At 2 a.m. on April 19, Sammern-Frankenegg dispatched groups of Lithuanian and Ukrainian SS auxiliaries and Polish police into the ghetto, moving in single file toward the Umschlagplatz. Sammern-Frankenegg believed that the swift occupation of that central area would result in the collapse of Jewish resistance elsewhere. Behind the Askaris went the remaining Ordnungsdienst, or Jewish ghetto police, excluding those of their number who balked at participating in the action or were caught trying to escape–they were brought to the Gestapo gathering point at 103 Zelazna Street and shot.

Subscribe Today

• Did you enjoy our article?
• Read more in World War II magazine
• Subscribe online and save nearly 40%!!!
 

Save for a few reconnaissance groups, the streets were devoid of Jews, but banners could be seen in conspicuous places–some in Communist red, some in Polish red and white, some in the Zionist colors of blue and white. Some bore slogans calling for the Christian Poles to act in solidarity with their Jewish countrymen.

At about 6 a.m., as the column reached the corner of Nalewki, Gesia and Franciszkanska streets, it encountered its first armed resistance. Molotov cocktails, grenades, bombs and bullets flew from every window and balcony, driving the soldiers back in panic.

German officers quickly restored order, and the SS advanced again, this time in a less orderly formation and firing wildly at every window and opening. Despite those measures, the Germans were forced to retreat once more. Thanks to their well-prepared defensive positions, the Jews had taken no casualties in the two-hour firefight. After the enemy pulled back, the fighters came out into the street, threw their arms around one another and wished one another mazel tov (’good luck’). Then they set about the grim but necessary task of looting the enemy dead.

Elsewhere, at the strategically important junction of Zamenhofa and Mila streets, four Jewish fighting groups lay in wait for the oncoming German assault. They allowed the enemy’s vanguard, which consisted of Jewish police, to pass, then opened fire as the soldiers and their auxiliaries approached. Again shocked by the sudden hail of fire, Ukrainians and Germans alike broke and ran for cover or fled the area entirely.

Fifteen minutes later, the Germans brought their first light armor into play–a French-built Chenillette Lorraine 38L tracked weapons-carrier and two armored cars. They were greeted with a volley of Molotov cocktails. An eyewitness keeping records for the ZOB described what followed: ‘The well-aimed bottles hit the tank. The flames spread quickly. The blast of the explosion is heard. The machine stands motionless. The crew is burned alive. The other two tanks turn around and withdraw. The Germans who took cover behind them withdraw in panic. We take leave of them with a few well-aimed shots and grenades.’

Moments later, one of the German armored vehicles re-appeared at the corner, only to be hit and set afire by a bomb. About a half-hour after the fight began, the Germans again abandoned the field to the Jews, whose reaction was described by an eyewitness: ‘The faces that only yesterday reflected terror and despair now shone with an unusual joy which is difficult to describe. This was a joy free from all personal motives, a joy imbued with the pride that the ghetto was fighting.’ Only one Jewish resistance fighter had died in the action.

After receiving Sammern-Frankenegg’s less-than-encouraging situation report, Stroop took charge and quickly exerted his iron will to restore order in the German ranks. After evaluating the reports from his officers, Stroop tersely conceded in his report to Himmler and Krüger: ‘At our first penetration into the ghetto the Jews and Polish bandits succeeded, with arms in hand, in repulsing our attacking forces, including the tank and armored vehicles. The losses during the first attack were: 12 men.’

Settling down to direct the next assault from a bench outside the Judenrat office, Stroop launched his first assault against the corner of Nalewki and Gesia streets at noon. This time, his troops employed fire-and-maneuver tactics, darting from one point of cover to the next. Stroop placed light fieldpieces at Muranowska Place to provide them with artillery support.

Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to