Comments on: Tough Call in Tunisia: Eisenhower's Winter Line http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher Sun, 19 May 2013 02:58:47 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: paul penrod http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-210240 paul penrod Tue, 02 Mar 2010 15:10:39 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-210240 What happened in Tunisia perhaps influenced Eisenhower's decision making in Europe, as he preferred the broad front strategy in Europe in the second half of 1944, more conservative than Montgomery's single thrust proposal. By then Ike could play not to lose as time was on his side and he didnt have to take any undue risks. THis forced the Germans to do the opposite and bleed themselves in futile counteroffensives. Tunisia was different, as the Germans still had the edge in experience and air superiority What happened in Tunisia perhaps influenced Eisenhower's decision making in Europe, as he preferred the broad front strategy in Europe in the second half of 1944, more conservative than Montgomery's single thrust proposal. By then Ike could play not to lose as time was on his side and he didnt have to take any undue risks. THis forced the Germans to do the opposite and bleed themselves in futile counteroffensives. Tunisia was different, as the Germans still had the edge in experience and air superiority

]]> By: Sensemaker http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-209149 Sensemaker Mon, 01 Mar 2010 22:29:00 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-209149 I tend not to think in terms of "what is the correct choice?" but rather in terms of "given the strategic and operational situation should I go for the low-risk low-gain choice or the high-risk high-gain choice?" By winter of 1942-43, it seemed that war had turned (Stalingrad was in progress, El-Alamein had happned, Midway had happened) and given the USSR/Commonwealth/US infintely greater resources, time was on their side. This situation calls for low-gain low-risk behaviour. By choosing the high-risk, high-gain method Eisenhower made a choice that did not fit the greater strategic situation. Fortunately for him and the world, he got lucky. Sensemaker I tend not to think in terms of "what is the correct choice?" but rather in terms of "given the strategic and operational situation should I go for the low-risk low-gain choice or the high-risk high-gain choice?"

By winter of 1942-43, it seemed that war had turned (Stalingrad was in progress, El-Alamein had happned, Midway had happened) and given the USSR/Commonwealth/US infintely greater resources, time was on their side. This situation calls for low-gain low-risk behaviour.

By choosing the high-risk, high-gain method Eisenhower made a choice that did not fit the greater strategic situation. Fortunately for him and the world, he got lucky.

Sensemaker

]]> By: Patrick Hays http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-207778 Patrick Hays Mon, 01 Mar 2010 00:39:44 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-207778 We have to remember that Ike had had to major problems confront him. First was that his supply lines we having trouble keeping the forces in the field supply. The second was the main reason for the debacle at Kasserine, the United States Army was not tacticle proficent enough the deal with the Whermacht. Sending them into rugged mountain terrian could have broken Ike's army and confirmed British fears about the quailty of the army. Moving to secure his open flank gave Ike the time to allow the army to slowly play its way into shape. It took time and cost mens lives, but less than what would have been in the Grand Dorsal. We have to remember that Ike had had to major problems confront him. First was that his supply lines we having trouble keeping the forces in the field supply. The second was the main reason for the debacle at Kasserine, the United States Army was not tacticle proficent enough the deal with the Whermacht. Sending them into rugged mountain terrian could have broken Ike's army and confirmed British fears about the quailty of the army. Moving to secure his open flank gave Ike the time to allow the army to slowly play its way into shape. It took time and cost mens lives, but less than what would have been in the Grand Dorsal.

]]> By: Bill Nance http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-207623 Bill Nance Sat, 27 Feb 2010 21:03:38 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-207623 Luke, Terrain always plays a role. Rugged terrain restricts mechanized formations. In fact, there were some after Tunisia that said that horse cavalry would have been ideal for those conditions. The problem is that if whoever you have doing your reconnaissance cannot fight past the enemy's security zone, that is the only zone you will ever hear about. Now, modern U.S doctrine (well before we decided to screw ourselves again) calls for a heavy cavalry force to go forward sneak or fight through the security zone, then make contact with the main enemy force, often through direct fire. Remember, anybody can do a movement to contact..... Once. and this is really what recon is. It takes a robust organization to survive that initial contact (which you don't always get to dictate when that occurs) and persist in the mission. This is precisely what the US did not have. Luke,
Terrain always plays a role. Rugged terrain restricts mechanized formations. In fact, there were some after Tunisia that said that horse cavalry would have been ideal for those conditions. The problem is that if whoever you have doing your reconnaissance cannot fight past the enemy's security zone, that is the only zone you will ever hear about.

Now, modern U.S doctrine (well before we decided to screw ourselves again) calls for a heavy cavalry force to go forward sneak or fight through the security zone, then make contact with the main enemy force, often through direct fire.

Remember, anybody can do a movement to contact….. Once. and this is really what recon is. It takes a robust organization to survive that initial contact (which you don't always get to dictate when that occurs) and persist in the mission. This is precisely what the US did not have.

]]> By: Luke Truxal http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-207494 Luke Truxal Sat, 27 Feb 2010 16:20:04 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-207494 Bill how much would the terrain in Tunisia limit the ability of the mechanized cavalry to recon the enemy positions? I think a major failure in recon occurred also because they Allies outran their air cover. German air superiority allowed them to conduct air recon pretty much uncontested which is no small advantage. Bill how much would the terrain in Tunisia limit the ability of the mechanized cavalry to recon the enemy positions? I think a major failure in recon occurred also because they Allies outran their air cover. German air superiority allowed them to conduct air recon pretty much uncontested which is no small advantage.

]]> By: Bill Nance http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-207401 Bill Nance Sat, 27 Feb 2010 14:06:28 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-207401 Luke, I'm more of a US cav guy, but I know a little about the brits. They had their own reconnaissance forces, but they were hampered in much the same way as the US cavalry was in that they were very lightly equipped and couldn't fight for information well. The desert recon force of Monty's 8th Army was renowned for its recon exploits through open supposedly untrafficable desert. My major source for all this is Hans Von Luck's book. Of course, reading that lets you know that the Germans had much the same issue when it came to reconnaissance forces. It's a constant struggle. Make your recon forces too heavy, and they're just another combat unit. Make them too light, they can't do their jobs. The modern American trend has been to go heavy. The reasoning is that cavalry does many things not just recon, and you can't survive if you're too light. Doctrinally, every major US formation should have a cavalry force in front of it, fighting for information, penetrating enemy security zones, IDing the enemy main body, and fixing it, allowing the friendly main body to maneuver against it. Luke, I'm more of a US cav guy, but I know a little about the brits.

They had their own reconnaissance forces, but they were hampered in much the same way as the US cavalry was in that they were very lightly equipped and couldn't fight for information well. The desert recon force of Monty's 8th Army was renowned for its recon exploits through open supposedly untrafficable desert.

My major source for all this is Hans Von Luck's book. Of course, reading that lets you know that the Germans had much the same issue when it came to reconnaissance forces. It's a constant struggle. Make your recon forces too heavy, and they're just another combat unit. Make them too light, they can't do their jobs.

The modern American trend has been to go heavy. The reasoning is that cavalry does many things not just recon, and you can't survive if you're too light. Doctrinally, every major US formation should have a cavalry force in front of it, fighting for information, penetrating enemy security zones, IDing the enemy main body, and fixing it, allowing the friendly main body to maneuver against it.

]]> By: Silicon Wafer http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-206961 Silicon Wafer Sat, 27 Feb 2010 04:20:00 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-206961 That's why Fredendall was building his bunker. That's why Fredendall was building his bunker.

]]> By: Silicon Wafer http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-206960 Silicon Wafer Sat, 27 Feb 2010 04:19:10 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-206960 If the Germans had an atomic bomb, they would have won at Kasserine. If the Germans had an atomic bomb, they would have won at Kasserine.

]]> By: Luke Truxal http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-206879 Luke Truxal Sat, 27 Feb 2010 02:28:05 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-206879 It seems that their are numerous recon failures through the Tunis campaigns. It seems as though the British make a large number of recon failures throughout World War II but Bill you are more of an expert on that. Did the British have any type of mechanized recon force such as armored cavalry? It seems that their are numerous recon failures through the Tunis campaigns. It seems as though the British make a large number of recon failures throughout World War II but Bill you are more of an expert on that. Did the British have any type of mechanized recon force such as armored cavalry?

]]> By: Bill Nance http://www.historynet.com/tough-call-in-tunisia-eisenhowers-winter-line.htm#comment-205843 Bill Nance Fri, 26 Feb 2010 04:44:58 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13682074#comment-205843 Luke, you might be on to something. Especially when you consider that each decision had some serious pros and cons, the political or job security considerations certainly helped tipped the balance. I still say, if there had been an effective, properly equipped heavy cavalry force to the front of II corps Kasserine would not have gone down like it did. Luke, you might be on to something. Especially when you consider that each decision had some serious pros and cons, the political or job security considerations certainly helped tipped the balance.

I still say, if there had been an effective, properly equipped heavy cavalry force to the front of II corps Kasserine would not have gone down like it did.

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