<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?><rss version="2.0"
	xmlns:content="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/content/"
	xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/"
	xmlns:atom="http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom"
	xmlns:sy="http://purl.org/rss/1.0/modules/syndication/"
		>
<channel>
	<title>Comments on: Triumph at Kasserine Pass</title>
	<atom:link href="http://www.historynet.com/triumph-at-kasserine-pass.htm/feed" rel="self" type="application/rss+xml" />
	<link>http://www.historynet.com/triumph-at-kasserine-pass.htm</link>
	<description>From the World&#039;s Largest History Magazine Publisher</description>
	<lastBuildDate>Sun, 19 May 2013 17:44:28 +0000</lastBuildDate>
	<sy:updatePeriod>hourly</sy:updatePeriod>
	<sy:updateFrequency>1</sy:updateFrequency>
	<generator>http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2</generator>
	<item>
		<title>By: Jim Lankford</title>
		<link>http://www.historynet.com/triumph-at-kasserine-pass.htm#comment-539519</link>
		<dc:creator>Jim Lankford</dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Thu, 28 Apr 2011 18:00:25 +0000</pubDate>
		<guid isPermaLink="false">http://www.historynet.com/?p=13683390#comment-539519</guid>
		<description>The “recent study” which the author claims concludes the 1st Armored Division was; &quot;reasonably well trained in the execution of a fatally flawed doctrine.&quot; is in error.  Further on in the article the author refers to a report written by MG Ernest Harmon analyzing Armored Force doctrine and tactics, but fails to included the armor expert’s frequent reiteration in the same report that armored doctrine was fundamentally sound.  In point of fact, MG Harmon was not condemning the doctrine, but pointing out the failure of the 1st Armored Division to properly utilize Armored Force doctrine in mounting a well-coordinated, combined arms attack (which would have included mechanized cavalry for reconnaissance) at Sidi bou Zid.   This point is made perfectly clear in the author’s paraphrasing of the report.  Thus, the author’s conclusion is not only completely incorrect, it begs the question:  Did he actually read MG Harmon’s report?

On a similar note, the author’s statement: “”The &quot;principle of mass&quot;—Clausewitz&#039;s dictum to synchronize and bring to bear all elements of a combat force for decisive effect—“” is fatally flawed.  Any serious student of the writings of Clausewitz knows full well that he distained “dictums” and “maxims” as prescriptive statements meant to organize warfare into a system of rules. Clausewitz’s strong aversion to this approach was a central theme in his severe criticisms of  Jomini -- who relied heavily on the prescriptive use of “dictums” and “maxims” in his works.  The end result is that the author mistakes Clausewitz’s “principle of mass” for a dictum when the great military philosopher would have never used the word in that manner.

It is articles such as this that continue to perpetuate gross misconceptions about Armored Force doctrine during WWII. 

Jim Lankford 
National Historian
14th Armored Division Association
&quot;LIBERATORS&quot;</description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The “recent study” which the author claims concludes the 1st Armored Division was; &#034;reasonably well trained in the execution of a fatally flawed doctrine.&#034; is in error.  Further on in the article the author refers to a report written by MG Ernest Harmon analyzing Armored Force doctrine and tactics, but fails to included the armor expert’s frequent reiteration in the same report that armored doctrine was fundamentally sound.  In point of fact, MG Harmon was not condemning the doctrine, but pointing out the failure of the 1st Armored Division to properly utilize Armored Force doctrine in mounting a well-coordinated, combined arms attack (which would have included mechanized cavalry for reconnaissance) at Sidi bou Zid.   This point is made perfectly clear in the author’s paraphrasing of the report.  Thus, the author’s conclusion is not only completely incorrect, it begs the question:  Did he actually read MG Harmon’s report?</p>
<p>On a similar note, the author’s statement: “”The &#034;principle of mass&#034;—Clausewitz&#039;s dictum to synchronize and bring to bear all elements of a combat force for decisive effect—“” is fatally flawed.  Any serious student of the writings of Clausewitz knows full well that he distained “dictums” and “maxims” as prescriptive statements meant to organize warfare into a system of rules. Clausewitz’s strong aversion to this approach was a central theme in his severe criticisms of  Jomini &#8212; who relied heavily on the prescriptive use of “dictums” and “maxims” in his works.  The end result is that the author mistakes Clausewitz’s “principle of mass” for a dictum when the great military philosopher would have never used the word in that manner.</p>
<p>It is articles such as this that continue to perpetuate gross misconceptions about Armored Force doctrine during WWII. </p>
<p>Jim Lankford<br />
National Historian<br />
14th Armored Division Association<br />
&#034;LIBERATORS&#034;</p>
]]></content:encoded>
	</item>
</channel>
</rss>
