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Union General Daniel SicklesAmerica's Civil War | 5 comments | Print This Post | Email This Post
On April 27, 1863, Hooker sent three army corps on a wide flanking movement to cross the Rappahannock and Rapidan rivers and get on Lee’s left flank and rear. His cavalry force, under Brig. Gen. George Stoneman, would swing south toward Richmond to disrupt Lee’s lines of communication and supply. Two corps would remain in front of Fredericksburg to confuse Lee as to Hooker’s real intentions. The remaining two corps, including Sickles’, were held in reserve, ready to go wherever they might be needed. Subscribe Today
Over the next two days, the three advanced corps crossed the rivers, and by the evening of April 30 they were encamped at their designated rendezvous site around the tiny crossroads hamlet of Chancellorsville, 11 miles west of Fredericksburg. There, brimming with enthusiasm at the initial success of his plan, Hooker established his headquarters in the Chancellor house and issued General Order No. 47 to his army. He announced, The operations of the last three days have determined that our enemy must either ingloriously fly, or come out from behind his defenses and give us battle on our own ground, where certain destruction awaits him.
The next morning, May 1, brought with it an incomprehensible change in Hooker’s spirit and behavior. As his advanced units waited anxiously for orders to attack, Hooker somehow lost his nerve. After his advanced corps made initial contact with Rebel forces, he issued orders to fall back, dig in and await Lee’s attack. Hooker, who had sneered at the caution and hesitation of previous commanders, now was himself overwhelmed by caution and hesitation. With Lee finally aware of the Federal threat and turning to meet it, Hooker shifted from the offensive to the defensive. At that moment, with his army on the brink of victory, he surrendered the initiative to Lee, who immediately seized it.
Early that same morning, Sickles’ corps marched up the Rappahannock from its position across from Fredericksburg, crossed the river at U.S. Ford and arrived at Chancellorsville shortly after noon. Upon arrival, the 19,000-man corps was placed behind the lines in reserve. The prospect of holding his corps as a reserve force did not appeal to Sickles’ combative nature. He soon discovered what looked like a weak spot in the army’s defensive line between the XI and XII corps, and with Hooker’s approval, he ordered Brig. Gen. David Birney to move his division into the line to fill the gap. The divisions of Maj. Gens. Hiram Berry and Amiel Whipple remained in reserve.
By daybreak on May 2, most of the army was entrenched around Chancellorsville. The V Corps anchored the left of the Union line on the Rappahannock, facing southeast. The II and XII corps, curving south and then west around the crossroads, faced east and south. The XI Corps held the right flank, strung out to the west along the Orange Turnpike, facing south. Between the XII and XI corps, Sickles’ III Corps held a line that bulged to the south at the elevated clearing of Hazel Grove.
At about 8 a.m., Birney’s lookouts in the treetops at Hazel Grove spotted a Confederate column moving west and south on the Catherine Furnace Road, about 1,600 yards away. Birney dispatched messengers to inform Sickles, who hurried to Hazel Grove to evaluate the situation for himself. Sickles later claimed that he realized that the Confederate movement was no feint and concluded that the Rebels were either in full retreat or were marching around the Union right flank. His aggressive instincts were aroused, and watching a continuous column of enemy troops moving across his front was more than Sickles could tolerate. He reported the movement to Hooker and appealed for permission to attack.
News of the enemy movement perplexed Hooker, who unhappily realized that Lee was not going to cooperate with his carefully devised plan. Presented with a chance to regain the initiative, Hooker, not knowing whether Lee was retreating or moving to flank him, again hesitated. He sent an order to Maj. Gen. Oliver Howard, commander of the XI Corps, warning him to prepare for a possible flank attack from the west. Pages: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7Help HistoryNet by bookmarking to
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5 Comments to “Union General Daniel Sickles”
I respectfully disagree with the conclusions presented in this article. I walked the ground and came to the same conclusions reached by Sickles. He saw what I saw; high ground to our fronts (west). Leave the original position in the saddle and head west; the Emmitsburg Pike terrain becomes compelling.
You get similar sensings walking eastward from Longstreet’s positions. I this case, however, instead of running into a routinely expected, thin skirmish line, you run into two battle-tested Federal divisions. Although stretched over a significant distance, these divisions created conditions similar to those expected of a dedicated covering force. By late afternoon, Longstreet’s Corps lacked the combat power and momentum to seize their objectives. We all ask ourselves many times over, “What would have happened if the opposing forces met for the first time at the base of Cemetery Ridge and the Round Tops?”
In a three-day period when every engagement was of great importance, I believe that these engagements between Longstreet and Sickles on the afternoon of the second day were pivotal and of paramount importance.
Thanks – Frank
By Frank Kolar on Dec 5, 2008 at 2:37 pm
given the man’s basic diregard for all things of civility, authority, and a basic understanding of what he was doing, i feel that had any other gen. been in command of sickles corps there may have not even been a picket’s charge on the 3rd, or even a third day of battle.
By tom on Dec 18, 2008 at 6:09 pm
Interesting article but author fails to see the obvious. at Chancellorsville Sickles action caused Lee to worry about Jackson’s force being struck in the rear that he had two detach forces he had not intended to attck Birney. The author correctly points out that Gen Howard, XI Cdr. was warned by Gen Hooker to prepare for a possible flank attack from the west. Gen Howard’s failure to properly entrench was the cause of the disaster not Gen Sickles movement. At Gettysburg, by moving the III corp forward, Gen Sickles placed it directly in the path of Gen Longstreet’s I Corp attack utterly wrecking the timetable of Gen Lee’s carefully devised echelon attack. The ensuing battles at the Peach Orchid, Wheatfield and Devil’s den were battles in places Gen Longstreet had not expected and had thought he would swiftly pass through. Longstreets mission was to strike the flank of the US II Corp and not be delayed and embroiled in useless actions around the Emmitsburg Pike. Gen Sickle’s Corp absorbed and dissipated Lee’s mighty blow before it could strike where Lee wanted it to.
By James Waller on Apr 7, 2009 at 11:25 am
It seems to me that even though there were some unintended positives for the union from Sickles actions his flamboyant, political calousness cost the union thousands of lives. Meade was likely right in taking up defensive positions. Even though Lee would have attacked with greater force, the Union was in a position to smash Lee’s forces. The ridge gave the Union an unapproachable position with cannon fire.
Just because Sickles caught the Rebels off guard doesn’t mean that his decision was right. He forced the battle of the Wheatfield, causing the union to lose almost two entire armies. He forced units held in reserve to be moved forward and he forced Meade to fight in defense out in the open. I don’t care what you walked. Sickles was a fool. Had night fall not come, and had Lee’s General’s not failed to reinforce their gains Gettysburg would have been lost.
By Rob on Apr 30, 2009 at 10:07 am
Remember Lee’s decision to attack the middle was based on forcing Meade to retreat due to Sickles incompetance. Lee’s decision was delayed because of the lack of intelligence from his calvary about the union reserve. Meade was right in redrawing his lines and taking up high positions. Had sickles not moved his army forward there would not have been a second or third day.
By Rob on Apr 30, 2009 at 10:11 am