The Tragic Pursuit of Total Victory: Germany’s Unrelenting Offensive That Lost WWI

Quick to take credit for victory at Tannenberg in 1914, Hindenburg was even more adept at sidestepping blame for the possible failure of what became known as the Kaiserschlacht. For if Germany with seven fresh armies could not defeat Entente forces in 1914, how could total victory be secured with only three armies on the move in 1918? Meanwhile, the initial German advance, impressive as it was, soon fizzled. Storm trooper tactics and determination had enabled breakthroughs, but Germany lacked cavalry and tanks, relying instead on increasingly footsore soldiers for exploitation. Casualties mounted, horse-drawn artillery got bogged down moving across a tortured landscape, and exhausted men paused to loot the far richer stores (including alcohol) of British depots.

A telling anecdote recounted by British prisoner C.R.M.F. Crutwell was the first impression of a British soldier captured in the opening stages of Operation Michael. Instead of losing hope, the Briton quickly took cheer. His impromptu tour of German depots and rear areas convinced him Entente forces had already won the war, so “astonishing” was the contrast between the high quality and sheer availability of Entente equipment, transport, and other military gear versus that possessed by his impoverished German captors.

Within ten days, the duumvirate admitted Operation Michael had failed. Amazingly, Ludendorff had allowed the offensive to fan out in three directions, dissipating its power. Meanwhile, the nature of the terrain and features of this area—its rivers, towns, forests, and canals—allowed a shaken but not broken British Expeditionary Force to establish lines of resistance, forcing storm trooper units either to flow around them or to pull up and wait for the slower-moving artillery. A golden opportunity to seize Amiens, one of two critical nodes in the British force’s rail network, was at first not seen, and then lost as German forces took the path of least resistance.

In retrospect, Ludendorff’s famous statement that spring that he would “punch a hole” in the Entente lines and from there improvise a way to victory clearly constituted strategic bankruptcy. He retrogressed to being a regimental colonel, losing himself in tactical details while micromanaging and second-guessing his subordinates. He had forgotten his craft and lost his way. “Je me demande si Ludendorff connait son métier” (“I wonder whether Ludendorff knows his profession”), Marshal Ferdinand Foch wondered aloud in his headquarters at the time.

Despite compelling evidence to the contrary, Ludendorff and Hindenburg remained convinced that attacking was the strongest form of war. Their unwavering commitment to the offensive was a manifestation of a pervasive and overly aggressive German military culture facing an existential crisis.

Never again in 1918 would Germany possess the same hitting power. Yet even after their colossal military gamble failed, there was no civilian authority remaining in Germany to force Hindenburg and Ludendorff to alter course. Making war had become the only policy, as Hindenburg and Ludendorff persisted in launching four more offensives that ultimately drove their men to the wall. While the German army grew ever weaker, Entente forces grew stronger as they coordinated their war-making efforts under Foch, selected as the Allied generalissimo during the crisis of March, and as the “Yanks and tanks” took to the field in ever increasing numbers.

The details of the subsequent Ludendorff offensives are less important than their lack of positive strategic results. Even worse, by June a depleted German army now had to defend a front of 510 kilometers instead of the 390 kilometers it defended in mid-March, and largely without the force-multiplying benefits of the Hindenburg Line. Having suffered a million casualties since March—especially severe among the highly trained and difficult to replace storm trooper units—the army would suffer grievously that summer from the lack of such benefits.

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