Union General Daniel Sickles

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As the morning wore on, Sickles grew increasingly uneasy about his designated position and began to eye an area of higher ground a half mile to his front, along the Emmitsburg Road. He eventually rode to headquarters and asked Meade to come and have a look, but Meade refused. Meade was not fond of Sickles and told him to position his troops as earlier instructed. Meade did grant Sickles the authority to choose his own ground and position his troops in any manner that he deemed most suitable, so long as he stayed within the limits of his general instructions. Meade also agreed to send his chief of artillery, Brig. Gen. Henry Hunt, to examine the ground with Sickles and make a recommendation.

Hunt and Sickles proceeded to the soon-to-be-famous Peach Orchard near the Emmitsburg Road, where Sickles explained his situation to Hunt. Hunt acknowledged the unfavorable nature of Sickles’ original position along Cemetery Ridge. He recognized that the low ridges along the road would constitute a favorable position for the enemy to hold, which was a good reason for Sickles to take possession of it. Sickles liked what he heard and asked if he should move his corps forward. Hunt answered, Not on my authority; I will report to General Meade for his instructions.

Hunt determined that the line afforded excellent positions for artillery, that its occupation would cramp the movements of the enemy and bring the Federals nearer to the Confederate lines, and that it would better afford Meade an opportunity for taking the offensive, should he desire to do so. At the same time, Hunt saw that, if occupied by Sickles, the new line would present a salient angle that would expose both of its sides to enfilading fire. It would also increase the ground the III Corps would have to defend, as it would still have to connect with Hancock’s left and anchor on Little Round Top. The line, and particularly the salient, would require a larger force than just the III Corps to hold it.

The artillery chief realized that Meade did not have a sufficient number of troops available to risk such an extension of his defensive line. The proper occupation of the position would require Meade to use both the III and V corps, which would leave him without reserves, as the VI Corps was still en route to the field. Hunt knew that Meade expected an attack at any moment, and there would not be enough time to safely relocate an entire army corps in the face of the impending peril. In view of the overall situation, Meade wanted Sickles to occupy what he considered to be the safer line. Hunt returned to Meade and reported that although Sickles’ proposed line seemed tactically better, he could not recommend it under the existing circumstances.

Hunt’s departure left Sickles in a quandary. His problem had not been resolved to his satisfaction. To make things worse, he learned that the two brigades of Brig. Gen. John Buford’s cavalry that had been screening his left flank had been withdrawn. Further, skirmishers from Colonel Hiram Berdan’s 1st and 2nd U.S. Sharpshooters reported that they had encountered Rebel infantrymen moving through the woods and around to his left. That was enough for Sickles. He envisioned Chancellorsville all over again; but this time he did not believe the Confederates were in retreat. Without further consultation or authorization, Sickles responded to the perceived threat and, at 3 p.m., ordered his corps to advance en masse to the Emmitsburg Road. His men were barely established in the new position when Lee’s attack opened with an artillery barrage.

Meade, riding to the sound of the cannonade, arrived under heavy artillery fire at Sickles’ line and realized at once that Sickles had made a disastrous mistake. Far out in front of the main Union line and aligned along the Emmitsburg Road with its right flank in the air was Brig. Gen. Andrew Humphreys’ division. Birney’s division, with its left flank exposed, occupied the Peach Orchard in a line that angled back past the Wheat Field and Rose’s Woods to the Devil’s Den, a cluster of huge boulders separated from Little Round Top by a creek called Plum Run. The two divisions joined at the Peach Orchard, the apex of Sickles’ dangerously vulnerable salient.

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Tags: 19th Century, America's Civil War, American Civil War, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures

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