U.S. Air Force Airlifts in the 1972 Eastertide Offensive

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In the official history of the Air Force airlift mission in Southeast Asia, author Ray Bowers describes the battle for An Loc during the 1972 Eastertide (or Easter) Offensive as ‘the most trying times of the war for Air Force C-130 crews.’ Historian Bowers’ statement is well founded, because it was at An Loc that a relative handful of U.S. Air Force airlifters suddenly found themselves the sole salvation of the defenders of a besieged South Vietnamese city.

By the spring of 1972, the once huge American presence in South Vietnam had been reduced to but a shadow of its former self. Nearly all American ground combat units had been withdrawn from the combat zone over the preceding two years. At the same time, the Air Force presence had been equally reduced, as Vietnamization saw the transfer of many former American responsibilities to the Vietnamese Air Force (VNAF).

In 1968, at the height of American involvement in the war, the airlift organization had consisted of a full air division controlling three in-country airlift wings and supported by three C-130 wings from elsewhere. In the spring of 1972, except for a single squadron at Clark Field in the Philippines, a single C-130 wing, the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing at Ching Chuan Kang (CCK) Air Base, Taiwan, was the only airlift unit still operating regularly in Southeast Asia. No major military operations had taken place in South Vietnam in nearly two years, and C-130 missions had been reduced to essentially a logistical role.

But all of that relative quietude changed suddenly in early April when North Vietnamese forces attacked and laid siege to An Loc, the capital of Binh Long province. An Loc, was cut off from all land resupply when the North Vietnamese 9th Viet Cong Division assaulted the city in preparation for a drive southward toward Lai Ke and, ultimately, Saigon itself. Had An Loc fallen, it is likely that the North Vietnamese would have achieved victory three years before they did.

An Loc was defended entirely by South Vietnamese troops, with only a few American advisers on the ground. Unlike Khe Sanh in 1968, there was no airstrip within the confines of the besieged city and none of the equipment and personnel–combat controllers, recovery teams, ground controlled radar approach teams–that had helped to make the airlift resupply of the Marine defenders such a success.

Initial resupply efforts at An Loc were by helicopter. The VNAF 237th Helicopter Squadron, assisted by American Hueys and Chinooks, airlifted additional troops and supplies into the besieged area. Fixed-wing landings were ruled out when the Communists captured the nearby Quan Loi airstrip on April 5. Helicopter resupply became increasingly difficult because escalating enemy ground fire closed off the approaches to the single LZ (landing zone) within the perimeter. Unlike in the earlier years of the war, when the heaviest anti-aircraft the helicopters crews had faced had been .51 caliber, at An Loc the Communists had a proliferation of automatic weapons up to and including 37mm cannons. In addition, Communist troops elsewhere in Vietnam had begun using hand-launched, surface-to-air SA-7 Strela guided missiles.

Smaller UH-1 Hueys continued to attempt running the gantlet to deliver personnel and supplies. But after enemy shelling destroyed a VNAF CH-47 Chinook on April 12, the further use of the twin-rotor CH-47 was halted. The South Vietnamese turned to fixed-wing airdrops.

In 1972, the primary VNAF transports were Fairchild C-123s and C-119s. On April 12 the South Vietnamese aircrews began resupply missions to An Loc–and found themselves face to face with the deadliest concentration of antiaircraft fire ever seen in South Vietnam. The Vietnamese C-123 crews had been trained in conventional, daylight airdrop tactics, approaching the drop zones at 700 feet, an altitude well within range of the Communist guns. A tiny drop zone compounded the problems of the VNAF crews; many of the loads dropped by the airplanes that did manage to make it over the target fell astray.

Intense groundfire forced the Vietnamese pilots to attempt drops from high attitudes, using makeshift sighting devices and guesswork. A lack of delayed-action parachute opening devices caused the loads to drift with the wind during their prolonged descents. After 27 missions in three days, only 34 out of 135 tons of airdropped cargo had been recovered.

When the VNAF effort proved ineffective, MACV (Military Assistance Command Vietnam) ordered the U.S. Air Force to commence C-130 drops to keep the besieged defenders supplied. On the evening of April 14, three aircrews from the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing at Tan Son Nhut were briefed for an airdrop mission the next morning to An Loc.

The three C-130 crews reported to the flight line at Tan Son Nhut at 0530 the following morning. Captain William Caldwell, aircraft commander of the third airplane in the three-ship formation, realized the seriousness of the situation when the 374th Tactical Airlift Wing commander, Colonel Andrew Iosue, stopped by each airplane to personally wish the crews luck. Never in almost 2,000 hours of Air Force flying had Caldwell had a commander personally wish him well before a flight.

That first U.S. Air Force An Loc mission was flown at higher altitudes, with the drop planes descending to the 600-foot drop altitude when they were one minute away from the drop zone. Such tactics had worked at Khe Sanh, as well as in the A Shau Valley and during other missions earlier in the war. But in the spring of 1972, the C-130 crews were flying against a much better armed enemy, and the guns were closer to the drop zone. The first airplane over An Loc, flown by the crew commanded by Major Robert F. Wallace of the 776th Tactical Airlift Squadron (TAS), encountered heavy groundfire in the vicinity of the drop zone. Hits struck the tail, but the crew managed to drop their load. The second crew approached from a different direction, but they failed to spot the drop zone because of the haze and smoke from the incessant shelling. When the airplane’s rear cargo door and ramp refused to open, the pilot pulled away.

Captain Caldwell’s crew, consisting of copilot Lieutenant John Hering, navigator Lieutenant Richard A. Lenz, flight engineer Tech. Sgt. Jon Sanders, and loadmasters Tech. Sgt. Charlie Shaub and Sergeant Dave McAleece, all from the 776th TAS, was the second U.S. Air Force C-130 crew to approach the An Loc drop zone, a soccer field just south of the city. As the C-130E drew within 30 seconds of the drop zone, a hail of enemy fire ripped into the belly of the Hercules. Sergeant Sanders was killed instantly, and Lieutenant Hering and Lieutenant Lenz were wounded. Several cockpit windows were shattered by bullets, and other rounds struck the pallets of ammunition, causing the load to begin smoldering. A round ruptured a bleed air duct running overhead in the cargo compartment; 700-degree (Celsius) air spilled into the airplane.

Loadmaster Shaub called on the intercom for the pilot to jettison the load, but failure of the electrical mechanism prevented it. Then intercom communications between the cockpit and the loadmasters failed. Realizing what had happened, Shaub cut loose the cargo; seconds after leaving the airplane, two pallets exploded in midair. Fire broke out in the left wheel welt, and Shaub grabbed a fire extinguisher to fight it. The hot metal, superheated by bleed air pouring into the cargo compartment, severely burned Shaub’s hands, but the veteran loadmaster fought the fire until it was extinguished.

When they returned to Tan Son Nhut and were preparing to land–on only two operable engines–the landing gear failed to come down. Though wounded and badly burned, Sergeant Shaub directed Sergeant McAleece as the younger loadmaster cranked down the landing gear, using the emergency extension system. One of the two remaining engines lost power during the approach, but the C-130 landed safely. For their efforts, Captain Caldwell and Shaub were awarded the Air Force Cross, the nation’s second highest award for bravery. Shaub subsequently received the William H. Pitzenbarger award for heroism from the Air Force Sergeants Association.

Apparently, in spite of the heroic efforts of the three crews on the 15th, none of the cargo was recovered by the An Loc defenders. Realizing that the situation called for a change in tactics, 374th Wing commander Colonel Iosue instructed his senior crew members to work out a new plan. Majors Ed Brya, a veteran C-130 pilot who had served an earlier tour in 1966-68, and Robert Highley, the standardization/evaluations pilot and navigator, put their heads together to develop a new tactic.

The plan–conceived by Brya and Highley–called for the drop planes to make their run-ins at treetop altitude, followed by a pop-up, two minutes before reaching the target, to the 600-foot drop altitude needed for the parachutes to open. As soon as the loads were clear, the pilots would make steep descending turns back to low level to leave the target area. Six different approach paths were plotted. Colonel Iosue took advantage of his previous experience as commander of all Air Force forward air controllers in Vietnam to arrange for his crews to talk to the FACs over An Loc prior to takeoff. The FACs would advise the C-130 crews of what appeared to be the safest inbound and outbound headings.

Colonel Iosue and Major Brya led a two-ship drop formation on April 16. Navigator Highley got a positive ID on the drop zone, and the two airplanes reported accurate drops. Yet the loads were later reported as ‘probably lost’ due to erroneous map coordinates furnished to the drop crews. Though both airplanes received hits from groundfire, both returned safely to Tan Son Nhut.

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Tags: 20th - 21st Century, Airborne Operations, Historical Conflicts, Vietnam War

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