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Union General Daniel SicklesAmerica's Civil War | 5 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post
When Meade confronted Sickles, he was furious. Sickles’ right was nowhere near Hancock’s left, nor was it anchored on Little Round Top. It was open on both ends and isolated from the rest of the army. Sickles, seeking to avoid a repeat of Howard’s Chancellorsville debacle, ironically had placed himself in an identical situation. Meade chided Sickles for his action and made it clear that Sickles had upset his plans. Sickles offered to withdraw to Meade’s designated position, but it was too late. Enemy infantrymen made a vigorous assault, and the III Corps sustained the shock. Subscribe Today
The dangers of Sickles’ salient quickly became apparent. If the Confederates could get around Devil’s Den, they could encircle and destroy Birney’s division. If they could penetrate Birney’s line at the Peach Orchard, they would also be behind Humphreys’ division, rendering his position untenable. Humphreys’ line was itself open to encirclement from the north, which would in turn render Birney’s position untenable. Finally, Sickles’ absence on Cemetery Ridge placed Hancock’s left flank in jeopardy should the Rebels succeed in occupying Little Round Top or getting around Devil’s Den. Once again, Sickles had managed to endanger his own corps, other Union units and the entire army itself.
After several hours of fierce combat, Sickles’ troops began to crumble. Hammered from two directions by two of Lt. Gen. James Longstreet’s divisions, the Peach Orchard, Rose’s Woods and the Wheat Field were overrun, and Birney’s division was shattered and driven back. With Rebels pouring through the Peach Orchard, Humphreys’ line, now attacked from the west and south, was doomed. Meade, with Hancock’s assistance, struggled to rush reinforcements from three other corps to bolster Sickles’ divisions, but the III Corps was knocked out of the fight and sent into disordered retreat. There was a gaping hole all along the left of Meade’s line.
In the end, however, the Confederates were not able to achieve their goals. Lee’s plan called for an oblique, echelon attack against Cemetery Ridge, beginning in the south and moving gradually northward along the Emmitsburg Road. But the 11-brigade attack was uncoordinated and disjointed. Lee’s commanders failed to advance on schedule and were unable to exploit their gains. Eventually, as darkness fell, the Confederate attack sputtered and dissipated in confusion. A Union disaster was narrowly averted.
As his salient collapsed around him, Sickles was struck in the right leg by shrapnel and carried from the field. The wound, which resulted in amputation, probably saved him from being court-martialed for his rash and perilous action. Meade was at first willing to concede that perhaps Sickles had somehow misinterpreted his orders, but Sickles said there had been no misunderstanding. He had made a decision and acted on his own responsibility, abandoning the position ordered by Meade for one that he believed to be better. He defended his decision until his dying day and insisted that he had made no error.
Sickles was an aggressive and combative general, but his weakness as a leader was his inability to take advice or consider other points of view. He had powerful friends in the Army and in Washington whom he manipulated to his own advantage, thus avoiding censure or prosecution for disobeying Meade’s orders and wrecking his corps. By an artful blending of fact, fancy and innuendo, he conjured up his own version of the battle. There is strong evidence that Sickles arranged for the printing of a fanciful account in the New York Herald on March 12, 1864, under the pseudonym Historicus, purporting to be the true story of what happened at Gettysburg. The account glorified Sickles’ foresight and initiative and stressed Meade’s incompetence. According to Historicus, Meade had advocated inglorious retreat. In a heroic effort to save the day, Sickles moved out to meet the enemy, precipitated a battle Meade was afraid to fight, and brought victory to Union arms. In essence, the article claimed, Sickles won the Battle of Gettysburg. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Tags: 19th Century, America's Civil War, American Civil War, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures
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5 Comments to “Union General Daniel Sickles”
I respectfully disagree with the conclusions presented in this article. I walked the ground and came to the same conclusions reached by Sickles. He saw what I saw; high ground to our fronts (west). Leave the original position in the saddle and head west; the Emmitsburg Pike terrain becomes compelling.
You get similar sensings walking eastward from Longstreet’s positions. I this case, however, instead of running into a routinely expected, thin skirmish line, you run into two battle-tested Federal divisions. Although stretched over a significant distance, these divisions created conditions similar to those expected of a dedicated covering force. By late afternoon, Longstreet’s Corps lacked the combat power and momentum to seize their objectives. We all ask ourselves many times over, “What would have happened if the opposing forces met for the first time at the base of Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops?”
In a three-day period when every engagement was of great importance, I believe that these engagements between Longstreet and Sickles on the afternoon of the second day were pivotal and of paramount importance.
Thanks – Frank
By Frank Kolar on Dec 5, 2008 at 2:37 pm
given the man’s basic diregard for all things of civility, authority, and a basic understanding of what he was doing, i feel that had any other gen. been in command of sickles corps there may have not even been a picket’s charge on the 3rd, or even a third day of battle.
By tom on Dec 18, 2008 at 6:09 pm
Interesting article but author fails to see the obvious. at Chancellorsville Sickles action caused Lee to worry about Jackson’s force being struck in the rear that he had two detach forces he had not intended to attck Birney. The author correctly points out that Gen Howard, XI Cdr. was warned by Gen Hooker to prepare for a possible flank attack from the west. Gen Howard’s failure to properly entrench was the cause of the disaster not Gen Sickles movement. At Gettysburg, by moving the III corp forward, Gen Sickles placed it directly in the path of Gen Longstreet’s I Corp attack utterly wrecking the timetable of Gen Lee’s carefully devised echelon attack. The ensuing battles at the Peach Orchid, Wheatfield and Devil’s den were battles in places Gen Longstreet had not expected and had thought he would swiftly pass through. Longstreets mission was to strike the flank of the US II Corp and not be delayed and embroiled in useless actions around the Emmitsburg Pike. Gen Sickle’s Corp absorbed and dissipated Lee’s mighty blow before it could strike where Lee wanted it to.
By James Waller on Apr 7, 2009 at 11:25 am
It seems to me that even though there were some unintended positives for the union from Sickles actions his flamboyant, political calousness cost the union thousands of lives. Meade was likely right in taking up defensive positions. Even though Lee would have attacked with greater force, the Union was in a position to smash Lee’s forces. The ridge gave the Union an unapproachable position with cannon fire.
Just because Sickles caught the Rebels off guard doesn’t mean that his decision was right. He forced the battle of the Wheatfield, causing the union to lose almost two entire armies. He forced units held in reserve to be moved forward and he forced Meade to fight in defense out in the open. I don’t care what you walked. Sickles was a fool. Had night fall not come, and had Lee’s General’s not failed to reinforce their gains Gettysburg would have been lost.
By Rob on Apr 30, 2009 at 10:07 am
Remember Lee’s decision to attack the middle was based on forcing Meade to retreat due to Sickles incompetance. Lee’s decision was delayed because of the lack of intelligence from his calvary about the union reserve. Meade was right in redrawing his lines and taking up high positions. Had sickles not moved his army forward there would not have been a second or third day.
By Rob on Apr 30, 2009 at 10:11 am