By late afternoon on December 16, the 2nd Division commander’s feeling of uneasiness had turned to one of impending disaster. General Robertson had by then lost his division reserve to the 99th as well as a combat command of the 9th Armored Division, on loan to him to use when the Wahlerscheid breakthrough was completed. Most of his infantry and two divisional artillery battalions were well forward, which would make any withdrawal extremely difficult at best because only a single road led south from Wahlerscheid. Earlier in the day he had requested permission from the First Army through the V Corps to call off the Wahlerscheid attack but was turned down. Since no one at First Army headquarters realized the scope of the German offensive at this stage, there seemed little to gain and much to lose by pulling back from the Wahlerscheid position. Undaunted, Robertson personally called the regimental commanders at Wahlerscheid late that evening and ordered them to hold tight for the night; they were to continue the attack in the morning, but only upon his express order.

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The Germans renewed their attack at Losheimergraben early on December 17. Strong attacks from both flanks and the front failed to achieve any significant progress, but the thinly held American line was crumbling rapidly as the remnants of the 394th’s 1st Battalion were reduced to small groups able to offer little more than token resistance. Compounding the Americans’ problems, German engineers had repaired a bridge along the Losheim-Losheimergraben road, and shortly before noon German armor made an appearance on the road, crawling slowly toward the disputed crossroads. As even more enemy infantry joined the fray, the few remaining GIs pulled back from the woods and took up positions in basements in the few buildings around a small customs house.

Around 1400, a withdrawal from the Losheimergraben area was authorized. Moving back through the woods, men of the 1st and 3rd battalions found themselves in Mürringen, due south of the Twin Villages and just north of Hünningen, where the lone battalion from the 23rd Infantry still held positions.

During the withdrawal, the 2nd Battalion clashed with a large group of Germans. With his ammunition dangerously low, the American commander was unwilling to risk another fight, and he led his troops into the woods southeast of Mürringen until a clear determination of friendly positions was made.

At Hünningen, Colonel Hightower anticipated a major attack as the Germans moved past his rear. But what the 1st Battalion commander did not realize was that the enemy column (Kampfgruppe Peiper) was actually detouring around Hünningen, interested only in getting back onto its assigned route.

At 1600, the expected attack unfolded, but not from the rear. Heavy shelling preceded an infantry attack from around Losheimergraben. American artillery fire, called down by an observer in the church steeple, was highly effective in stopping the onrushing German troops. But the enemy kept coming, the German commander sending seven distinct attacking waves during the afternoon and early evening. Several penetrations of the thin American line were made but at no time was the enemy able to take Hünningen.

Sometime during the afternoon, Hightower received a radio message removing him from the 394th and assigning him to the 9th Infantry Division headquartered in Wirtzfeld. The message, from Colonel Chester Hirschfelder, 9th Infantry commander, also instructed Hightower to "pull back to new positions or you will be cut off." By then, however, Hightower’s men were so closely engaged with the Germans that he was not sure if he could break off and move without great difficulty. Nevertheless, he called Colonel Riley of the 394th and advised him of the change in plans. Riley was notably upset, for if Hightower’s men pulled out now, his entire right flank would be up in the air, and he still did not know the whereabouts of his 2nd Battalion. A quick radio exchange with General Lauer confirmed the order. Riley knew now that he had no alternative–with ammunition running out and enemy pressure increasing by the minute, he would also have to pull back. Lauer agreed but insisted that any move would have to be coordinated with the 23rd Infantry. Riley spoke with Hightower again, and between them a plan took shape. The withdrawal from Hünningen and Mürringen would commence soon after midnight.

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