Comments on: The Warthog and the Close Air Support Debate (Book Review) http://www.historynet.com/the-warthog-and-the-close-air-support-debate-book-review.htm From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher Sat, 21 Nov 2009 23:31:52 -0500 http://wordpress.org/?v=2.8.4 hourly 1 By: What Might Have Been: A-10’s for the Army? « Chockblock’s blog http://www.historynet.com/the-warthog-and-the-close-air-support-debate-book-review.htm/comment-page-1#comment-73467 What Might Have Been: A-10’s for the Army? « Chockblock’s blog Sun, 07 Jun 2009 02:01:06 +0000 #comment-73467 [...] this day many in the Army and outside the DOD feel that the Air Force is still trying to ditch the A-10. When I heard about this I almost dropped out of college to join the army. With my hopes of A-10 [...] [...] this day many in the Army and outside the DOD feel that the Air Force is still trying to ditch the A-10. When I heard about this I almost dropped out of college to join the army. With my hopes of A-10 [...]

]]> By: Steve Huse http://www.historynet.com/the-warthog-and-the-close-air-support-debate-book-review.htm/comment-page-1#comment-60467 Steve Huse Tue, 12 May 2009 21:24:38 +0000 #comment-60467 This book just goes to show that weapons systems are more determined by what is need to combat the competing services rather than what is needed to fight the enemy. Until Gates forced their hand the Air Force wouldn't have Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. They were to help the Army not fight the cold war tyep Air War - so the Air Force didn't want any part of them. They still require that pilots fly them and then complain they have too few operators. This book just goes to show that weapons systems are more determined by what is need to combat the competing services rather than what is needed to fight the enemy.

Until Gates forced their hand the Air Force wouldn’t have Unmanned Aerial Vehicles. They were to help the Army not fight the cold war tyep Air War – so the Air Force didn’t want any part of them. They still require that pilots fly them and then complain they have too few operators.

]]> By: mark http://www.historynet.com/the-warthog-and-the-close-air-support-debate-book-review.htm/comment-page-1#comment-59553 mark Fri, 08 May 2009 19:11:30 +0000 #comment-59553 .....and meanwhile your fast movers take 45 minutes to get a single JDAM on the ground in the middle of an ECAS then bingo out to the tanker while a Hog would be winchester x2. Hi-tech crapology and insane budgets don't always solve everything …..and meanwhile your fast movers take 45 minutes to get a single JDAM on the ground in the middle of an ECAS then bingo out to the tanker while a Hog would be winchester x2. Hi-tech crapology and insane budgets don’t always solve everything

]]> By: Kurt http://www.historynet.com/the-warthog-and-the-close-air-support-debate-book-review.htm/comment-page-1#comment-15757 Kurt Sat, 01 Nov 2008 18:38:36 +0000 #comment-15757 The A-10 is an artifact of circus psychology. So ugly it can only be redeemed by it's one-trick pony gun system and macho muchacho approach to overhead CAS. It was obsolescent the day the SA-7 showed up on the HCMT. If the Author truly flew the A-7 and has /anything/ good to say about the A-10, he is a fraud. Something readily proven by the use of Air To Air capability as the nominal measure of the A-7's utility as a CAS platform. The A-7 could dominate vertical _energy tactics_ against the Hog. Which is indeed saying something. The A-7D also had working HUDWAC and 'digital' bombing from the start in SEA and would pick up TISL and LANA within a decade, enabling it to fly at night and in weather which grounded half of NATO in Germany, including the A-10. With no INS, no TISL for the first 2 years, no autopilot or moving map, no radar altimeter and no Sidewinder for about the first 7 years of duty with USAFE, the A-10 is a complete joke of an air to mud aircraft in Europe and little better for the original environment of SEA. As far as fighting the CAS fight with enemy jets overhead, let's put this in perspective: the FA jets we faced were largely MiG- 21/23 throughout the 80s and as such were nearly blind at night with minimal LDSD and tail-aspect only IRST. They had cheap vector which would not have survived the opening hour under jamming and lousy weapons. If you have a working TFR and a sustained 450 knot capability, you can lose any threat air out there at night which is the only time the enemy will move. While going BEYOND the FLOT is the way you beat battlefield AS sweeps. Something the A-10 would be lucky to do with the FOLs being overrun within 2-4hrs of conflict start and so little speed that it couldn't even fall back to French and Low Country alternatives and still make useful radii in useful time. The only saving grace for the A-10 was the D-Maverick and even that weapon was too little, too late, being sent back to the labs until 1986 when essentially the Cold War was dead and everyone knew it. You want to fight WWIII in Europe in the 'window of vulnerability' from 1979 to 1984, you do it at night with a jet that can automate enough of the nav/attack process to lay down or loft conventional ordnance without getting nailed by groundfire. That certainly is NOT the A-10. The A-10 is an artifact of circus psychology. So ugly it can only
be redeemed by it’s one-trick pony gun system and macho
muchacho approach to overhead CAS. It was obsolescent the day
the SA-7 showed up on the HCMT.
If the Author truly flew the A-7 and has /anything/ good to say
about the A-10, he is a fraud. Something readily proven by the
use of Air To Air capability as the nominal measure of the A-7’s
utility as a CAS platform.
The A-7 could dominate vertical _energy tactics_ against the
Hog. Which is indeed saying something.
The A-7D also had working HUDWAC and ‘digital’ bombing from
the start in SEA and would pick up TISL and LANA within a
decade, enabling it to fly at night and in weather which grounded
half of NATO in Germany, including the A-10.
With no INS, no TISL for the first 2 years, no autopilot or moving
map, no radar altimeter and no Sidewinder for about the first 7
years of duty with USAFE, the A-10 is a complete joke of an air to
mud aircraft in Europe and little better for the original
environment of SEA.
As far as fighting the CAS fight with enemy jets overhead, let’s
put this in perspective: the FA jets we faced were largely MiG-
21/23 throughout the 80s and as such were nearly blind at night
with minimal LDSD and tail-aspect only IRST. They had cheap
vector which would not have survived the opening hour under
jamming and lousy weapons. If you have a working TFR and a
sustained 450 knot capability, you can lose any threat air out
there at night which is the only time the enemy will move.
While going BEYOND the FLOT is the way you beat battlefield AS
sweeps. Something the A-10 would be lucky to do with the FOLs
being overrun within 2-4hrs of conflict start and so little speed
that it couldn’t even fall back to French and Low Country
alternatives and still make useful radii in useful time.
The only saving grace for the A-10 was the D-Maverick and even
that weapon was too little, too late, being sent back to the labs
until 1986 when essentially the Cold War was dead and everyone
knew it.
You want to fight WWIII in Europe in the ‘window of
vulnerability’ from 1979 to 1984, you do it at night with a jet
that can automate enough of the nav/attack process to lay down
or loft conventional ordnance without getting nailed by
groundfire. That certainly is NOT the A-10.

]]> By: TUCKER http://www.historynet.com/the-warthog-and-the-close-air-support-debate-book-review.htm/comment-page-1#comment-14970 TUCKER Sat, 25 Oct 2008 03:36:02 +0000 #comment-14970 Has the U.S. Marine corps ever flown the A-10 warthog?? Has the U.S. Marine corps ever flown the A-10 warthog??

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