Marcos pointed out that the Philippines had a long-standing commitment to SEATO, which could not now be ignored. He could have added that the nation's traditionally strong anti-Communist stance was involved, and mentioned the immediate threat at that time from Sukarno's konfrontasi policy and the Hukbalahap (pro-Communist) guerrillas within the Philippines itself. These facts may have contributed to Marcos' rationale for commitment to South Vietnam.

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Senator Fulbright failed to understand why the Philippines insisted on a price for PHILCAG because he did not realize that the Philippines could not afford to pay for it themselves. The Philippines was not totally bankrupt, but the national budget was generally running at a deficit, at times as much as 2 million pesos a day. On one hand, the 36 million pesos the Philippine government expected to pay for PHILCAG was a great deal of money, but on the other hand, the financial benefits from increased American aid and from the continued and increasing buildup of American military forces in the area was of tremendous value. The possibilities, in short, were for the kind of economic'shot in the arm' experienced by the United States in the opening years of World War II before Pearl Harbor, though on a much smaller scale.

Were these the sole reasons for the dispatching of PHILCAG to Vietnam? One author has suggested that Marcos had intended all along to back such a proposal–that he opposed Macapagal in an attempt to get even for Macapagal's reneging on his agreement to back Marcos in the next election, rather than run for a second term himself. Once in office, Marcos would naturally have taken advantage of the aid offered in exchange for PHILCAG by the American government in order to institute civic action and other programs that would make his administration look good, and ensure a second term for himself. Or, in view of the numerous trial balloons launched early in his administration concerning an amendment to the Constitution lengthening the president's term of office, Marcos might have agreed in order to further his schemes for perpetual, one-man rule.

Certainly, Marcos was pragmatic. Having gauged public opinion so that he knew the probability of success for his proposal to send engineers, and knowing from the earlier U.S. negotiations with Macapagal what offers could be expected from the United States, he began his campaign. He spoke darkly of national security and interests, and factors that he 'could not reveal in a public manner.' He was probably responsible for some of the speculations, whether of high moral tone or of the most practical cupidity, that might have affected the outcome of the final vote. Too many facts–details of United States­Philippines negotiations–which presumably were secret at the time, seem to have turned up in the press to suggest otherwise, and it must be remembered that the Manila Times was then practically a government mouthpiece.

Wilson told the Subcommittee on Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad that even though Marcos had originally stressed Philippine national interests in his support for PHILCAG, played host to a conference in October 1966 of nations with troops in South Vietnam, and made a dramatic visit to PHILCAG in the field in the summer of 1967, things had changed. Wilson said, 'There is a progressive backing away from these issues, based apparently on President Marcos' feeling that he would have difficulty in maintaining the necessary support from the Philippine Congress.'

The growing American disenchantment with the war in later years, South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu's inability to win more than a third of the votes in 1967, and similar factors may well have influenced Philippine public opinion as well as that of President Marcos. In 1968 the government of the Philippines began fact-finding missions to some Communist countries. At the end of 1968 Marcos publicly discussed the possibility of withdrawal of the American military presence from Asia and the need to be prepared.

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