Vietnam War: The Individual Rotation Policy

By Mark DePu | Vietnam  | one comment  |  Print This Post  |  Email This Post

The generals had their own reasons to support the rotation policies. They sought to maximize fairness and equity for individual soldiers, a rationale that inevitably placed a higher priority on individual soldiers at the expense of the soldier’s unit, and by extension, the nation those soldiers served. The generals’ support was also driven by the logic of the professional soldier. General Johnson was convinced that the rotation policy would actually reduce casualties in the long run, since it avoided the burnout factor that had proved so costly in World War II.

In the final analysis those arguments were incidental, for the reality was that Congress dictated the nation’s draft policies, and those policies left the military few options. There simply were not enough units to enable units to be rotated through the war zone; this left the generals with no other choice than to rotate individuals.

Ultimately, then, the military’s one-year rotation policy grew out of a powerful combination of factors. At the core were the nation’s Selective Service system and LBJ’s decision not to call out the Reserves and the Guard. Those factors plus the generals’ genuine concern for the welfare of their soldiers combined to create a policy that had remarkable resiliency despite its obvious flaws. In a democracy, it could hardly have been different.

This article was written by Mark DePue and originally published in the December 2006 issue of Vietnam Magazine. For more great articles be sure to subscribe to Vietnam Magazine today.

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Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Historical Conflicts, Vietnam War

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