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Union General Daniel SicklesAmerica's Civil War | 5 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post
Years after the battle, XI Corps historian Augustus Choate Hamlin, who had been a lieutenant colonel and medical inspector at Chancellorsville, investigated the events of that fateful day. His report was quite different from previously accepted accounts of the XI Corps’ disaster. In his 1896 book, The Battle of Chancellorsville, Hamlin charged that Sickles’ expedition to Catherine Furnace and beyond was the ultimate cause of the rout and the campaign’s failure. Hamlin blamed Sickles because he had persuaded Hooker to allow him to make the fatal reconnaissance that isolated the XI Corps and left it without reserves. Hamlin also derided Sickles for his ignorance of Jackson’s location and true intention and for the absurdity of his expedition. Subscribe Today
Sickles clearly had failed to respond properly to the situation at hand when he advanced to create his salient. If he really suspected that Lee was attempting to flank Hooker’s line, his proper response would have been to support Howard, not isolate him. He should have realized that Lee was not retreating when Birney was struck by the two enemy brigades at Catherine Furnace. That attack made it clear that there was a strong force of Confederates still massed in force on his left, apart from the marching units–and they were obviously not retreating. Yet Sickles continued to advance, completely disregarding what must have been a flanking column bent on mischief to the west.
By his hasty actions, Sickles succeeded in isolating elements of Hooker’s army (his own and Howard’s) at a time when a united defense was essential. Had Sickles remained next to Howard, along with Barlow’s reserve brigade, he might have been able to bolster that corps and prevent or minimize the ensuing rout. In the end, however, Howard’s corps was decimated, the entire army was endangered, and Sickles’ own corps narrowly escaped destruction.
After its defeat at Chancellorsville, the Army of the Potomac retired to its encampments north of the Rappahannock River across from Fredericksburg. As Hooker and his staff prepared for yet another campaign against him, Lee retained the military initiative and, on June 6, 1863, launched his own ambitious invasion of the North. On June 25, Hooker learned that Lee’s army had crossed the Potomac into Maryland and sent his own army in pursuit. Two days later, however, he resigned his command of the army. Several of Hooker’s corps commanders were among the likely candidates to replace him. The New York Herald touted Sickles as the best man for the job. When Howard heard a rumor that Sickles was being considered, he exclaimed, If God gives us Sickles to lead us I shall cry with vexation & sorrow and plead to be delivered.
On June 28, just three days before the largest battle ever fought on American soil, President Abraham Lincoln appointed Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade, former commander of the V Corps, to replace Hooker. On July 1, Lee’s and Meade’s armies collided on the rolling farmlands of Pennsylvania near the small crossroads town of Gettysburg. The first day’s action ended in favor of the Confederates, but as the new day dawned, the Federals were in possession of the high ground. Meade was working furiously to consolidate and solidify his defensive line in anticipation of Lee’s next attack.
Shortly after 6 a.m. on July 2, Meade dispatched a messenger with instructions for Sickles to position his 12,000-man corps along the lower section of Cemetery Ridge, south of Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock’s II Corps. Sickles was to occupy a line that recently had been vacated by Brig. Gen. John Geary’s XII Corps division, place his right on Hancock’s left, and anchor his left on the northern foot of the rocky knoll called Little Round Top.
Sickles acquiesced to the order, but he was not happy. He was on the lowest part of the ridge and felt that the ground would be very difficult to defend. Dissatisfied as he was with the low, wooded nature of his position, he failed to station any troops on Little Round Top, where he could better observe the enemy’s movements and take advantage of higher ground. Sickles later said that he did not think he could stretch his men to reach Little Round Top. He also claimed that he could not discover the exact location and extent of Geary’s sector. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
            Tags: 19th Century, America's Civil War, American Civil War, Historical Conflicts, Historical Figures
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5 Comments to “Union General Daniel Sickles”
I respectfully disagree with the conclusions presented in this article. I walked the ground and came to the same conclusions reached by Sickles. He saw what I saw; high ground to our fronts (west). Leave the original position in the saddle and head west; the Emmitsburg Pike terrain becomes compelling.
You get similar sensings walking eastward from Longstreet’s positions. I this case, however, instead of running into a routinely expected, thin skirmish line, you run into two battle-tested Federal divisions. Although stretched over a significant distance, these divisions created conditions similar to those expected of a dedicated covering force. By late afternoon, Longstreet’s Corps lacked the combat power and momentum to seize their objectives. We all ask ourselves many times over, “What would have happened if the opposing forces met for the first time at the base of Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops?”
In a three-day period when every engagement was of great importance, I believe that these engagements between Longstreet and Sickles on the afternoon of the second day were pivotal and of paramount importance.
Thanks – Frank
By Frank Kolar on Dec 5, 2008 at 2:37 pm
given the man’s basic diregard for all things of civility, authority, and a basic understanding of what he was doing, i feel that had any other gen. been in command of sickles corps there may have not even been a picket’s charge on the 3rd, or even a third day of battle.
By tom on Dec 18, 2008 at 6:09 pm
Interesting article but author fails to see the obvious. at Chancellorsville Sickles action caused Lee to worry about Jackson’s force being struck in the rear that he had two detach forces he had not intended to attck Birney. The author correctly points out that Gen Howard, XI Cdr. was warned by Gen Hooker to prepare for a possible flank attack from the west. Gen Howard’s failure to properly entrench was the cause of the disaster not Gen Sickles movement. At Gettysburg, by moving the III corp forward, Gen Sickles placed it directly in the path of Gen Longstreet’s I Corp attack utterly wrecking the timetable of Gen Lee’s carefully devised echelon attack. The ensuing battles at the Peach Orchid, Wheatfield and Devil’s den were battles in places Gen Longstreet had not expected and had thought he would swiftly pass through. Longstreets mission was to strike the flank of the US II Corp and not be delayed and embroiled in useless actions around the Emmitsburg Pike. Gen Sickle’s Corp absorbed and dissipated Lee’s mighty blow before it could strike where Lee wanted it to.
By James Waller on Apr 7, 2009 at 11:25 am
It seems to me that even though there were some unintended positives for the union from Sickles actions his flamboyant, political calousness cost the union thousands of lives. Meade was likely right in taking up defensive positions. Even though Lee would have attacked with greater force, the Union was in a position to smash Lee’s forces. The ridge gave the Union an unapproachable position with cannon fire.
Just because Sickles caught the Rebels off guard doesn’t mean that his decision was right. He forced the battle of the Wheatfield, causing the union to lose almost two entire armies. He forced units held in reserve to be moved forward and he forced Meade to fight in defense out in the open. I don’t care what you walked. Sickles was a fool. Had night fall not come, and had Lee’s General’s not failed to reinforce their gains Gettysburg would have been lost.
By Rob on Apr 30, 2009 at 10:07 am
Remember Lee’s decision to attack the middle was based on forcing Meade to retreat due to Sickles incompetance. Lee’s decision was delayed because of the lack of intelligence from his calvary about the union reserve. Meade was right in redrawing his lines and taking up high positions. Had sickles not moved his army forward there would not have been a second or third day.
By Rob on Apr 30, 2009 at 10:11 am