A statement that betrays a lack of knowledge of events post Alexander. The “Greeks” – for which read the Macedonians – were much preoccupied with the squabble for empire. The satraps of the “upper” satrapies (Bactria, Soghdia, Arachosia, Parapamisadae, India, etc) engaged in a major war against the aggrandising Peithon and then fell into the second Diadoch War which culminated in the great battles of Paraetecene (Nov 317) and Gabiene (early January 316). After the settlement imposed by Antigonus Monophthalmus, the far eastern satrapies gradually slipped as attention turned to the great struggle between Antigonus, Lysimachos, Seleucus, Ptolemy and Kassander. By the time this was decided (Ipsos and Corupedium) the “upper” satrapies would be largely out of Macedonian control until Antiochus III (The Great) and his anabasis.

The fact of the matter is that Alexander did not want to commit the manpower necessary to hold India and, by the time of the campaign in Iran (317) the south of India was lost. Further, Alexander’s successors had little or no interest in the Indian satrapies preferring to control the heart of empire Persis to the west) even unto allowing the Bactrian satrapy to become a quasi-independent eventually becoming the Greco-Bactrian state which fell about 150 BC.

Then you are somewhat unaware of Mazeus being appointed to Babylonia ofter Gaugamela? Of Atropates, part of the ‘rebellion’ under Bessus, who was appointed to Media?

If the greeks had won why did they never ever return to conquer India? Why, according to some accounts, that after the battle the greeks returned to Baylon demoralised?

Again, the Indian rajah led a smaller army that credited. Alexander, far from returning to Babylon demoralised after the battle, expanded his domain. The Macedonians refused to go beyond the Hyphasis. Porus ruled as client king a practise the Romans were later to near formalise.

As I’ve written, Alexander was not interested in investing the manpower to control the kingdom. It is likely they did not want to be so left.

For an area not ever conquered we hear much about Indian revolts against Macedonian rule at this time and after. Somehow, though, we are expected to believe that whlst Alexander contolled areas north and soutn of Porus, he was left “unconquered”? Unlikely.

The current account of the battle is made on the notes taken by either Greek or Roman historians who lived 200-300 yrs after the death of Alexander. Please correct me if I’m wrong? These accounts where based on accounts made by greeks/macedonians who where with Alexander. Why do people or western historians consider the possibility that those accounts could be lies? Even in these modern times world leaders always attempt to put a possitive spin on a defeat and try to change actual events by distorting facts to make them look better. Why not during the time of Alexander?

As far as I am aware, every Kings or leader who fought against Alexander either ended up dead in battle or executed after the battle and replaced by Alexander. However, Porus despite being “defeated” get to keep his kingdon!? Yes, the Greeks say that Alexander did this becaise he respected Porus but I dont buy that story. If the greeks had won why did they never ever return to conquer India? Why, according to some accounts, that after the battle the greeks returned to Baylon demoralised?

This is my account of the battle, it ended either in a defeat to Alexander or a stalemate where both Kings agreed to part their seperate ways.

“Unable” is likely a touch too strong. “Unwilling” to do so and invest the manpower to keep it so is more likely.

You are correct about the “lasting impression’ (not) that the Macedonian made. India was slipping by the time of his death. The last realistic hold over the area slipped after Antiochus III (”The Great”) lost interest. Even so, this was more an alliance with the Greco-Bactrian kingdom whereby Antiohus was recognised as “overlord”; at least untill he looked towards Egypt and ultimate defeat by Rome.

The fact is that this battle – although much studied for its tactics – is a minor or peripheral battle; a little in the mold of Granicus. Alexander took on what was, demonstrably, a Rajah’s territorial array. This was no Persian Royal army and it was far from the Greek coalition that would embarrass Antipater in 323.

Although the source tradition for this battle is frustratingly defective, there are some reasonably clear points. The first of which are the three divisions of the army to occupy Porus’ attention. Another is the assault or “turning” force. The article claims:

“Alexander led the turning force of 5,000 cavalry and 10,500 infantry, including 2,000 archers…”

Arrian is clear in his listing of this force (and actually repeats the total that he comes to when he gets to listing casualties):

“Alexander picked the select body-guard called the Companions, as well as the cavalry regiments of Hephaestion, Perdiccas, and Demetrius, the cavalry from Bactria, Sogdiana, and Scythia, and the Daan horse-archers; and from the phalanx of infantry the shield-bearing guards, the brigades of Clitus and Coenus, with the archers and Agrianians.”

After the crossing Arrian repeats the listing of the infantry and, although the passage is faulty suffers from a scribal gloss, the import is the same: the royal hypaspists, the regular hypaspists and the units (2) of the phalanx which the faulty text describes as the “other shield-bearing guards, as each happened at the time to have the right of precedence”. Along with the Agrianes, archers and javelin men this would amount to something in the order of 8,000. Certainly the hypaspists and two phalanx regiments will have numbered 6,000.

It is with this force that Alexander takes on Porus’ main army. This should give pause to those entertaining a large Indian host awaiting him. The descriptions given of this army are, like the Persian armies earlier, exaggerated. Porus is variously described as fielding 30-50,000 infantry and 85-200 elephants. These elephants, in contrast to the article, are not posted on the wings. They are, as the sources describe, posted along the front of the infantry and resemble a “city wall” with Indian infantry between them (and on the wings). Arrian describes these 200 elephants as being posted at 100 foot intervals (some 30 metres). This makes a battle line of some six kilometres in width. This is obvious exaggeration and such a line is most unlikely to be taken on by a Macedonian force whose line can amount to little more than 900 metres.

That says much about the numbers of Porus’ levy. Curtius is likely much closer with his 85 elephants.

Other points need to be raised. Alexander had with him 5,000 cavalry. He cannot have mounted a 2/4 split of this. Also Arrian is clear that the assault force took on the Indians and fought the battle. Reconstructions that include Meleagher’s force or Craterus’ do so without the support of the sources. Arrian plainly states:
AT the same time Craterus and the other officers of Alexander’s army who had been left behind on the bank of the Hydaspes crossed the river, when they perceived that Alexander was winning a brilliant victory. These men, being fresh, followed up the pursuit instead of Alexander’s exhausted troops, and made no less a slaughter of the Indians in their retreat.

The battle is clearly won when Craterus and “the other officers” (Meleagher et al) finally make it across. To seal the point later Arrian gives casualty figures for those engaged in the original attack.

I realise that the article is merely a “synopsis” but Porus’ main problem was not a gap or extending his left. His biggest problem was combating the Macedonian cavalry assault on his left. To do this he transferred his right cavalry behind the infantry to his left. Unfortunately it was pursued by Coenus and forced onto both the elephants and infantry.

That Alexander could surround the Indians with his assault force clearly indicates a number far less than the Greco-Macedonian sources give.

For the fellow wondering about the Indian archers, the source material clearly indicates they were ineffective due to the fact they could not brace their bows in the mud.

The fact is the Indian Rajah Porus lost the battle. His force was not large and his major ally was the Hydaspes which he reckoned the Macedonian would not bother attempting to cross in the face of opposition. He seriously underestimated the nature of the enemy commander.

He clearly knew he needed the weather as a screen and foresaw the difficulty in the crossing which is why he led the initial crossing and attack, as apposed to a feint led by a subordinate, which Porus seem to at least initially anticipated.

My question to those with knowledge of Indian accounts, are there alternate accounts of the crossing? Why would it seem unlikely that Alexander’s forces would be able to handle the Indians (once engaged),who by all accounts had yet to fight a ‘Western Army’ (heavy infantry based supported by Calvary).

But I would agree that Alexander was clearly impressed with not only Porus but also his soldiers as is evident in him allowing Porus to remain in control of his territory. If he were following his previous lessons, it seems he would have been inclined to replace Porus as the leader of the Indians, who did not share a religion or social establishment of the previously conquered peoples, making them indifferent to Alexander’s status as divine ruler of the West and ‘East’. Such admiration would suggest that the battle did not end in a massacre as the text suggests, but rather was at least a difficult victory for the ‘Greeks.’

2. How alexander avoided mad elephant army? It was greatest strength of indian kings. Only way indian’s used was fire ball. In the heavy rain Alexander could not use that. How did he manage then?

3. There is a basic addition of soldiers problem in this text. While cooking the story, historian forgot that by his statistics 26000 porous army faught against 23,000 greek army in a dark muddy jungle known to indians only. and still 12,000 indians died. Are you joking??????

4. Prous had large army of archers? Where is that information? Indians for 5000 years were the master of archering arts, they are the inventors of various different kinds of bows with massive impacts, many evidences were there. In india at that time, archery was the most effective war tool.

5. Please ask some european team to cross beas in a stormy rainy night using 2000 years old boats. Do you have any idea how big boats are required? And how many to cross the river? Alexander never faced such river earlier, all these processes went on and Porous was sleeping???? Do you think they were idiots, seeing 30,000 army moving and enjoying????

6. By indian legend there were several attempts by Alexander to cross the river by boats and he suffered heavy casualties. Just think, they could not even walk in the back they were staying, how could they think of crossing the river and attack. Come to India, I will train you how to walk on a muddy clouds, it is very tricky and you have to be very concious always, forget of war. Your mental state becomes restless under these rains and a frustration comes to every common people, because you just cant do anything.

Before cooking a story please think.