Comments on: The Dangers of Going Deep: Where Do You Stop? http://www.historynet.com/the-dangers-of-going-deep-where-do-you-stop.htm From the World's Largest History Magazine Publisher Sat, 25 May 2013 01:28:30 +0000 hourly 1 http://wordpress.org/?v=3.3.2 By: Rob Citino http://www.historynet.com/the-dangers-of-going-deep-where-do-you-stop.htm#comment-790830 Rob Citino Thu, 01 Mar 2012 19:11:53 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685192#comment-790830 Thanks for the note, ADTS. I'll have to take another look at the Luttwak book. It's been too long since I read it! --RC Thanks for the note, ADTS. I'll have to take another look at the Luttwak book. It's been too long since I read it! –RC

]]> By: ADTS http://www.historynet.com/the-dangers-of-going-deep-where-do-you-stop.htm#comment-790793 ADTS Thu, 01 Mar 2012 08:29:36 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685192#comment-790793 1) This reminds me of Luttwak, "Strategy." (I think - it's been a long while since I've read it.) The narrative device(s) are very similar. Luttwak first details the virtues of a deep front attack from the attacker's perspective, and then notes that from the defender's perspective, at least at first glance, the situation is actually quite favorable: enemy axes of advance with exposed flanks, tenuous logistics, etc. I'm reminded a bit of Eisenhower assuming command of the Battle of the Bulge, refusing to be flummoxed: "The enemy will not be permitted to cross the Meuse." 2) It's interesting to consider the pathologies of militaries in authoritarian regimes in which the consequences of conveying unwanted information are extraordinarily high. Pollak's "Arabs at War" (once more, please don't hold me to that one - it's been quite some time since I read it) and, more recently, "Saddam's Generals" ( Woods et al, Institute for Defense Analyses, which also comes on top of work done, I think, for JFCOM) come to mind. I suppose one could analyze the question at many levels and in many ways - e.g., from the refusal to wake Hitler on 6 June 1944. What I find striking about "Saddam's Generals" and Woods's work writ large is how much it bolsters what generally seems to be a discredited case among most for invasion. Reading Woods et al, one is hard-pressed to consider Saddam Hussein a "rational actor" (whatever that much bandied-about phrase means). Hence: could he have been deterred? I'm also reminded of Robert Jervis's argumentation that the WMD judgment of the Intelligence Community, while ultimately incorrect, was not unreasonable. Thus, to perhaps raise a third point: are we seeing a new generation of - revisionist? - scholarship regarding the Iraq War? I am quite interested in the connection between Soviet military doctrine and, say, AirLand Battle, along the lines of, arguably, Dima Adamsky's "The Culture of Military Innovation." John Mearsheimer also used the Manchurian campaign as a case study for "Conventional Deterrence." It seems to me something of a "forgotten war" due both to when (right at the very end of WW II) and where (Manchuria - where's that?!) it occurred. Regards ADTS Regards ADTS 1) This reminds me of Luttwak, "Strategy." (I think – it's been a long while since I've read it.) The narrative device(s) are very similar. Luttwak first details the virtues of a deep front attack from the attacker's perspective, and then notes that from the defender's perspective, at least at first glance, the situation is actually quite favorable: enemy axes of advance with exposed flanks, tenuous logistics, etc. I'm reminded a bit of Eisenhower assuming command of the Battle of the Bulge, refusing to be flummoxed: "The enemy will not be permitted to cross the Meuse."

2) It's interesting to consider the pathologies of militaries in authoritarian regimes in which the consequences of conveying unwanted information are extraordinarily high. Pollak's "Arabs at War" (once more, please don't hold me to that one – it's been quite some time since I read it) and, more recently, "Saddam's Generals" ( Woods et al, Institute for Defense Analyses, which also comes on top of work done, I think, for JFCOM) come to mind. I suppose one could analyze the question at many levels and in many ways – e.g., from the refusal to wake Hitler on 6 June 1944. What I find striking about "Saddam's Generals" and Woods's work writ large is how much it bolsters what generally seems to be a discredited case among most for invasion. Reading Woods et al, one is hard-pressed to consider Saddam Hussein a "rational actor" (whatever that much bandied-about phrase means). Hence: could he have been deterred? I'm also reminded of Robert Jervis's argumentation that the WMD judgment of the Intelligence Community, while ultimately incorrect, was not unreasonable. Thus, to perhaps raise a third point: are we seeing a new generation of – revisionist? – scholarship regarding the Iraq War?

I am quite interested in the connection between Soviet military doctrine and, say, AirLand Battle, along the lines of, arguably, Dima Adamsky's "The Culture of Military Innovation." John Mearsheimer also used the Manchurian campaign as a case study for "Conventional Deterrence." It seems to me something of a "forgotten war" due both to when (right at the very end of WW II) and where (Manchuria – where's that?!) it occurred.

Regards
ADTS

Regards
ADTS

]]> By: Robert Kapanjie http://www.historynet.com/the-dangers-of-going-deep-where-do-you-stop.htm#comment-790304 Robert Kapanjie Wed, 29 Feb 2012 02:33:14 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685192#comment-790304 Operation Uranus indeed did smash through the Roumanian armies. This has led history to demean their martial spirit and elan. This I believe is wholly undeserved, the Roumanian was an excellent fighting man. The problem was that they were grossly under provisioned, there was insufficient heavy armor and artillery to equip them. The best and latest military hardware went to the Wehrmacht not to the Roumanian divisions. It would be interesting to know if the Soviet high command knew how weak they were before launching the offensive that trapped the Sixth army and which proved to be a major turning point in the war.I suspect they did. Operation Uranus indeed did smash through the Roumanian armies. This has led history to demean their martial spirit and elan. This I believe is wholly undeserved, the Roumanian was an excellent fighting man. The problem was that they were grossly under provisioned, there was insufficient heavy armor and artillery to equip them. The best and latest military hardware went to the Wehrmacht not to the Roumanian divisions. It would be interesting to know if the Soviet high command knew how weak they were before launching the offensive that trapped the Sixth army and which proved to be a major turning point in the war.I suspect they did.

]]> By: tony tramonte http://www.historynet.com/the-dangers-of-going-deep-where-do-you-stop.htm#comment-790274 tony tramonte Tue, 28 Feb 2012 16:18:27 +0000 http://www.historynet.com/?p=13685192#comment-790274 Very interesting. Given that the party commissars (like Khrushchev) were right on the scene, it would be interesting to see how the hypothetical front commander deal's with his fellow leader. Very interesting. Given that the party commissars (like Khrushchev) were right on the scene, it would be interesting to see how the hypothetical front commander deal's with his fellow leader.

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