respectively by the end of June of 1944. Saipan was not secure until 9 July 1944. Guam was not secure until the middle of August, and those victories happened ater the commitment of additional troops. The Marine Corps General primarily responsible for the invasion of Peleliu, MG William Rupertus, believed the 1st Marine Division would secure Peleliu in 3 to 4 days. After several weeks, 1st Marine Division had suffered approximately 6500 casualties and had not secured Peleliu. Additional troops had to be committed to Peleliu.

At least three times prior to Iwo Jima, the Navy/Marine Corps team went into a battle believing that the combination of overwhelming naval gunfire support and air support plus thousands of battle hardened Marines would rapidly overcome japanese resistance. Each time that strategy did not work.

One question the author does not address is, why the Navy/Marine Corps amphibious team attempted that strategy again on Iwo Jima? Another is, when it was clear that strategy was not working, could additional troops have been committed to Iwo Jima?

]]> By: Brayton Harris http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm#comment-504264 Brayton Harris Fri, 25 Mar 2011 03:45:52 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682258#comment-504264 Question for the author: I'm just finishing a bio of Fleet Admiral Nimitz under contract with Palgrave-Macmillan and am cleaning up discrepancies. Your article is very helpful, but there is one ambiguity . . . please clarify: you write, "By the end of hostilities, 36 Superforts had landed on Iwo Jima.: "Hostilities" could mean, the end of the war, or the end of fighting on Iwo. I suspect you mean end of the war, but can't use the detail without verification. Thanks, Brayton Question for the author: I'm just finishing a bio of Fleet Admiral Nimitz under contract with Palgrave-Macmillan and am cleaning up discrepancies. Your article is very helpful, but there is one ambiguity . . . please clarify: you write, "By the end of hostilities, 36 Superforts had landed on Iwo Jima.:

"Hostilities" could mean, the end of the war, or the end of fighting on Iwo.

I suspect you mean end of the war, but can't use the detail without verification.

Thanks, Brayton

]]> By: Ken Clark http://www.historynet.com/worth-the-cost-justificaton-of-iwo-jima-invasion.htm#comment-481804 Ken Clark Fri, 04 Mar 2011 06:18:49 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682258#comment-481804 This article makes me sick knowing my uncle was killed on Iwo. I have always questioned the need to storm this hellhole. Why couldn't we have cut off their water and food supplies? Seems that as always, the fatboys at the top with no sense made the choices. This article makes me sick knowing my uncle was killed on Iwo. I have always questioned the need to storm this hellhole. Why couldn't we have cut off their water and food supplies? Seems that as always, the fatboys at the top with no sense made the choices.

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