World War II: The Liberation of Paris

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The truce was advantageous to the French because the Resistance was uncertain when Allied troops would arrive. Their leaders knew the Resistance’s weakness, hoped to preserve the capital from damage and were anxious to prevent repressive German countermeasures. The truce was advantageous to the Germans because it maintained order in the city and let Choltitz devote his attention to defending the outskirts of Paris against Allied troops without having to worry about a civilian insurrection within.

During his negotiations with Nordling, Choltitz had made a significant pronouncement. He could not be expected, he said, to surrender to irregular troops like the French Resistance. This appeared to mean that in order to save his honor and protect his family he would make a show of fighting before capitulating to Regular forces.

Resistance emissaries left the French capital to seek Allied commanders and de Gaulle. Some made contact and delivered exaggerated reports of disorder in Paris. But the most important messages said that Choltitz would surrender his garrison as soon as Allied troops entered the city and seized his headquarters in the Hôtel Meurice on the Rue de Rivoli.

De Gaulle feared civil unrest in the city. It might cause violent German reaction. It might bring unreliable radical Resistance elements to power. The parties of the left were especially strong in Paris. The commander of the Resistance in the capital was a Communist. De Gaulle was sensitive to the ancient dictum, ‘He who holds Paris holds France.’

The solution to everyone’s problem, it seemed, was to get Allied troops into the capital. On August 21, de Gaulle and Koenig conferred with Eisenhower. The Supreme commander told them of his intention to bypass Paris. He promised to use Leclerc’s division for the liberation when the time was right.

Later that same day, de Gaulle sent Eisenhower a hand-carried letter. In it, de Gaulle threatened politely to order Leclerc to Paris himself. After Eisenhower read the letter, he jotted on the margin of the note that he would probably ‘be compelled to go into Paris.’

Several days earlier, on August 16, the Combined Chiefs of Staff had informed Eisenhower that there was no objection to de Gaulle’s entry into the capital. The Allies would then recognize de Gaulle’s provisional government as the de facto government of France. Most Frenchmen, it was becoming increasingly clear, approved of de Gaulle.

On August 21 Eisenhower telephoned Bradley and asked him to come and meet with him on the following morning. The meeting was intended to be a discussion on the previous position on liberating Paris.

Before Bradley arrived, Eisenhower wrote to Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall to explain his dilemma. It was desirable, Eisenhower said, to defer the capture of Paris, but it seemed this was no longer possible. If the Germans held Paris in strength, they would menace the flanks of the Allied troops bypassing the capital. If the Germans conceded the place, ‘It falls into our hands whether we like it or not,’ he wrote.

Eisenhower’s problem was this: He conducted operations on military grounds alone and could not act to fulfill a political motive. He could turn Leclerc loose to liberate the capital any way the French desired, but he could not approve a political diversion of part of his military forces. Nor could he afford to lose control of the 2nd French Armored Division. He had to have a military reason why the Allies should liberate the city.

If the Germans were ready to quit the city without giving battle, the Allies should enter–for the prestige involved, to maintain order in the capital, to satisfy French requests and to secure important Seine River crossing sites. According to de Gaulle, a few cannon shots would disperse the Germans. Bradley agreed.

As Eisenhower and Bradley talked, conflicting rumors of the state of affairs in the city continued to arrive. Was Choltitz ready to capitulate or destroy the city? According to Resistance envoys, they controlled most of the city and all of the bridges. The bulk of the Germans had already gone, the defenses outside Paris were inconsequential. The armistice expired at noon on the following day, August 23. To avoid bloodshed and destruction, Allied troops had to enter the capital immediately.

The information supplied by the Resistance provided Eisenhower with the military reason he needed for liberating Paris. His solution was to send reinforcements to the French Resistance in order to repay ‘their great assistance in the campaign.’ He also ordered an immediate shipment of food and coal to the city.

Since reinforcement was a military action, the liberation was to be Allied rather than French. Leclerc was to liberate Paris, Bradley said, ‘to help the French recapture their pride after four years of occupation.’ But Allied troops were to accompany the French into the capital.

Early in the afternoon, Bradley flew to Hodges’ First Army headquarters in order to get the liberation started. When he landed, Bradley found Leclerc waiting, as he had been all morning. Bradley told Leclerc to start immediately for Paris. Leclerc gave a joyous shout, then immediately jumped into his own airplane and flew back to his division.

Bradley then asked Hodges what troops could accompany Leclerc. Hodges said Gerow’s V Corps could go. It would be fair for Gerow to liberate Paris, Hodges said, because Gerow and Maj. Gen. J. Lawton Collins had been D-Day commanders. Since then, Collins had had the honor of liberating Cherbourg. Now Gerow was to have his moment of glory. Liberating Paris was no longer a strictly French occasion–it was an Allied event.

Gerow would command Leclerc’s 2nd French Armored Division, the 4th Infantry Division, some American reconnaissance and engineer troops and whatever British unit turned up. Eisenhower had telephoned Montgomery and asked him to send a British contingent. Leclerc and his men were to have the honor of the initial entry, but American and British troops would also enter. All were to display their national flags.

That evening, Gerow telephoned Leclerc and told him he expected no serious opposition. He ordered the Frenchman to start for Paris that night. Contrary to this order, however, Leclerc waited until early on the morning of August 23 to move.

Gerow’s force traveled toward Paris on two routes. The northern column, expected to be the main effort, consisted of the bulk of the French division in the lead, some American reconnaissance and engineer troops and four battalions of the V Corps’ artillery. The southern column consisted of a French combat command, most of the U.S. cavalry, the V Corps headquarters and the 4th Infantry Division, in that order. British troops failed to show up.

The columns made good progress. By nightfall on the 23rd they were less than 20 miles from the capital. The northern column was beyond Rambouillet on the road to Versailles. The southern column was in similar position. Just short of their goal, however, the French met German opposition.

Leclerc reached Rambouillet in the evening and learned from reconnaissance elements and French civilians that the Germans had set up a solid defensive line outside of Paris. Getting into the city would be no easy matter. Trying to speed up his advance, Leclerc changed his main effort from the northern column to the southern by sending a combat command from the northern force to the southern.

His decision was unfortunate in three respects. He inadvertently chose to make his main effort at the place where the German defenses were the strongest and in the greatest depth. He put his main effort out of range of supporting artillery in the northern column. And finally, he impinged on the route of advance reserved for the 4th Infantry Division.

Why did Leclerc do so? Perhaps he was reluctant to attack through Versailles and endanger that national monument. Maybe he was attracted to the wide Orléans-Paris highway. Probably he was displaying his independence and his resentment of American control in a matter he considered to be strictly French.

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Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Historical Conflicts, World War II

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